Financially motivated intrusion / financial sectorHighTLP:CLEAR

Storm-3358 ARTEX

Storm-3358 ARTEX Agentic Intrusions Against the Financial Sector

Published
6 November 2026
Added
11 November 2026, 03:52 UK
Last updated
12 November 2026

8 to block nowNothing to hunt10 behaviours to hunt

Hunt3 platforms

Run the hunt before you block, to find past activity. The same hunt is published for each platform. Preview and copy the queries in the dashboard.

  • Defender XDRKQLDefender portal > Hunting > Advanced hunting. Paste and run over 30 days.Download hunt.kql
  • SplunkSPLSearch & Reporting, last 30 days or more. Reads the CIM data models.Download hunt.spl
  • Google SecOpsYARA-L 2.0Rules Editor. Paste, Retrohunt over 30 days, then turn on live mode.Download hunt.yaral

These queries can return false positives. Know your environment and confirm a hit before acting.

Summary

Agentic AI framework used to exploit web apps at banks and drop WISP, vshell and AdaptixC2 RATs. Most targets are financial organisations in Southeast Asia, with a smaller number of large financial organisations globally.

Do now

  1. Block the 8 indicators.
  2. Run the hunt.
  3. Check for i12345_b2.ps1.

Indicators 8

ValueTypeActionCopy
199[.]19[.]95[.]66IPv4block
199[.]19[.]95[.]67IPv4block
199[.]19[.]95[.]68IPv4block
91[.]92[.]240[.]238IPv4block
85[.]11[.]168[.]45IPv4block
85[.]11[.]167[.]52IPv4block
178[.]16[.]54[.]129IPv4block
31[.]77[.]229[.]35IPv4block

Sources Microsoft · Unit 42 · Sophos · FBI IC3 · URLhaus

More detail

What to do

  1. Block the ARTEX server and C2 addresses at the perimeter and in Defender XDR, and search 30 days of firewall, proxy and web server logs for them.
  2. Inventory internet-facing upload endpoints and server-side URL fetch features (document portals, onboarding and KYC forms, webhooks, PDF and image processors); require authentication on uploads and restrict outbound destinations.
  3. Hunt for web server processes spawning a shell, curl, wget or nc, new binaries run from temp or world-writable paths, and new cron entries on web hosts.
  4. Watch for bursts of rapid, retried requests with default tool user agents (Nmap, curl, python-requests, headless Chromium) against public web applications.
  5. Hunt for ARTEX-like operator behaviour described by Unit 42: short request bursts with a 25-31 second pause, a GET after each successful write, write-then-delete tests on storage buckets, placeholder inputs immediately before real credentials, and a cloud credential used within about 60 seconds of being retrieved, often from a new IP. Do not treat research examples such as evil.com as indicators, and do not block them.
  6. Hunt for temporary files under C:\Windows\Temp whose names start with artx or match i<digits>_*.ps1, and for command lines containing MARKER123 or ARTX123 (Sophos X-Ops).
  7. Review Entra ID audit logs for application credentials added or roles assigned by an application, especially in financial tenants.

Behaviours to hunt 10

Behaviours are leads, not confirmed indicators, and can match legitimate activity. Compare any hit against your own baseline and environment before acting.

  1. alert Web server starting a downloader or shell

    Look forA web server process starting curl, wget, nc, ncat, netcat or a shell

    Why it mattersMicrosoft saw ARTEX agents use curl and netcat to download the WISP, vshell and AdaptixC2 RATs after exploiting upload and SSRF flaws. Microsoft

    Log sourceEDR process events on internet-facing web servers

    QueriesKQL · SPL · YARA-L

  2. hunt Rapid scanning with default scanner user agents

    Look forBursts of many varied requests from one source in minutes, with default tool user agents (Nmap, curl, wget, Python HTTP clients, headless Chromium or Playwright)

    Why it mattersMicrosoft describes agentic scanning as many varied requests in a short time, at machine speed. The agent changes user agents quickly, so use this to alert, not to block. Microsoft

    Log sourceWeb server, WAF and reverse-proxy logs

    QueriesKQL · SPL

  3. hunt New cron jobs and temp-folder binaries on web hosts

    Look forNew cron jobs, and new binaries run from temporary or world-writable folders, on web hosts

    Why it mattersMicrosoft lists suspicious cron job creation and processes launched from world-writable directories among the detections for this activity. Microsoft

    Log sourceEDR process and file events

    QueriesSPL

  4. hunt Inference-paced request bursts then a pause

    Look forShort bursts of about 1 to 14 web or API requests a second apart, then a 25 to 31 second pause, consistent with waiting on a model inference call

    Why it mattersUnit 42's ARTEX defender guide describes this think-then-act cadence as a hallmark of agentic tooling, alongside machine-speed pivots after a credential is found. Unit 42

    Log sourceWeb server, WAF and reverse-proxy logs

    QueriesKQL · SPL

  5. hunt Write then GET or write-then-delete checks

    Look forA GET to the same path after a successful write, or a write-then-delete test against a storage bucket or object, from the same source in a short window

    Why it mattersUnit 42 observed ARTEX agents checking their own work with a GET after almost every successful write, and running write-then-delete tests on storage buckets. Unit 42

    Log sourceWeb, API and cloud audit logs (including AWS S3)

    QueriesKQL · SPL

  6. hunt Canary inputs immediately before real credentials

    Look forPlaceholder or canary usernames and values sent immediately before real credentials in the same authentication or API session

    Why it mattersUnit 42 saw ARTEX agents test canary inputs, such as bogus usernames, before real ones. Published research examples included evil.com, test@example.com and deadbeefdeadbeefdeadbeef12; those are illustrations, not indicators to block. Hunt the pattern in your logs. Unit 42

    Log sourceWeb application, identity and API logs

    QueriesNone yet: check by hand

  7. hunt Cloud credential reused within 60 seconds from a new IP

    Look forA stolen or newly retrieved cloud credential used within about 60 seconds of being discovered, often from a new IP address

    Why it mattersUnit 42 observed ARTEX operators pivot within about a minute of a credential download, including validating more than 200 client secrets in about three minutes, and recommended hunting first use of a cloud key from a new IP. Unit 42

    Log sourceAWS CloudTrail, identity-provider and cloud audit logs (Defender XDR CloudAppEvents)

    QueriesKQL · SPL

  8. hunt ARTEX temp scripts under Windows\Temp

    Look forTemporary files under C:\Windows\Temp whose names start with artx or match i<digits>_*.ps1, such as i12345_b2.ps1

    Why it mattersSophos X-Ops describes ARTEX operators dropping short-lived PowerShell scripts under C:\Windows\Temp with names like i12345_b2.ps1 or artx*. Sophos

    Log sourceEDR file events on Windows endpoints, especially in financial tenants

    QueriesKQL · SPL

  9. alert ARTEX MARKER123 or ARTX123 command markers

    Look forCommand lines containing MARKER123 or ARTX123

    Why it mattersSophos X-Ops reported ARTEX operators using MARKER123 and ARTX123 as command markers during intrusions. Sophos

    Log sourceEDR process events

    QueriesKQL · SPL · YARA-L

  10. hunt Entra app adding credentials or assigning roles

    Look forAn Entra ID application adding a credential or assigning a role

    Why it mattersSophos X-Ops describes ARTEX follow-on activity that adds application credentials and assigns roles in Entra ID, including against financial organisations. Sophos

    Log sourceEntra ID audit and directory logs

    QueriesKQL · SPL

Affected countries and sectors

Targets
Southeast Asia, Global
Sectors
Financial services

Background

Microsoft Threat Intelligence reports that Storm-3358, a financially motivated, Cambodia-based intrusion cluster, began targeting financial organisations in October 2026 with ARTEX, an open-source agentic penetration testing framework. Most targets are financial organisations in Southeast Asia, with a smaller number of large financial organisations globally. The ARTEX agents scan internet-facing systems at machine speed, exploit anonymous file upload and server-side request forgery (SSRF) flaws in web applications, then use curl and netcat to pull down the open-source WISP, vshell and AdaptixC2 remote access trojans for persistence and lateral movement. Microsoft listed the ARTEX servers and C2 nodes below as active on 6 November 2026; the actor rotates infrastructure, so behaviour-based hunting matters as much as blocking. On 11 November 2026 Unit 42 published a defender guide to ARTEX and similar agentic tools, describing the same class of machine-speed behaviour: short bursts of one to 14 requests then a 25 to 31 second pause, self-correction after failed requests, a GET after almost every successful write, write-then-delete tests on storage buckets, canary usernames and placeholder values (research examples only, not indicators to block), and use of a stolen credential within about a minute of discovery. Unit 42 did not publish new network indicators. Sophos X-Ops later described the same class of ARTEX tradecraft, including short-lived scripts under C:\Windows\Temp with names such as i12345_b2.ps1 or artx*, command markers such as MARKER123 and ARTX123, and Entra ID application credential and role changes. Sophos did not publish new network indicators.

Downloads

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