Phishing / identityMediumTLP:CLEAR

SkyW4lker M365 phishing

SkyW4lker: Microsoft 365 Device-Code Phishing Kit Targeting Enterprises

Published
27 October 2026
Added
11 November 2026, 16:11 UK
Last updated
11 November 2026

Nothing to block90 to hunt5 behaviours to hunt

Hunt3 platforms

Run the hunt before you block, to find past activity. The same hunt is published for each platform. Preview and copy the queries in the dashboard.

  • Defender XDRKQLDefender portal > Hunting > Advanced hunting. Paste and run over 30 days.Download hunt.kql
  • SplunkSPLSearch & Reporting, last 30 days or more. Reads the CIM data models.Download hunt.spl
  • Google SecOpsYARA-L 2.0Rules Editor. Paste, Retrohunt over 30 days, then turn on live mode.Download hunt.yaral

These queries can return false positives. Know your environment and confirm a hit before acting.

Summary

Microsoft 365 device-code phishing kit that obtains tokens through genuine sign-in and MFA. Completing that genuine sign-in, including MFA, hands the attacker a Microsoft 365 token without a password being stolen.

Do now

  1. Run the hunt.
  2. Check for client_geo.js.
  3. Check for the listed behaviours.

Indicators 90

ValueTypeActionCopy
0ff365access[.]mooo[.]comDomainalert
0utlook0ffice365a…adox[.]comDomainalert
5200m[.]comDomainalert
7criccasinobonus[.]ccDomainalert
acrobat-adobe-com…gllo[.]comDomainalert
atlantictriad[.]i…list[.]comDomainalert
atlassgroupinc[.]comDomainalert
auth-loadingdocum…s[.]onlineDomainalert
awemode[.]outlook…nwest[.]usDomainalert
bennett002[.]mooo[.]comDomainalert
bezpartien[.]onlineDomainalert
bigbrain[.]chicke…ller[.]comDomainalert
bloomfleldcapital[.]comDomainalert
bramum[.]onlineDomainalert
bxcelcounselling[.]orgDomainalert
calmechc[.]netDomainalert
celestialtremor[.]orgDomainalert
celvarioncorn[.]orgDomainalert
centipedtourspa[.]comDomainalert
cleggs[.]my03[.]comDomainalert
clingard[.]proDomainalert
clubdenut[.]clubDomainalert
coreansdmain[.]comDomainalert
csr-rooflng[.]comDomainalert
dutchfarrms[.]comDomainalert
eccentric-authent…tion[.]comDomainalert
ecosys[.]newdocum…einc[.]comDomainalert
efaxdoc[.]auth[.]…-inc[.]comDomainalert
efaxdoc[.]documen…stom[.]comDomainalert
flow505[.]mooo[.]comDomainalert
flow55[.]chickenkiller[.]comDomainalert
frontdesk[.]clickDomainalert
ghethim[.]comDomainalert
glafondbottamcons…tion[.]comDomainalert
globlasumi[.]comDomainalert
gregor[.]justdied[.]comDomainalert
grincool[.]xyzDomainalert
haevy-llc[.]comDomainalert
hivezoom[.]comDomainalert
ideahom[.]worldDomainalert
incommecialre[.]comDomainalert
innvisoin[.]netDomainalert
insigthinvestments[.]comDomainalert
investomind[.]bizDomainalert
jjnysnobiogtx[.]orgDomainalert
kilishy[.]qhigh[.]comDomainalert
kuer[.]onlineDomainalert
lampadasdeslgn[.]comDomainalert
linking[.]mefound[.]comDomainalert
m365cloud[.]login…loor[.]comDomainalert
maqaigiapelhani[.]camDomainalert
metrorocl[.]co[.]ukDomainalert
mgproparties[.]comDomainalert
naregruop[.]comDomainalert
noxband[.]comDomainalert
off365acess[.]jum…crab[.]comDomainalert
off365mail[.]clubDomainalert
office0365login[.…waky[.]comDomainalert
outlookdrive[.]mi…cerm[.]comDomainalert
pdlhaelth[.]comDomainalert
priorispace[.]bizDomainalert
psionicsandhorses[.]netDomainalert
reauth[.]copilot[…cerm[.]comDomainalert
reauth[.]docs[.]c…uras[.]comDomainalert
rektham[.]onlineDomainalert
rustlnsurance[.]comDomainalert
seatacsmarine[.]comDomainalert
slybee[.]comDomainalert
solutions00filept…duct[.]comDomainalert
stellarntis-fs[.]comDomainalert
studeseliamechan[.]linkDomainalert
sunraycontractlng[.]comDomainalert
sunstateaquips[.]comDomainalert
swiftii[.]chicken…ller[.]comDomainalert
thepaybank[.]comDomainalert
torvion[.]lifeDomainalert
unitadrentals[.]comDomainalert
us-agricultures[.]comDomainalert
vasquezmyth[.]comDomainalert
/assets/php/endpo…public.phpURLalert
/assets/js/client_geo.jsURLalert
/assets/js/endpoint.jsURLalert
/assets/js/url_helper.jsURLalert
/assets/php/endpo…_visit.phpURLalert
/assets/private_c…/widget.jsURLalert
/assets/php/endpo…llenge.phpURLalert
it[A-Za-z0-9]{32}usOtheralert
zt[A-Za-z0-9]{32}opOtheralert
9aa0b87974b9b4cd4…a5ed02c268SHA256alert
copilots[.]outloo…tors[.]comDomainalert

Sources ANY.RUN

More detail

What to do

  1. Hunt proxy, DNS and web logs for /session_public.php?action=start, repeated ?action=poll, and the JavaScript modules /assets/js/client_geo[.]js, endpoint.js and url_helper.js.
  2. In Entra ID, review unexpected device-code sign-ins, especially shortly after a password-protected contract or invoice email, and restrict the device-code flow with Conditional Access where it is not required.
  3. Alert on the listed typo-squatted and kit-hosting domains; do not block them yet, because they come from a single source, and some other hosts in the same report look like compromised legitimate sites and were left out.
  4. Treat password-protected business attachments whose password is in the email body as suspicious, and never enter a Microsoft device code from an email, a document or a page that is not a sign-in you started.

Behaviours to hunt 5

Behaviours are leads, not confirmed indicators, and can match legitimate activity. Compare any hit against your own baseline and environment before acting.

  1. alert Outbound requests to /session_public.php?action=start

    Look forOutbound requests to /session_public.php?action=start, followed by repeated /session_public.php?action=poll

    Why it mattersThe SkyW4lker phishing page registers a session with the visitor's IP and geolocation, then polls every few seconds to see whether the victim has completed Microsoft device-code authentication. ANY.RUN

    Log sourceWeb proxy, firewall or endpoint network logs

    QueriesKQL

  2. alert Loads of /assets/js/client_geo[.]js

    Look forLoads of /assets/js/client_geo[.]js, /assets/js/endpoint[.]js or /assets/js/url_helper[.]js

    Why it mattersThese JavaScript modules are distinctive SkyW4lker kit fingerprints, and they are also used by the related Gabagool credential-phishing kit. ANY.RUN

    Log sourceWeb proxy or endpoint network logs

    QueriesKQL

  3. alert Unexpected Microsoft Entra ID device-code sign-ins

    Look forUnexpected Microsoft Entra ID device-code sign-ins, especially shortly after a password-protected contract, invoice or proposal email

    Why it mattersSkyW4lker does not steal a password or bypass MFA. The victim completes a genuine Microsoft device-code sign-in, and the attacker's backend receives the issued token. ANY.RUN

    Log sourceEntra ID sign-in logs (authentication protocol: device code)

    QueriesNone yet: check by hand

  4. hunt Landing paths matching //it[A-Za-z0-9]{32}us or the earlier...

    Look forLanding paths matching //it[A-Za-z0-9]{32}us or the earlier //zt[A-Za-z0-9]{32}op, including links that end with ? or ??

    Why it mattersANY.RUN observed these landing-token formats on SkyW4lker (and Gabagool) pages from June to October 2026. ANY.RUN

    Log sourceEmail URL, proxy and web logs

    QueriesKQL

  5. hunt Requests for /assets/private_captcha/public/widget[.]js or...

    Look forRequests for /assets/private_captcha/public/widget[.]js or /assets/php/endpoints/private_captcha_challenge[.]php, or /assets/php/endpoints/confirm_visit[.]php

    Why it mattersSkyW4lker and Gabagool use a self-hosted CAPTCHA gate and a shared visit-confirmation endpoint to hide the phishing page from automated scanners. ANY.RUN

    Log sourceWeb proxy or endpoint network logs

    QueriesKQL

Affected countries and sectors

Targets
United States, India, Canada, United Kingdom, United States, Europe
Sectors
Technology, Manufacturing, Government

Background

ANY.RUN describes SkyW4lker (also branded SkyW4lker x365 Sentinel) as a device-code phishing kit aimed at Microsoft 365 users, most often in technology, manufacturing and government organisations in the United States, and also seen in India, Canada, the United Kingdom and elsewhere in Europe. The victim is sent a password-protected PDF, DOCX or XLSX, typically framed as a contract, invoice or proposal, with the password in the email body; a CAPTCHA and sometimes a lure page on a trusted service then leads to a page that tells them to enter a Microsoft device code on Microsoft's own sign-in site. Completing that genuine sign-in, including MFA, hands the attacker a Microsoft 365 token without a password being stolen. The kit's PHP backend and obfuscated JavaScript register the visit with action=start on /session_public.php and poll with action=poll until authentication finishes. ANY.RUN counted 618 related sandbox analyses between 23 June and 21 October 2026, rising from about 20 in June to about 200 in September, and assesses with high confidence that SkyW4lker and the Gabagool credential-phishing kit were built by the same developer. These figures are sandbox submissions, not a confirmed victim count, and the indicators come from a single source, so they are published at medium confidence for alerting and hunting, not for blocking.

Downloads

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MITRE ATT&CK7

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