Turla Cereal
Turla Cereal: Exchange Server Espionage Toolset
- Published
- 10 November 2026
- Added
- 10 November 2026, 13:43 UK
- Last updated
- 10 November 2026
18 to block now8 to hunt
Hunt3 platforms
Run the hunt before you block, to find past activity. The same hunt is published for each platform. Preview and copy the queries in the dashboard.
- Defender XDRKQLDefender portal > Hunting > Advanced hunting. Paste and run over 30 days.Download hunt.kql
- SplunkSPLSearch & Reporting, last 30 days or more. Reads the CIM data models.Download hunt.spl
- Google SecOpsYARA-L 2.0Rules Editor. Paste, Retrohunt over 30 days, then turn on live mode.Download hunt.yaral
These queries can return false positives. Know your environment and confirm a hit before acting.
Summary
Russia-aligned Turla .NET toolset turning Exchange servers into passive backdoors. ESET attributes Cereal, a previously undocumented modular .NET toolset, with high confidence to the Russia-aligned APT group Turla.
Do now
- Block the 18 indicators.
- Run the hunt.
- Hash-sweep every Exchange server for the SHA1 values in iocs.csv (or….
Indicators 26
| Value | Type | Action | Copy |
|---|---|---|---|
4a3c263977417fb69…c5924f390c | SHA1 | block | |
7742c6b0aaf114335…cb18a0b8b3 | SHA1 | block | |
afe448dd95494cd14…384664a3b7 | SHA1 | block | |
4a65040646e354303…3d467f65cb | SHA1 | block | |
d1e17520a2435edcd…6fbdf75f94 | SHA1 | block | |
7ab784d0049890d98…73e3cc23be | SHA1 | block | |
5d80118b1ee974936…aeff70b8f3 | SHA1 | block | |
d51c58c2e95d45618…3c847c50a4 | SHA1 | block | |
5b94fe76ec4feb0b5…d2fe22597b | SHA1 | block | |
1408a8f62b09a5ad0…f59f70a330 | SHA1 | block | |
3d1a534ce0d0c293f…0728213104 | SHA1 | block | |
ad85fbf2cc879d432…ab59e3d387 | SHA1 | block | |
3ea03188dba8898d9…68c5437edc | SHA1 | block | |
3fba18af966deacf7…2dd90a6d6f | SHA1 | block | |
eb9ba1da5363f5d04…e93f39a78e | SHA1 | block | |
0b4e4a1ce7fee91bf…325642bb60 | SHA1 | block | |
a4e477ce257f2c635…6c080967c0 | SHA1 | block | |
a5be8706032a0798f…a6309355f5 | SHA1 | block | |
iph.dat | File name | alert | |
C:\Windows\System…objapi.dll | File name | alert | |
C:\Windows\System…emcomn.dll | File name | alert | |
/owa/sdds/ | URL | alert | |
/AUTODISCOVER/MIC…XYSERVICE/ | URL | alert | |
/AUTODISCOVER/INT…RATED/API/ | URL | alert | |
/AUTODISCOVER/PROXYSERVICE/ | URL | alert | |
/MICROSOFT-SERVER…RATED/API/ | URL | alert |
Sources ESET · WeLiveSecurity · MalwareBazaar · MalwareBazaar (2)
More detail
What to do
- Hash-sweep every Exchange server for the SHA1 values in iocs.csv (or run hunt.kql); test file blocks on one server first because the loaders use Exchange and WMI file names.
- Hunt IIS and HTTP.sys logs for the CerealNeuron URL prefixes; ESET found no external C2 IPs to block.
- Check System32\wbem for ncobjapi.dll and wbemcomn.dll copies whose hashes do not match Microsoft's.
- If found, rebuild the Exchange server and review transport rules and mail flow for exfiltration.
Affected countries and sectors
- Targets
- Kazakhstan, Romania
- Sectors
- Government
Background
ESET attributes Cereal, a previously undocumented modular .NET toolset, with high confidence to the Russia-aligned APT group Turla. It was found on Microsoft Exchange servers of governmental organisations in Kazakhstan (November 2025) and Romania, where an email collection module injected into legitimate Exchange processes taps the mail transport pipeline and was configured to pick out email sent to or from NATO and the EU. There is no external C2: the CerealNeuron passive backdoor turns the victim's own Exchange server into the C2 through HttpListener URL prefixes, and the loaders abuse DLL search-order hijacking and the .NET native image cache.