ScreenConnect crypto bait
Fake Crypto-Exchange Guest Sessions Planted on 100+ MSP ScreenConnect Servers
- Published
- 13 November 2026
- Added
- 14 November 2026, 01:25 UK
- Last updated
- 14 November 2026
1 to block now2 to hunt2 behaviours to hunt
Hunt3 platforms
Run the hunt before you block, to find past activity. The same hunt is published for each platform. Preview and copy the queries in the dashboard.
- Defender XDRKQLDefender portal > Hunting > Advanced hunting. Paste and run over 30 days.Download hunt.kql
- SplunkSPLSearch & Reporting, last 30 days or more. Reads the CIM data models.Download hunt.spl
- Google SecOpsYARA-L 2.0Rules Editor. Paste, Retrohunt over 30 days, then turn on live mode.Download hunt.yaral
These queries can return false positives. Know your environment and confirm a hit before acting.
Summary
Thousands of fake crypto-exchange guest sessions planted on MSP ScreenConnect servers, likely as bait for technicians with unpatched clients. About 97.8% of connections came from one IONOS VPS, 74[.]208[.]158[.]106.
Do now
- Block the 1 indicator.
- Run the hunt.
- Patch CVE-2026-84869 now.
Indicators 3
| Value | Type | Action | Copy |
|---|---|---|---|
74[.]208[.]158[.]106 | IPv4 | block | |
197[.]47[.]160[.]252 | IPv4 | alert | |
87[.]106[.]111[.]220 | IPv4 | alert |
More detail
What to do
- Block 74[.]208[.]158[.]106 at the edge in front of self-hosted ScreenConnect servers and search 90 days of firewall and ScreenConnect server logs for it, 197[.]47[.]160[.]252 and 87[.]106[.]111[.]220.
- Upgrade every technician Host client and Access agent to ScreenConnect 26.6.5 or later (CVE-2026-84869); until then follow ConnectWise's advice to remove TransferFiles permission from roles and session groups.
- Search the ScreenConnect session list for guests with crypto-exchange and role names, empty company or site fields, guest version 25.3.4.9288 or no guest public key; copy App_Data\Session.db and its WAL file before deleting them.
- Check session history for any technician who joined a fake session; if text was sent, treat it as possible credential exposure, and if the client was unpatched, inspect that workstation's ScreenConnect Temp and Startup folders and process history.
- Keep Access installer links private, rebuild any installer that was public, restrict installer and web access where supported, and tell technicians not to join sessions they cannot tie to a customer.
Behaviours to hunt 2
Behaviours are leads, not confirmed indicators, and can match legitimate activity. Compare any hit against your own baseline and environment before acting.
alert ScreenConnect technician client running a file from its Temp folder
Look forScreenConnect.WindowsClient.exe on a technician workstation starting cmd.exe, powershell.exe, wscript.exe or msiexec.exe with a file under Documents\<folder>\Temp\
Why it mattersHuntress gives this as the host-side shape of CVE-2026-84869 exploitation, where a malicious guest makes an unpatched technician client accept and run a transferred file; the fake crypto-exchange sessions are likely bait for exactly that. Tuning: parent must be ScreenConnect.WindowsClient.exe, the child must be a shell, script host or installer, and the command line must point into a Documents\<folder>\Temp\ path, the client's transfer folder. Expected false positives: a technician deliberately opening a file pulled back from a customer machine; confirm with the session history before escalating. Huntress
Log sourceDefender XDR DeviceProcessEvents; EDR process events in Splunk or Google SecOps
QueriesKQL · SPL · YARA-L
hunt Crypto-exchange-named guest sessions with no guest key
Look forNew ScreenConnect Access guest sessions with crypto-exchange and role names (e.g. KUCOIN-SRV, LAPTOP-BINANCE, BACKUP-PROBIT), empty company or site fields, guest version 25.3.4.9288, ClientType 1 and no guest public key, often many from one external IP in a short window
Why it mattersHuntress found this combination on every fake guest: the emulator claims version 25.3.4.9288, sends no guest key and uses exchange-plus-role names, and almost all enrolments came from 74[.]208[.]158[.]106. Tuning: the version alone is not unique, so require the empty public key or the crypto-exchange name pattern as well. These records are not in Defender XDR tables, so no XDR query is given. Huntress
Log sourceScreenConnect server database (App_Data\Session.db) and server connection logs
QueriesNone yet: check by hand
Affected countries and sectors
- Targets
- Worldwide
- Sectors
- Managed service providers, IT services
Background
Huntress reported on 13 November 2026 that someone had enrolled about 2,400 unauthorized guest sessions on at least 118 self-hosted ConnectWise ScreenConnect servers belonging to 109 MSPs and other organisations between 3 and 13 November. The sessions come from a scripted emulator that impersonates a Windows ScreenConnect client and uses relay addresses taken from publicly downloadable Access installers. They carry crypto-exchange names such as KUCOIN-SRV, LAPTOP-BINANCE and BACKUP-PROBIT, show fake trading-desktop thumbnails, claim guest version 25.3.4.9288, send no guest public key and are kept online by an operator who revisits the servers every 151 seconds. About 97.8% of connections came from one IONOS VPS, 74[.]208[.]158[.]106. Huntress has not seen the sessions push files or run commands, but assesses they are likely bait: a technician who opens one with an unpatched client could be hit by CVE-2026-84869, the Guest-to-Host file transfer and execute flaw already used in a separate ScreenConnect campaign, and in one case a technician typed text into a fake session. 74[.]208[.]158[.]106 is on the block list; the Egyptian residential address that created the first sessions and a related IONOS host are alert only.