Nation-state / espionageHighTLP:CLEAR

VAPOR PANDA ARTEX

VAPOR PANDA Uses ARTEX Agents and BLOODALCHEMY Against Ministries, Telecoms and US Industry

Published
29 October 2026
Added
15 November 2026, 18:55 UK
Last updated
15 November 2026

8 to block now1 to hunt4 behaviours to hunt

Hunt3 platforms

Run the hunt before you block, to find past activity. The same hunt is published for each platform. Preview and copy the queries in the dashboard.

  • Defender XDRKQLDefender portal > Hunting > Advanced hunting. Paste and run over 30 days.Download hunt.kql
  • SplunkSPLSearch & Reporting, last 30 days or more. Reads the CIM data models.Download hunt.spl
  • Google SecOpsYARA-L 2.0Rules Editor. Paste, Retrohunt over 30 days, then turn on live mode.Download hunt.yaral

These queries can return false positives. Know your environment and confirm a hit before acting.

Summary

China-nexus VAPOR PANDA ran ARTEX agents against 200+ organisations and side-loaded BLOODALCHEMY via a renamed svchost.exe. At nine organisations the actor deployed the BLOODALCHEMY backdoor through a renamed GameHook binary (svchost.exe) side-loading graphics-hook-filter64.dll.

Do now

  1. Block the 8 indicators.
  2. Run the hunt.
  3. Check for svchost.exe.

Indicators 9

ValueTypeActionCopy
nginxmysql[.]comDomainblock
45[.]153[.]126[.]223IPv4block
sqlserver-sqlite[.]comDomainblock
89[.]46[.]234[.]50IPv4block
www[.]ddduuuppp[.]comDomainblock
192[.]121[.]47[.]20IPv4block
3fb5a9fb3e2cb1d62…3d60a12ee4SHA256block
364251838edfcf5ef…134bf807abSHA256block
49fe70419fd19b81c…686c7d2068SHA256alert

Sources CrowdStrike · BleepingComputer · BleepingComputer (2)

More detail
Note This campaign is separate from the Storm-0940 ARTEX activity already in this feed. The renamed svchost.exe is a legitimate GameHook binary, so its hash is alert only and must not be blocked. The C2 addresses sit on M247 and Akton hosting and may be reassigned over time.

What to do

  1. Block nginxmysql[.]com, sqlserver-sqlite[.]com and www[.]ddduuuppp[.]com, their addresses 45[.]153[.]126[.]223, 89[.]46[.]234[.]50 and 192[.]121[.]47[.]20, and the BLOODALCHEMY loader and payload hashes, and search DNS, proxy, firewall and EDR logs back to mid-October 2026.
  2. Hunt for svchost.exe running outside System32 or SysWOW64 that loads graphics-hook-filter64.dll, for graphics-hook_config.bin on disk, and for the C:\ProgramData\artx5v\ directory or artx5v and art18- strings in command lines.
  3. Rotate signing keys, pre-authentication keys and service credentials that appear in any old backup or directory export, enforce SAML signature validation and IMDSv2, and limit cloud roles that can run commands on instances.
  4. Check that every Windows host, including servers thought to be unreachable from the internet, runs your EDR sensor, since the operator looked for hosts without one.

Behaviours to hunt 4

Behaviours are leads, not confirmed indicators, and can match legitimate activity. Compare any hit against your own baseline and environment before acting.

  1. alert BLOODALCHEMY side-loading through a renamed svchost.exe

    Look forsvchost.exe running outside System32 or SysWOW64 that loads graphics-hook-filter64.dll, or graphics-hook_config.bin written to disk

    Why it mattersVAPOR PANDA renamed a legitimate GameHook binary to svchost.exe so it would side-load the BLOODALCHEMY loader graphics-hook-filter64.dll, which decrypts graphics-hook_config.bin. Tuning: the image-load branch requires svchost.exe from a folder other than C:\Windows\System32 or C:\Windows\SysWOW64; the file branch matches only the exact payload name. Expected false positives: none known; OBS Studio ships graphics-hook DLLs but does not load them from a process named svchost.exe. CrowdStrike

    Log sourceEDR image load and file events (DeviceImageLoadEvents, DeviceFileEvents)

    QueriesKQL · SPL · YARA-L

  2. alert ARTEX artx5v and art18- markers

    Look forARTEX markers: the C:\ProgramData\artx5v\ directory, or artx5v or art18- strings in process command lines

    Why it mattersCrowdStrike lists command-line parameters with artx or artex strings, artx-prefixed cloud roles, art18- administration-command comments and the C:\ProgramData\artx5v\ directory as ARTEX markers. Tuning: only the distinctive artx5v and art18- strings are matched, because short artx or artex substrings can appear in unrelated software. Expected false positives: authorised red-team use of ARTEX. CrowdStrike

    Log sourceEDR process and file events (DeviceProcessEvents, DeviceFileEvents); cloud run-command logs for art18- comments

    QueriesKQL · SPL · YARA-L

  3. hunt Agents hunting for hosts without EDR

    Look forHosts enumerated for missing EDR sensors through tasklist and folder listings shortly before follow-on activity

    Why it mattersThe operator told ARTEX agents to find Windows machines in the domain without the EDR sensor by checking tasklist output and folder listings, then focus on those hosts. tasklist and dir are too common to hunt alone, so this is a written lead: check sensor coverage across every Windows host and treat newly seen remote tasklist runs against many hosts from one account as suspicious. CrowdStrike

    Log sourceEDR process events

    QueriesNone yet: check by hand

  4. hunt SAML and XXE abuse to reach cloud instance metadata

    Look forAn unsigned SAML assertion or XXE request followed by cloud instance metadata access and run-command use by the instance role

    Why it mattersAt a US pharmaceutical firm the agent chained an unsigned SAML assertion and an XXE flaw to query the instance metadata service, then used the role to issue administration commands to thousands of instances. Enforce SAML signature validation and IMDSv2, and alert on an instance role suddenly sending run commands to many instances. CrowdStrike

    Log sourceWeb application and IdP logs, AWS CloudTrail (SSM SendCommand) or equivalent cloud audit logs

    QueriesNone yet: check by hand

Affected countries and sectors

Targets
United States, Belgium, Philippines, Greece, Latin America, Central America, Europe, Asia, Middle East, North America
Sectors
Government, Diplomatic, Telecommunications, Pharmaceutical, Semiconductor, Defence, Nuclear, Financial services, Think tanks

Background

CrowdStrike reported on 29 October 2026 that the China-nexus actor VAPOR PANDA ran the ARTEX agent framework, mainly with DeepSeek, against more than 200 organisations in at least 14 countries from 17 October. Targets included foreign ministries in Latin America, Europe, Asia and the Middle East, a European presidency and prime minister's office, 19 US pharmaceutical, semiconductor, defence, nuclear and financial organisations, and telecoms in the US, Belgium and the Philippines. Agents chained an unsigned SAML assertion and an XXE flaw to reach cloud instance metadata, read LAPS passwords, abused resource-based constrained delegation, forged a mail-server admin token from an old directory export, and checked which hosts lacked an EDR sensor. At nine organisations the actor deployed the BLOODALCHEMY backdoor through a renamed GameHook binary (svchost.exe) side-loading graphics-hook-filter64.dll. The three C2 domains, their three addresses and the loader and payload hashes are on the block list; the legitimate GameHook binary hash is alert only.

Downloads

View folder in repository

MITRE ATT&CK16

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