Espionage / APTCriticalTLP:CLEAR

Silent Lynx Strix

Silent Lynx Strix AI-Agent Espionage Against Tajikistan

Published
11 November 2026
Added
12 November 2026, 11:30 UK
Last updated
12 November 2026

13 to block now9 to hunt9 behaviours to hunt

Hunt3 platforms

Run the hunt before you block, to find past activity. The same hunt is published for each platform. Preview and copy the queries in the dashboard.

  • Defender XDRKQLDefender portal > Hunting > Advanced hunting. Paste and run over 30 days.Download hunt.kql
  • SplunkSPLSearch & Reporting, last 30 days or more. Reads the CIM data models.Download hunt.spl
  • Google SecOpsYARA-L 2.0Rules Editor. Paste, Retrohunt over 30 days, then turn on live mode.Download hunt.yaral

These queries can return false positives. Know your environment and confirm a hit before acting.

Summary

CloudSEK found an exposed server belonging to Silent Lynx (UAT-6275 at Cisco Talos, TAG-193 at Recorded Future), a Ka... The operator server 89[.]125[.]213[.]123, its two stage URLs, foreverpeace[.]ru and the nine implant and lure hashes are on the block list.

Do now

  1. Block the 13 indicators.
  2. Run the hunt.
  3. Check for P.ps1.

Indicators 22

ValueTypeActionCopy
89[.]125[.]213[.]123IPv4block
hxxp://89[.]125[.…8080/P.ps1URLblock
hxxp://89[.]125[.…/decoy.pdfURLblock
foreverpeace[.]ruDomainblock
af2822560bc0e44b6…da6ac30d2cSHA256block
f26756cabe92842e2…1b42e01463SHA256block
e6907392677134a1a…86611f2e0dSHA256block
27dc5628adc666da7…6b932aef6eSHA256block
5d8a2df90fa3cf913…3e3d1a44c1SHA256block
19b68e504e1512dc1…c12d1f0bf0SHA256block
bf7fe6b518676a3e6…ac33aed826SHA256block
efc1bbb873e9b6916…a9bae9fab1SHA256block
368cb250f7b962c55…2b991a0e6dSHA256block
134[.]17[.]14[.]24IPv4alert
srvdriv.exeFile namealert
ssdpdrv.exeFile namealert
netsrvc.exeFile namealert
ssdspsrv.exeFile namealert
CoreMessaging.exeFile namealert
P.ps1File namealert
Отчёт_2026.pdf.lnkFile namealert
\chvost\Release\Netdrv.pdbOtheralert

Sources CloudSEK · Threadlinqs · Mint (Reuters) · Cisco Talos

More detail
Note All indicators come from CloudSEK's analysis of one exposed server; Threadlinqs repeats some of them. 134[.]17[.]14[.]24 is alert-only because CloudSEK could not confirm who owns it. The AI agent ran on the operator's server, so OpenRouter, DeepSeek, Gemini and Telegram traffic is only a hunting lead on your own servers and must not be blocked. The file names are lookalikes of Windows services and need the hashes or the path to confirm.

What to do

  1. Block 89[.]125[.]213[.]123, the two 89[.]125[.]213[.]123:8080 stage URLs and foreverpeace[.]ru, and BlockAndRemediate the nine SHA-256 hashes; alert on 134[.]17[.]14[.]24. Search 90 days of proxy, firewall and EDR logs for all of them, and for any outbound connection to TCP 46125.
  2. Hunt Windows endpoints for shortcuts with a PDF icon that start hidden PowerShell, for amsiInitFailed in PowerShell command lines, and for services or binaries named srvdriv, ssdpdrv, netsrvc, ssdspsrv or CoreMessaging.exe.
  3. On GeoServer, Tomcat and PostgreSQL hosts, look for new WAR deployments, a webshell under /health/, java or postgres spawning a shell, COPY ... FROM PROGRAM in database logs, and cron entries that call external addresses.
  4. Review government SSO and document-management logs for one ordinary account pulling large numbers of documents outside its role in parallel, resuming after errors, and in fixed-size chunks; then reset that account and fix per-document authorisation.
  5. If the network was reached, hunt for fscan, NetExec, Responder, Inveigh, Ligolo and GOST, rotate domain credentials including krbtgt twice after an NTDS dump, and change default passwords on network equipment.

Behaviours to hunt 9

Behaviours are leads, not confirmed indicators, and can match legitimate activity. Compare any hit against your own baseline and environment before acting.

  1. alert LNK lure starting hidden PowerShell or a shell to port 46125

    Look forA shortcut with a PDF icon that starts hidden PowerShell to fetch P.ps1 and a decoy PDF from a remote server, then a raw TCP shell to port 46125 (one variant sets amsiInitFailed first)

    Why it mattersThis is Silent Lynx's delivery chain: a .lnk in a ZIP, password-protected ZIP or ISO opens a decoy, then hidden PowerShell runs P.ps1 in memory and opens a shell to the operator. Port 46125 is the operator's listener; amsiInitFailed is the AMSI bypass in one variant. CloudSEK

    Log sourceEDR process and network events on Windows endpoints

    QueriesKQL · SPL · YARA-L

  2. alert Silent Lynx lookalike service binaries

    Look forServices or binaries named srvdriv, ssdpdrv, netsrvc, ssdspsrv or CoreMessaging.exe

    Why it mattersSilent Lynx's wrappers install the Laplas and Chvost shells as Windows services with names that look like drivers or the SSDP service. CoreMessaging is a real Windows DLL, so an executable with that name is unusual. CloudSEK

    Log sourceEDR process, file and registry events; Windows System event 7045 (service installed)

    QueriesKQL · SPL · YARA-L

  3. alert WAR deployed to GeoServer or Tomcat, or Java spawning a shell

    Look forNew WAR files deployed to GeoServer or Tomcat, a webshell under /health/, or the Java process spawning a shell

    Why it mattersSilent Lynx got into Uzbekistan's Smart Forestry GeoServer by deploying malicious WAR files (one carried a Metasploit payload servlet) and drove a webshell on the /health/ path through a curl wrapper. CloudSEK

    Log sourceEDR file and process events on Linux application servers; GeoServer and Tomcat access logs

    QueriesKQL · SPL · YARA-L

  4. alert PostgreSQL COPY FROM PROGRAM or postgres spawning a shell

    Look forPostgreSQL running COPY ... FROM PROGRAM, or the postgres process spawning a shell or network tool

    Why it mattersOn the Smart Forestry host the operator logged in to PostgreSQL as a superuser and used COPY ... FROM PROGRAM to open a reverse shell as the postgres user. CloudSEK

    Log sourcePostgreSQL server logs (log_statement); EDR process events on database hosts

    QueriesKQL · SPL · YARA-L

  5. alert Cron callback to an external address

    Look forCron jobs on Linux servers that open shells or call back to external addresses

    Why it mattersCron entries on the compromised GeoServer host called back to the operator's server and to 134[.]17[.]14[.]24. CloudSEK

    Log sourceEDR process events on Linux servers; crontab file changes

    QueriesKQL · SPL · YARA-L

  6. alert fscan, NetExec, Responder, Inveigh, Ligolo or GOST

    Look forBursts of internal reconnaissance from a new shell: whoami, hostname and ipconfig in quick succession, then fscan, NetExec, Responder, Inveigh, Ligolo or GOST

    Why it mattersThe operator's dispatcher ran whoami, hostname and ipconfig on every new shell automatically, and the agent drove scans with fscan and NetExec, poisoning with Responder and Inveigh, and tunnels through Ligolo and GOST. CloudSEK

    Log sourceEDR process events on Windows and Linux hosts

    QueriesKQL · SPL · YARA-L

  7. hunt Server calling OpenRouter, DeepSeek or Gemini APIs

    Look forServers or service accounts calling OpenRouter, DeepSeek or Gemini APIs

    Why it mattersThe Strix agent sent its model calls through OpenRouter to DeepSeek V4.1 Flash and Gemini 2.5 Flash. These are legitimate services, so never block them; a server or service account with no business reason to call them is a lead. CloudSEK

    Log sourceProxy, DNS and EDR network events on servers

    QueriesKQL · SPL

  8. hunt Server calling the Telegram Bot API, or .hermes on disk

    Look forServers calling the Telegram Bot API, or a .hermes directory on a host

    Why it mattersThe operator tasked the agent through a Telegram bot, and the document collectors posted progress to a Telegram chat. The agent framework lived under .hermes/. Telegram is legitimate, so hunt for non-Telegram processes on servers calling api.telegram.org; do not block it. CloudSEK

    Log sourceProxy, DNS and EDR network and file events

    QueriesKQL · SPL

  9. hunt Bulk document pulls by one SSO account

    Look forOne ordinary SSO account pulling large numbers of documents from a document-management system, in parallel and in fixed-size chunks

    Why it mattersThe operator used one railway employee's standard account on the government SSO portal to pull more than 2,000 documents outside that role. The collectors ran many requests at once, resumed after failures and split the data into chunks for exfiltration. CloudSEK

    Log sourceSSO portal and document-management (EDO) application logs

    QueriesNone yet: check by hand

Affected countries and sectors

Targets
Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, Central Asia
Sectors
Government, Defence, Rail transport, Telecommunications

Background

CloudSEK found an exposed server belonging to Silent Lynx (UAT-6275 at Cisco Talos, TAG-193 at Recorded Future), a Kazakhstan-nexus espionage group. The operator had domain-level access to Tajikistan's national railway from mid-August to at least 10 October 2026, dumped NTDS credentials, and used one railway employee's account on the government SSO portal to pull more than 2,000 documents from the national electronic document (EDO) platform, including defence correspondence. The group also broke into Uzbekistan's Smart Forestry GeoServer through malicious WAR files and a PostgreSQL COPY FROM PROGRAM reverse shell, and built Turkmenistan-themed lures in October. Much of the reconnaissance, collection and cleanup was run by a self-hosted Hermes agent branded Strix, which used DeepSeek and Gemini models through OpenRouter and took tasks over Telegram. The operator server 89[.]125[.]213[.]123, its two stage URLs, foreverpeace[.]ru and the nine implant and lure hashes are on the block list. 134[.]17[.]14[.]24 is alert-only because its ownership is unconfirmed. OpenRouter, DeepSeek, Gemini and Telegram are legitimate services: hunt for them on servers, never block them.

Downloads

View folder in repository

MITRE ATT&CK19

Open in the live dashboard Get the blocklist