Supply chain / npmHighTLP:CLEAR

WPPConnect npm and Docker stealer

Hijacked WPPConnect npm, GitHub and Docker Releases Send Server Secrets and WhatsApp Sessions to a Telegram Bot

Published
16 November 2026
Added
16 November 2026, 11:58 UK
Last updated
16 November 2026

8 to block now7 to hunt3 behaviours to hunt

Hunt3 platforms

Run the hunt before you block, to find past activity. The same hunt is published for each platform. Preview and copy the queries in the dashboard.

  • Defender XDRKQLDefender portal > Hunting > Advanced hunting. Paste and run over 30 days.Download hunt.kql
  • SplunkSPLSearch & Reporting, last 30 days or more. Reads the CIM data models.Download hunt.spl
  • Google SecOpsYARA-L 2.0Rules Editor. Paste, Retrohunt over 30 days, then turn on live mode.Download hunt.yaral

These queries can return false positives. Know your environment and confirm a hit before acting.

Summary

Hijacked WPPConnect npm, GitHub nightly and Docker releases upload server secrets and WhatsApp session tokens to a Telegram bot. Malicious releases of WPPConnect, a widely used Node.js toolkit for automating WhatsApp Web, went out through the project's own release workflow….

Do now

  1. Block the 8 indicators.
  2. Run the hunt.
  3. Check for Node.js.

Indicators 15

ValueTypeActionCopy
f2dd03a8368c4dcc7…d18ad9d427SHA256block
06158b832fb2aeb54…395e5673a0SHA256block
cefc9ea30124812d8…500323986fSHA256block
a8fd315c910cf0d0e…392c944f2dSHA256block
f33c4385218ecc302…12709a63afSHA256block
ea9f2913ecb46073f…a72093e79dSHA256block
755274304012c7489…3d184d113bSHA1block
68925177e1fb4f05e…a0b22003fbSHA1block
@wppconnect-team/…nect@2.4.1File namealert
@wppconnect/server@2.10.82File namealert
sha256:56a546a38f…99a235c4c7Otheralert
sha256:cc01ce839a…554c7f6aebOtheralert
sha256:cba29bc582…5bc69f69e0Otheralert
7343578055Otheralert
.wpp-diagFile namealert

Sources github.com · github.com (2) · GMO Flatt Security · Leitwacht · registry.npmjs.org · registry.npmjs.org (2) · registry.npmjs.org (3) · registry.npmjs.org (4) · hub.docker.com

More detail
Note api.telegram.org and api.ipify.org are shared public services, so traffic to them alone proves nothing; the chat ID and a node process as the sender are what matter. The Docker latest, 2 and 2.10 tags have since moved to a 2.10.84 build, so match images by digest and pull date rather than tag. How the release workflow or maintainer account was taken over has not been published.

What to do

  1. Search lockfiles, node_modules and container inventories for @wppconnect-team/wppconnect 2.4.1, @wppconnect/server 2.10.82, the GitHub nightly tarball and wppconnect/wppconnect-server images pulled on 15-16 November 2026; pin 2.4.0 and 2.10.81 and rebuild.
  2. On any machine or container that ran them, treat every environment variable, the .env and config files and the WhatsApp sessions in tokens/ and wppconnect_tokens/ as stolen: rotate the keys and log the WhatsApp sessions out.
  3. Block the file hashes and alert on node processes calling api.telegram.org, on chat_id 7343578055 in proxy logs and on the .wpp-diag or .wpp-support-diag marker files.

Behaviours to hunt 3

Behaviours are leads, not confirmed indicators, and can match legitimate activity. Compare any hit against your own baseline and environment before acting.

  1. alert node process calling the Telegram Bot API

    Look forNode.js process sending data to api.telegram.org (Bot API sendDocument), often shortly after a lookup to api.ipify.org

    Why it mattersThe issue report and Leitwacht's analysis show the diagnostics.js module looking up the host's public IP at api.ipify.org and then POSTing the collected environment, .env, config and WhatsApp token files as a document to api.telegram.org/bot.../sendDocument with chat_id 7343578055. A WhatsApp automation server or developer machine running node has no reason to call the Telegram Bot API unless the application is a Telegram bot. Expected false positives: Node.js applications that are genuine Telegram bots or send alerts to Telegram; check the process command line and working directory. github.com

    Log sourceDefender XDR DeviceNetworkEvents; proxy or TLS-inspection logs

    QueriesKQL

  2. alert WPPConnect stealer marker file in temp

    Look forMarker file .wpp-diag or .wpp-support-diag written in a temp directory

    Why it mattersThe stealer writes .wpp-diag (server 2.10.82) or .wpp-support-diag (library 2.4.1) in the operating system's temp directory to limit itself to one upload a day per machine. The legitimate WPPConnect code has no such file, so its presence shows the malicious module ran on that host. Expected false positives: none known. github.com

    Log sourceDefender XDR DeviceFileEvents; EDR file events

    QueriesKQL · SPL · YARA-L

  3. hunt diagnostics.js in a WPPConnect package folder

    Look fordiagnostics.js written under a @wppconnect or wppconnect-server package folder

    Why it mattersThe malicious module ships as dist/utils/diagnostics.js in @wppconnect-team/wppconnect 2.4.1 and dist/util/diagnostics.js in @wppconnect/server 2.10.82; clean releases 2.4.0 and 2.10.81 have no diagnostics.js. A write of that file during npm install or an image build marks a machine that pulled an infected release, even before it runs. Expected false positives: a future clean release that adds a file with the same name; compare the SHA256 with the block list. GMO Flatt Security

    Log sourceDefender XDR DeviceFileEvents; EDR file events

    QueriesKQL · SPL

Affected countries and sectors

Targets
Worldwide
Sectors
Software development, Messaging and customer service

Background

Malicious releases of WPPConnect, a widely used Node.js toolkit for automating WhatsApp Web, went out through the project's own release workflow on 15 and 16 November 2026. @wppconnect-team/wppconnect 2.4.1 (published 15 November 23:31 UTC, about 7,500 weekly downloads) runs dist/utils/diagnostics.js on import, and @wppconnect/server 2.10.82 (16 November 03:09 UTC, about 1,500 weekly downloads) runs dist/util/diagnostics.js 30-240 seconds after the server starts, skipping CI and sandbox hosts. The module copies every environment variable, reads .env, .env.local, .env.production, config.js, config.json and ormconfig.json from the working directory and the WhatsApp session-token files under tokens/ and wppconnect_tokens/, adds the public IP from api.ipify.org and uploads it all as a document to Telegram bot 9034051102 (chat 7343578055), at most once a day per machine. GMO Flatt Security found the same code in the project's GitHub nightly release and in six amd64 tags of the wppconnect/wppconnect-server Docker image (latest, main, 2, 2.10, 2.10.82 and 2.10.83). The code was added under the joaosouz4dev account as "environment diagnostics" and removed hours later; npm has deprecated both versions and latest now points at 2.4.0 and 2.10.81. The six file hashes and two npm tarball SHA-1 values are on the block list; package versions, Docker digests, the Telegram chat ID and the marker file are alert only.

Downloads

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MITRE ATT&CK8

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