StrikeStub ClickFix RAT
StrikeStub: ClickFix PowerShell Dropper and Modular RAT/Stealer
- Published
- 12 November 2026
- Added
- 12 November 2026, 15:11 UK
- Last updated
- 12 November 2026
2 to block now4 to hunt5 behaviours to hunt
Hunt3 platforms
Run the hunt before you block, to find past activity. The same hunt is published for each platform. Preview and copy the queries in the dashboard.
- Defender XDRKQLDefender portal > Hunting > Advanced hunting. Paste and run over 30 days.Download hunt.kql
- SplunkSPLSearch & Reporting, last 30 days or more. Reads the CIM data models.Download hunt.spl
- Google SecOpsYARA-L 2.0Rules Editor. Paste, Retrohunt over 30 days, then turn on live mode.Download hunt.yaral
These queries can return false positives. Know your environment and confirm a hit before acting.
Summary
ClickFix PowerShell that drops a modular WebSocket RAT and stealer, with attacker staging on squidscript[.]com. A fake 'Verify you are human' prompt copies a hidden PowerShell command that downloads hxxp://squidscript[.]com/Cloudflare.exe to %TEMP%\svc.exe and runs it.
Do now
- Block the 2 indicators.
- Run the hunt.
- Check for explorer.exe.
Indicators 6
| Value | Type | Action | Copy |
|---|---|---|---|
squidscript[.]com | Domain | block | |
hxxp://squidscrip…dflare.exe | URL | block | |
spiraldirect[.]ch | Domain | alert | |
StrikeStub/1.0 | Other | alert | |
%TEMP%\svc.exe | File name | alert | |
\Microsoft\WindowsUpdate.exe | File name | alert |
Sources Akamai
More detail
What to do
- Block squidscript[.]com and hxxp://squidscript[.]com/Cloudflare.exe (they are in the Defender XDR import file).
- Hunt for explorer.exe launching hidden PowerShell that uses iwr or irm to write %TEMP%\svc.exe, for RuntimeBroker.exe running outside System32, and for WindowsUpdate.exe in a user Run key or Startup folder.
- Search proxy, firewall and TLS-inspection logs for the WebSocket user agent StrikeStub/1.0; the C2 address was not published.
- Treat spiraldirect[.]ch as a compromised site: alert on visits and review the host, but do not block the legitimate domain as if it were attacker infrastructure.
- If confirmed, isolate the host, remove the Run-key and Startup persistence, and rotate browser and other credentials that may have been taken through DPAPI.
Behaviours to hunt 5
Behaviours are leads, not confirmed indicators, and can match legitimate activity. Compare any hit against your own baseline and environment before acting.
alert explorer.exe launching hidden PowerShell to drop svc.exe
Look forexplorer.exe launching powershell.exe with -w hidden and Invoke-WebRequest or Invoke-RestMethod (iwr or irm) saving a payload to %TEMP%\svc.exe
Why it mattersAkamai saw the compromised site copy a hidden PowerShell one-liner to the clipboard; after the victim pasted it into Win+R, explorer.exe launched PowerShell, which downloaded hxxp://squidscript[.]com/Cloudflare.exe to %TEMP%\svc.exe and started it. Akamai
Log sourceDefender XDR DeviceProcessEvents
QueriesKQL · SPL · YARA-L
alert RuntimeBroker.exe running outside System32
Look forRuntimeBroker.exe running from a path outside Windows\System32, Windows\SysWOW64 or WinSxS
Why it mattersStrikeStub masquerades as RuntimeBroker.exe with spoofed Microsoft version resources, but it is a MinGW/GCC build. A genuine RuntimeBroker.exe lives under System32. Akamai
Log sourceDefender XDR DeviceProcessEvents
QueriesKQL · SPL · YARA-L
alert WindowsUpdate.exe Run-key and Startup persistence
Look forWindowsUpdate.exe persisting through a Registry Run key and as Microsoft\WindowsUpdate.exe under the user Startup folder
Why it mattersStrikeStub uses dual persistence: a Run key and a Startup-folder drop named Microsoft\WindowsUpdate.exe, separate from the RuntimeBroker disguise of the main payload. Akamai
Log sourceDefender XDR DeviceRegistryEvents and DeviceFileEvents
QueriesKQL · SPL · YARA-L
hunt WebSocket C2 with user agent StrikeStub/1.0
Look forWebSocket command-and-control traffic using the user agent StrikeStub/1.0
Why it mattersAkamai recovered the StrikeStub/1.0 user agent from the RAT's WebSocket enrolment handshake. The C2 host and port are config-driven and were not published. Akamai
Log sourceProxy, firewall, TLS-inspection and web logs; endpoint network telemetry if user-agent fields are collected
QueriesSPL
hunt HVNC, dated keylog files or DPAPI browser theft
Look forHidden VNC (hvnc_start), keylog files named keylog_YYYY-MM-DD.txt, or DPAPI / profile-cloning access to browser credential stores by a disguised RuntimeBroker.exe or WindowsUpdate.exe
Why it mattersOperators can toggle hidden VNC, keylogging, webcam capture, live desktop streaming, clipboard monitoring and DPAPI theft of Chromium credentials, plus a Firefox profile-clone workaround for locked SQLite databases. Akamai
Log sourceDefender XDR DeviceFileEvents and DeviceProcessEvents
QueriesKQL · SPL
Affected countries and sectors
- Targets
- Not stated
- Sectors
- Not stated
Background
Akamai, writing on 12 November 2026, describes StrikeStub, a modular Windows remote access trojan and stealer likely sold as malware-as-a-service, delivered through a ClickFix lure on the compromised site spiraldirect[.]ch. A fake 'Verify you are human' prompt copies a hidden PowerShell command that downloads hxxp://squidscript[.]com/Cloudflare.exe to %TEMP%\svc.exe and runs it. The payload masquerades as RuntimeBroker.exe with spoofed Microsoft version resources, persists as Microsoft\WindowsUpdate.exe through a Registry Run key and the user Startup folder, and talks to a config-driven C2 over WebSockets with the user agent StrikeStub/1.0. Operators can toggle hidden VNC, keylogging, webcam capture, live desktop streaming, clipboard monitoring and DPAPI theft of browser credentials. squidscript[.]com and the Cloudflare.exe URL are attacker infrastructure and are on the block list; spiraldirect[.]ch is a compromised legitimate site and is alert only. Akamai did not publish a sample hash or the C2 host, which is read from a runtime config, so hunt on the behaviours and the user agent as well as the staging URL.