Claude Code extension backdoor
Trojanized Claude Code IDE Extension Plants Persistent Reverse SSH Backdoor on Developer Machines
- Published
- 30 October 2026
- Added
- 14 November 2026, 10:17 UK
- Last updated
- 14 November 2026
6 to block now2 to hunt3 behaviours to hunt
Hunt3 platforms
Run the hunt before you block, to find past activity. The same hunt is published for each platform. Preview and copy the queries in the dashboard.
- Defender XDRKQLDefender portal > Hunting > Advanced hunting. Paste and run over 30 days.Download hunt.kql
- SplunkSPLSearch & Reporting, last 30 days or more. Reads the CIM data models.Download hunt.spl
- Google SecOpsYARA-L 2.0Rules Editor. Paste, Retrohunt over 30 days, then turn on live mode.Download hunt.yaral
These queries can return false positives. Know your environment and confirm a hit before acting.
Summary
Tampered Claude Code editor extension served for 11 hours adds an attacker SSH key and a persistent reverse SSH tunnel on developer machines. The six file hashes are on the block list; the C2 address is alert and hunt.
Do now
- Block the 6 indicators.
- Run the hunt.
- Check for com.apple.sysmond.plist.
Indicators 8
| Value | Type | Action | Copy |
|---|---|---|---|
ecb58cb29078d9646…cc3ab6bf15 | SHA256 | block | |
7e0a52885fadee055…3decb0e278 | SHA256 | block | |
fcbb327e38e61c4fe…3c3a17c364 | SHA256 | block | |
3de17229011657698…9966edd081 | SHA256 | block | |
80402fdcad8799285…8e4f84ee6c | SHA256 | block | |
6786ec90cbd459496…cb9cb21731 | SHA256 | block | |
134[.]209[.]82[.]225 | IPv4 | alert | |
hxxp://134[.]209[…099/beacon | URL | alert |
Sources Cursor · Cursor (2) · Microsoft · Netskope Threat Labs · ThreatFox · MalwareBazaar
More detail
What to do
- Find every machine that installed or auto-updated anthropic.claude-code 2.1.312 or 2.1.313 from the Cursor marketplace between 09:27 and 20:35 UTC on 29 October 2026, and search 90 days of firewall, proxy and EDR network logs for 134[.]209[.]82[.]225 (TCP 22 and 8099).
- On those machines check ~/.ssh/authorized_keys (Windows: %USERPROFILE%\.ssh\authorized_keys and C:\ProgramData\ssh\administrators_authorized_keys) for a key with the comment svc-telemetry and fingerprint SHA256:0Z6R+DF64Do2nwQic8a7kkfDLNNk4IiK+2U2Rci4htk, and remove only that entry after collecting evidence.
- Remove the persistence: ~/.config/.smt, ~/.config/.smtk and ~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.apple.sysmond.plist on macOS, the @reboot crontab line on Linux, and the SysMon scheduled task, Startup\sysmon.cmd, %USERPROFILE%\.config\smt.cmd and smtk on Windows; kill ssh or autossh processes running -N -R *:0:localhost:22 and delete $TMPDIR/.stk_* files.
- Rotate every credential reachable from an affected machine (git, SSH, cloud, API keys and tokens held in environment variables) from a clean device, and review SSH logons to the machine since 29 October.
- Restrict editor extensions to approved publishers and set an installation cooldown for newly published versions.
Behaviours to hunt 3
Behaviours are leads, not confirmed indicators, and can match legitimate activity. Compare any hit against your own baseline and environment before acting.
alert ssh reverse tunnel to local port 22
Look forssh or autossh opening a reverse forward from a server-assigned remote port to the local SSH port (-R *:0:localhost:22)
Why it mattersMicrosoft and Netskope show the loader launching ssh (autossh -M 0 on macOS and Linux, a hidden PowerShell retry loop on Windows) with -N -R '*:0:localhost:22', host-key checks disabled and a key file from $TMPDIR/.stk_* or ~/.config/.smtk, so the attacker can reach the workstation's own SSH service through their server. Asking the remote server to allocate any port (0) and forward it back to local port 22 is not how developers or remote-support tools normally use SSH. Expected false positives are rare admin-built reverse tunnels for remote access, which usually use a fixed remote port; review the destination and parent process. Microsoft
Log sourceDefender XDR DeviceProcessEvents (Windows and macOS); EDR process events; Linux auditd
QueriesKQL · SPL · YARA-L
alert SysMon, sysmond or .smt persistence files
Look forLoader persistence files .smt, .smtk, smt.cmd, smtk, $TMPDIR/.stk_*, com.apple.sysmond.plist or Startup\sysmon.cmd, or a SysMon scheduled task that runs smt
Why it mattersMicrosoft and Netskope list these exact names: ~/.config/.smt and .smtk (macOS, Linux), %USERPROFILE%\.config\smt.cmd and smtk plus a SysMon scheduled task or a Startup-folder sysmon.cmd (Windows), ~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.apple.sysmond.plist (macOS) and a temporary .stk_ followed by ten hex characters key file. The names imitate monitoring tools but none belongs to Sysinternals Sysmon (which installs as a service, not a Startup batch file or a user LaunchAgent) or to Apple. Matching sysmon.cmd only in the Startup folder and the task only when it references smt keeps false positives close to none. Netskope Threat Labs
Log sourceDefender XDR DeviceFileEvents and DeviceEvents (ScheduledTaskCreated); EDR file events
QueriesKQL · SPL · YARA-L
hunt Editor process writing authorized_keys
Look forauthorized_keys or administrators_authorized_keys written by the code editor or its Node.js extension host
Why it mattersThe loader runs inside the editor's extension host and appends an Ed25519 key with the comment svc-telemetry to the user's authorized_keys (and administrators_authorized_keys on Windows where present), per Microsoft. Editors do not normally write SSH authorisation files on the local machine; remote-development extensions do this on the remote host, not the workstation. Expected false positives are developers deliberately editing authorized_keys in the editor, so confirm the svc-telemetry comment or fingerprint SHA256:0Z6R+DF64Do2nwQic8a7kkfDLNNk4IiK+2U2Rci4htk. Microsoft
Log sourceDefender XDR DeviceFileEvents; file integrity monitoring on SSH key files
QueriesKQL
Affected countries and sectors
- Targets
- Worldwide
- Sectors
- Software development
Background
On 29 October 2026 an attacker used a credential stolen in a vendor-side key exposure to place tampered copies of the anthropic.claude-code extension (versions 2.1.312 and 2.1.313, macOS arm64 and Windows x64) on the cache that serves the Cursor editor's extension marketplace. The builds were live for about 11 hours (09:27-20:35 UTC) and up to 5,000 users may have received them; Anthropic did not publish them and the VS Code Marketplace, npm and Open VSX copies were clean. A loader prepended to extension.js runs when the editor starts, collects the hostname, user, OS, git email, public IP and the names of secret-looking environment variables, adds an attacker SSH key marked svc-telemetry to authorized_keys, tries to enable SSH, opens a persistent reverse SSH tunnel to 134[.]209[.]82[.]225 as user tunnel, installs persistence (SysMon scheduled task or Startup sysmon.cmd on Windows, com.apple.sysmond LaunchAgent on macOS, @reboot cron on Linux) and posts host details to port 8099. The six file hashes are on the block list; the C2 address is alert and hunt.
Downloads
MITRE ATT&CK10
- T1195.002Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Supply Chain
- T1098.004Account Manipulation: SSH Authorized Keys
- T1572Protocol Tunneling
- T1021.004Remote Services: SSH
- T1053.005Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task
- T1547.001Boot or Logon Autostart: Startup Folder
- T1543.001Create or Modify System Process: Launch Agent
- T1053.003Scheduled Task/Job: Cron
- T1082System Information Discovery
- T1071.001Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols