Exploitation / initial accessHighTLP:CLEAR

ZeroQlik Qlik Sense

ZeroQlik Returns: Qlik Sense Servers Exploited for Reverse Shells, Go Agent and ActiveMQ/Veeam Tooling

Published
11 November 2026
Added
13 November 2026, 11:40 UK
Last updated
13 November 2026

4 to block now3 to hunt2 behaviours to hunt

Hunt3 platforms

Run the hunt before you block, to find past activity. The same hunt is published for each platform. Preview and copy the queries in the dashboard.

  • Defender XDRKQLDefender portal > Hunting > Advanced hunting. Paste and run over 30 days.Download hunt.kql
  • SplunkSPLSearch & Reporting, last 30 days or more. Reads the CIM data models.Download hunt.spl
  • Google SecOpsYARA-L 2.0Rules Editor. Paste, Retrohunt over 30 days, then turn on live mode.Download hunt.yaral

These queries can return false positives. Know your environment and confirm a hit before acting.

Summary

Old Qlik Sense flaws exploited at EU firms for PowerShell reverse shells, a Go agent and SSH-key persistence. The shell is a trimmed Nishang one-liner that checks in to 45[.]115[.]26[.]23 over HTTP at /hb and connects back on TCP 4455.

Do now

  1. Block the 4 indicators.
  2. Run the hunt.
  3. Patch Qlik Sense Enterprise now.

Indicators 7

ValueTypeActionCopy
45[.]115[.]26[.]23IPv4block
24ee79a5198392303…82d91bb768SHA256block
1ff457d643e5246ef…790909efd5SHA256block
hxxp://45[.]115[.….]23:80/hbURLblock
SHA256:Fl1zSuSZvR…xxWaQFfzeEOtheralert
WinUpdCheckOtheralert
CVE-2023-48365Othermonitor

Sources Cynet · The Hacker News · URLhaus · MalwareBazaar

More detail
Note Cynet did not confirm which Qlik Sense vulnerability was used. The ActiveMQ and Veeam tooling looked unfinished and Cynet saw no successful exploitation with it. OpenSSH-Win64.zip on the staging server was the legitimate package, so it is not listed.

What to do

  1. Patch Qlik Sense Enterprise for CVE-2023-41265, CVE-2023-41266 and CVE-2023-48365, and keep the Qlik proxy off the internet.
  2. Block 45[.]115[.]26[.]23 and search firewall, proxy and EDR logs for it on TCP 80, 4455, 4456, 4457 and 8012.
  3. On Qlik Sense servers, look for Scheduler.exe starting cmd.exe or PowerShell, the WinUpdCheck scheduled task, C:\ProgramData\ssh\winc.ps1, C:\Windows\Temp\wsvc.exe, a wsvc service named Windows Service Controller, and the node6-sm key in C:\ProgramData\ssh\administrators_authorized_keys; treat a hit as a full compromise.
  4. Patch ActiveMQ (CVE-2023-46604) and Veeam Backup & Replication (CVE-2024-40711), which the same operator was preparing to exploit.

Behaviours to hunt 2

Behaviours are leads, not confirmed indicators, and can match legitimate activity. Compare any hit against your own baseline and environment before acting.

  1. alert Qlik Sense Scheduler.exe spawning a shell

    Look forQlik Sense Scheduler.exe starting cmd.exe or powershell.exe, especially powershell -nop -w hidden -enc

    Why it mattersExploiting CVE-2023-41265/41266 or CVE-2023-48365 runs commands as the Qlik Sense Scheduler service, which is what Cynet saw across several EU customers and what Arctic Wolf saw in the 2023 Cactus intrusions. Tuning: the parent must be Scheduler.exe from a Qlik Sense install path, so other products' schedulers do not match. Expected false positives: a Qlik external program task deliberately set up to run a script; confirm with the Qlik admins. Cynet

    Log sourceDefender XDR DeviceProcessEvents; Sysmon event 1 in Splunk or Google SecOps

    QueriesKQL · SPL · YARA-L

  2. alert WinUpdCheck task, winc.ps1, wsvc agent or node6-sm SSH key

    Look forPersistence from persist.ps1: the WinUpdCheck scheduled task, C:\ProgramData\ssh\winc.ps1, C:\Windows\Temp\wsvc.exe, a wsvc service shown as Windows Service Controller, or administrators_authorized_keys written by PowerShell

    Why it mattersCynet's persist.ps1 adds the attacker's ed25519 key (comment node6-sm) to C:\ProgramData\ssh\administrators_authorized_keys, installs OpenSSH and opens TCP 22, writes the reverse shell to winc.ps1 and runs it every five minutes from the WinUpdCheck task, and installs the Go agent as the wsvc service. Tuning: matches only these exact names and paths. Expected false positives: an administrator adding SSH keys with PowerShell; check for the node6-sm comment. Cynet

    Log sourceDefender XDR DeviceProcessEvents, DeviceFileEvents and DeviceEvents; Windows Security 4698 and System 7045; Sysmon 1 and 11

    QueriesKQL · SPL · YARA-L

Affected countries and sectors

Targets
Europe
Sectors
Not stated

Background

Cynet reports that in October 2026 the Qlik Sense Scheduler.exe process on servers at several EU customers launched cmd.exe and a hidden, base64-encoded PowerShell reverse shell, all within about three minutes. The process tree matches the 2023 Cactus ransomware intrusions, so the operator most likely used the old Qlik Sense flaws CVE-2023-41266 with CVE-2023-41265, or CVE-2023-48365 (DoubleQlik). The shell is a trimmed Nishang one-liner that checks in to 45[.]115[.]26[.]23 over HTTP at /hb and connects back on TCP 4455. An open directory on the same server (TCP 8012) held a Go reverse-shell agent (wsvc.exe, TCP 4456) for Windows and several Linux architectures, a Bash agent (TCP 4457), a persist.ps1 script that installs OpenSSH, adds the ed25519 key node6-sm to administrators_authorized_keys, writes C:\ProgramData\ssh\winc.ps1 and creates the WinUpdCheck task every five minutes, plus ActiveMQ CVE-2023-46604 payloads and a modified Veeam CVE-2024-40711 toolchain still in testing. The server address and the two persist.ps1 hashes are on the block list.

Downloads

View folder in repository

MITRE ATT&CK9

Open in the live dashboard Get the blocklist