Exploitation / Windows privilege escalationMediumTLP:CLEAR

SignDrop CLFS zero-day

SignDrop: Public Windows CLFS Zero-Day for SYSTEM Privilege Escalation (Hunt Only)

Published
12 November 2026
Added
13 November 2026, 19:25 UK
Last updated
13 November 2026

Nothing to block1 to hunt3 behaviours to hunt

Hunt3 platforms

Run the hunt before you block, to find past activity. The same hunt is published for each platform. Preview and copy the queries in the dashboard.

  • Defender XDRKQLDefender portal > Hunting > Advanced hunting. Paste and run over 30 days.Download hunt.kql
  • SplunkSPLSearch & Reporting, last 30 days or more. Reads the CIM data models.Download hunt.spl
  • Google SecOpsYARA-L 2.0Rules Editor. Paste, Retrohunt over 30 days, then turn on live mode.Download hunt.yaral

These queries can return false positives. Know your environment and confirm a hit before acting.

Summary

Public unpatched Windows exploit turns CLFS authentication into SYSTEM via a hid.dll planted in the ink folder. Cyderes reproduced a SYSTEM shell.

Do now

  1. Run the hunt.
  2. Check for hid.dll.
  3. Check for the listed behaviours.

Indicators 1

ValueTypeActionCopy
C:\Program Files\…nk\hid.dllOtheralert

Sources Cyderes Howler Cell · github.com · SecurityWeek · BleepingComputer

More detail
Note No attacker infrastructure or hashes exist; the path row is a host artefact for hunting, not something to block. Do not disable CLFS authentication as a workaround: it reopens the older memory-corruption bugs.

What to do

  1. Record HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\CLFS\Authentication Mode on every host; Mode 0 or 1 is in scope.
  2. Alert on hid.dll created in or loaded from the ink folder and on consent.exe starting a console or shell.
  3. Tighten application and script control, since the exploit needs code running as a local user first.
  4. Apply Microsoft's fix when released; do not turn off CLFS authentication.

Behaviours to hunt 3

Behaviours are leads, not confirmed indicators, and can match legitimate activity. Compare any hit against your own baseline and environment before acting.

  1. alert hid.dll written to or loaded from the ink folder

    Look forhid.dll written to, or loaded from, C:\Program Files\Common Files\microsoft shared\ink\ (the DLL SignDrop plants through the SYSTEM .cnpf write)

    Why it mattersSignDrop redirects the CLFS .cnpf signature file, created as SYSTEM, to the ink folder as hid.dll, overwrites it with its payload and has consent.exe load it, then deletes it with a transacted delete. Windows does not ship hid.dll in the ink folder (the real one is in System32), so Cyderes rates any appearance there as alert-worthy whatever the variant. Tuning: matched on the exact file name and folder only. Expected false positives: none known; keep file and image-load telemetry for the ink folder because the file is removed after use. Cyderes Howler Cell

    Log sourceDefender XDR DeviceFileEvents and DeviceImageLoadEvents; Sysmon events 11 and 7 in Splunk or Google SecOps

    QueriesKQL · SPL · YARA-L

  2. alert consent.exe starting a console or shell

    Look forconsent.exe (the UAC consent UI) starting conhost.exe, cmd.exe, PowerShell or rundll32.exe

    Why it mattersCyderes found consent.exe, started as SYSTEM by the exploit's runas request, loads the planted hid.dll, whose payload opens a SYSTEM console on the user's desktop and kills the UAC prompt. consent.exe only draws the elevation prompt and does not start shells or consoles, so a child like this means code is running inside it. Tuning: parent and child names only, no command-line matching. Expected false positives: none known; confirm with the hid.dll hunt on the same device. Cyderes Howler Cell

    Log sourceDefender XDR DeviceProcessEvents; Sysmon event 1 or Windows 4688 in Splunk or Google SecOps

    QueriesKQL · SPL · YARA-L

  3. alert Unmodified SignDrop proof-of-concept working folder

    Look forFiles created under a %TEMP%\SigDrop_ working folder (the unmodified public proof of concept)

    Why it mattersThe public exploit stages its CLFS container, .cnpf file and bait MpEngine.dll in %TEMP%\SigDrop_ and deletes the folder when it finishes. This only catches the unchanged release; a recompiled copy can rename the folder, so rely on the hid.dll and consent.exe hunts for variants. Expected false positives: your own authorised testing of the proof of concept. Cyderes Howler Cell

    Log sourceDefender XDR DeviceFileEvents; Sysmon event 11 in Splunk or Google SecOps

    QueriesKQL · SPL · YARA-L

Affected countries and sectors

Targets
Global
Sectors
Not stated

Background

On 10 November 2026 the researcher behind the Nightmare-Eclipse releases (GitHub MSNightmare) published SignDrop, a working exploit that takes a standard user to SYSTEM on Windows with CLFS authentication active (Mode 0 or 1). It makes Microsoft Defender's signature-update RPC open a crafted CLFS log, so clfs.sys writes the .cnpf signature file as SYSTEM to a path chosen through Object Manager links, overwritten as C:\Program Files\Common Files\microsoft shared\ink\hid.dll and loaded by consent.exe. Cyderes reproduced a SYSTEM shell. There is no CVE or patch, and no in-the-wild use has been reported.

Downloads

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MITRE ATT&CK4

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