Supply chain / MSP remote accessCriticalTLP:CLEAR

ScreenConnect panel hijack

ScreenConnect Cloud Panel Hijack: Rogue Clients Pushed to MSP-Managed Endpoints

Published
11 November 2026
Added
11 November 2026, 22:05 UK
Last updated
13 November 2026

12 to block now45 to hunt12 behaviours to hunt

Hunt3 platforms

Run the hunt before you block, to find past activity. The same hunt is published for each platform. Preview and copy the queries in the dashboard.

  • Defender XDRKQLDefender portal > Hunting > Advanced hunting. Paste and run over 30 days.Download hunt.kql
  • SplunkSPLSearch & Reporting, last 30 days or more. Reads the CIM data models.Download hunt.spl
  • Google SecOpsYARA-L 2.0Rules Editor. Paste, Retrohunt over 30 days, then turn on live mode.Download hunt.yaral

These queries can return false positives. Know your environment and confirm a hit before acting.

Summary

Hijacked cloud ScreenConnect panels push rogue clients to MSP-managed endpoints and pivot back to technicians. The Hacker News reported the same CVE attribution on 12 November.

Do now

  1. Block the 12 indicators.
  2. Run the hunt.
  3. Patch technician-side Host and endpoint-side Guest clients now.

Indicators 57

ValueTypeActionCopy
185[.]99[.]255[.]28IPv4block
155[.]94[.]150[.]39IPv4block
newnewnew[.]gotdns[.]orgDomainblock
soxnewwork[.]homedns[.]orgDomainblock
sc[.]payproofkit[.]comDomainblock
cdn007-digitaldow…oads[.]comDomainblock
hxxps://ns[.]mo7s…dF.php?p=4URLblock
hxxps://ns[.]mo7s…dF.php?p=5URLblock
ns[.]mo7sen[.]devDomainblock
hxxps://ns[.]mo7s…v/EadF.phpURLblock
185[.]241[.]211[.]197IPv4block
007[.]from-ak[.]comDomainblock
Panel-Lateral.ps1File namealert
Run-Lateral-Full.batFile namealert
runnew.cmdFile namealert
ToolboxRelayUploader.exeFile namealert
2588ef5c15954b10Otheralert
ed630cc2c873b091Otheralert
d905b2b1b165d0a9Otheralert
4b8f4089ddaac6a9Otheralert
df1f7ef0cfacd0d8Otheralert
TrapWatchOtheralert
C:\ProgramData\RelayTrap\File namealert
C:\Windows\Temp\sc.msiFile namealert
amexsafekeyupdate[.]comDomainalert
60142ea5daebbf94a…a3136ef4bbSHA256alert
SSA-2026-STATEMEN…518787.batFile namealert
94b93c649b0ae0281…646355eb11SHA256alert
7a9aca9fdd4dcc13f…c1c80271ecSHA256alert
b93f10f30ee453d1e…e0f4953b4dSHA256alert
3c7a98f0fdb6235b8…07d7972ec4SHA256alert
d2ed7a7bf4f8ac9c7…611698de9aSHA256alert
4a1dd3cd2ea14368a…9b810af04bSHA256alert
8cb5f48bbe70b5248…7fd92e06afSHA256alert
cf50d73fa8117a758…64efe93956SHA256alert
81cc2baa35b798d60…e97d19f781SHA256alert
c31e6f075cd77e018…5e297410a9SHA256alert
deda7c30d798a19b6…b2d2b9fb45SHA256alert
0bd84c776dc01f784…869724bf08SHA256alert
454c43d296b1276bd…45bce12a8aSHA256alert
5dd3a6ba806ac4726…8d950148d0SHA256alert
43b7a5e56f9e6c7b7…1059e2db95SHA256alert
50659748723e906c8…d0c31fed61SHA256alert
a1937467fd862916f…fdba77dcdcSHA256alert
338e37f58043635eb…34e55e88ecSHA256alert
8e6912deed82e80bb…9a97cff4f4SHA256alert
d85315bd7602b6f5c…dd536ceb21SHA256alert
C:\Windows\Temp\s…it-run.batFile namealert
sckit-decoder.ps1File namealert
SilentForceInstal…nstall.ps1File namealert
Stop-LabTrap.ps1File namealert
LabConfig.ps1File namealert
Stage0Loader.ps1File namealert
61a672a13f03a9e81…2d4e185ae2SHA256alert
0be01e7bd69cfdd22…961372fef2SHA1alert
3f81c9c874a896c46…aa3d9f2054SHA1alert
13ce33b19daee3963…c38f6bc0d3SHA1alert

Sources Reddit r/msp · ConnectWise · Sophos · Huntress · Microsoft · BleepingComputer · Huntress (2) · Blackpoint Cyber · The Hacker News

More detail

What to do

  1. Check that the Labtech Plus, RMM Plus, RMM+, RMM Plus Password Link and RMM+ Password Link extensions are disabled (on-premises partners must do this themselves), keep their installation records and logs, and do not re-enable them until ConnectWise says it is safe.
  2. Do not triage suspected hosts through ScreenConnect: use your EDR live-response shell, WinRM or another out-of-band tool, because an interactive session can carry the infection back to the technician's workstation.
  3. Revoke all active ScreenConnect web sessions, rotate ScreenConnect credentials, verify MFA in your identity provider, and audit Run Command and Toolbox history for mass executions you did not start.
  4. Block 185[.]99[.]255[.]28, ns[.]mo7sen[.]dev and the EadF.php stager URLs now (Huntress, Sophos and Blackpoint all saw them), also block 155[.]94[.]150[.]39, newnewnew[.]gotdns[.]org, soxnewwork[.]homedns[.]org, sc[.]payproofkit[.]com and cdn007-digitaldownloads[.]com, block only these exact dynamic-DNS hostnames, not gotdns.org or homedns.org, and alert on amexsafekeyupdate[.]com.
  5. On endpoints, remove the rogue ScreenConnect client service (client IDs 2588ef5c15954b10 and ed630cc2c873b091), the TrapWatch scheduled task, C:\ProgramData\RelayTrap\, %TEMP%\sckit-* and the RelayTrapLiteAlert Run value before lifting isolation.
  6. On technician workstations, look for sqlite3.exe or PowerShell reading browser cookie stores or .ASPXAUTH, for Panel-Lateral.ps1, LabConfig.ps1, Run-Lateral-Full.bat or %TEMP%\sckit-decoder.ps1, and for the toolkit hashes Huntress and Blackpoint published (a miss does not clear a host, because they change per host), then reset browser-stored sessions and tokens.
  7. Patch technician-side Host and endpoint-side Guest clients to ScreenConnect 26.6.5.9742 or later (CVE-2026-84869). The patch blocks RelayTrap's Guest-to-Host execution but does not protect a hijacked technician session; if a technician connected to a suspected host, revoke ScreenConnect web sessions from a clean device and rotate credentials.

Behaviours to hunt 12

Behaviours are leads, not confirmed indicators, and can match legitimate activity. Compare any hit against your own baseline and environment before acting.

  1. alert Second ScreenConnect client pushed by Run Command

    Look forScreenConnect.ClientSetup.msi installed by an existing ScreenConnect client (Run Command pushing a second client), especially with c=Exploited in the installer query

    Why it mattersWith panel access the actor uses Run Command to push a second, rogue ScreenConnect client to every managed endpoint; Huntress lists the installer pattern /Bin/ScreenConnect.ClientSetup.msi?...&c=Exploited and the actor name Addmin. Legitimate MSP upgrades also run this installer, so judge the relay host and whether a change was scheduled. Reddit r/msp

    Log sourceDefender XDR DeviceProcessEvents; ScreenConnect audit log (Run Command and Toolbox history)

    QueriesKQL · SPL · YARA-L

  2. alert Rogue ScreenConnect client IDs or attacker relay

    Look forScreenConnect client service whose command line carries the rogue client IDs 2588ef5c15954b10 or ed630cc2c873b091, or a relay (h=) of 185[.]99[.]255[.]28 or the campaign C2 hostnames

    Why it mattersEvery ScreenConnect client names its relay in the h= value of the service command line. Huntress published two rogue client IDs and the attacker relay, so a client pointing there is the backdoor itself. Reddit r/msp

    Log sourceDefender XDR DeviceProcessEvents

    QueriesKQL · SPL · YARA-L

  3. alert TrapWatch scheduled task persistence

    Look forTrapWatch scheduled task running as SYSTEM every 10 seconds

    Why it mattersHuntress names the TrapWatch task as the persistence that reinfects endpoints within minutes of isolation being lifted. Reddit r/msp

    Log sourceDefender XDR DeviceEvents (ScheduledTaskCreated) and DeviceProcessEvents

    QueriesKQL · SPL · YARA-L

  4. alert RelayTrap and sckit staging files

    Look forFiles under C:\ProgramData\RelayTrap\ or %TEMP%\sckit-*

    Why it mattersHuntress lists both locations as campaign artefacts that must be wiped before an endpoint is released. Reddit r/msp

    Log sourceDefender XDR DeviceFileEvents

    QueriesKQL · SPL · YARA-L

  5. alert RelayTrapLiteAlert Run-key persistence

    Look forRelayTrapLiteAlert value in a registry Run key

    Why it mattersHuntress names this Run-key value as part of the persistence to remove. Reddit r/msp

    Log sourceDefender XDR DeviceRegistryEvents

    QueriesKQL · SPL · YARA-L

  6. hunt sqlite3 after ScreenConnect activity (reverse pivot)

    Look forsqlite3.exe run on a device within 60 minutes of a ScreenConnect process on the same device (technician reverse pivot)

    Why it mattersWhen a technician opens an interactive ScreenConnect session to an infected endpoint, the malware rides the session back, drops sqlite3.exe to scrape saved browser sessions and tokens, then pivots into other panels. Huntress does not give a time window; 60 minutes is a starting point to tune. Developer and database tools can run sqlite3.exe, so exclude known users and paths. Reddit r/msp

    Log sourceDefender XDR DeviceProcessEvents (join on DeviceId within 60 minutes)

    QueriesKQL · SPL

  7. hunt Unexpected mass Run Command or Toolbox use

    Look forMass Run Command or Toolbox executions in the ScreenConnect audit log that no technician started

    Why it mattersHuntress asks every ScreenConnect user to check Run Command history now, even with no alert, because the actor pushes the rogue client to all endpoints at once. Reddit r/msp

    Log sourceScreenConnect audit and session logs

    QueriesNone yet: check by hand

  8. alert Guest-to-Host file transfer and Run within seconds of connect

    Look forA ScreenConnect Host client receiving a file transfer and a Run from a Guest within seconds of a session starting, often Run-Lateral-Full.bat about 2.5 seconds after connect

    Why it mattersBlackpoint found that RelayTrap replaces the legitimate Guest and, after a 2.5-second delay, tries a Guest-to-Host file transfer and execute (CVE-2026-84869) toward the connecting technician, typically sending Run-Lateral-Full.bat, which then pulls a loader from ns[.]mo7sen[.]dev/EadF.php. A patched Host (26.6.5.9742 or later) blocks the exploit; Blackpoint and Huntress have not observed a successful Guest-to-Host. The trap still attempts the transfer against a patched Host. Blackpoint Cyber

    Log sourceScreenConnect audit log (event ID 201 in session context); Defender XDR DeviceFileEvents and DeviceProcessEvents on technician workstations

    QueriesKQL · SPL · YARA-L

  9. alert Non-browser or PowerShell access to .ASPXAUTH or cookie stores

    Look for.ASPXAUTH cookie access by a non-browser process, or PowerShell reading browser cookie stores (Cookies, Login Data, Web Data) on a technician workstation

    Why it mattersIf RelayTrap lands on the technician's Host, Panel-Lateral.ps1 and LabConfig.ps1 search local browser data and process memory for ScreenConnect .ASPXAUTH cookies and replay them against the panel. Blackpoint has not confirmed a successful cookie recovery or panel fan-out. Blackpoint Cyber

    Log sourceDefender XDR DeviceProcessEvents and DeviceFileEvents on technician workstations

    QueriesKQL · SPL · YARA-L

  10. hunt ScreenConnect panel session replayed from a new IP or user agent

    Look forA ScreenConnect panel session replayed from a new IP address or user agent

    Why it mattersAfter stealing an .ASPXAUTH cookie, SCKit is written to reuse the technician's already authenticated management session to push commands to other endpoints. A session that continues from a new IP or user agent, without a corresponding interactive login, is the fan-out signal. No successful technician pivot has been observed. Blackpoint Cyber

    Log sourceScreenConnect audit and session logs; identity-provider sign-in logs for the panel

    QueriesNone yet: check by hand

  11. hunt Unpatched ScreenConnect clients (CVE-2026-84869)

    Look forScreenConnect Host or Guest clients older than 26.6.5.9742 (CVE-2026-84869). The patch blocks RelayTrap's Guest-to-Host execution but does not protect a hijacked technician session

    Why it mattersBlackpoint confirmed that RelayTrap targets CVE-2026-84869 (CVSS 9.9) and that a current patched Host does not request or execute the payload. Clients must be on 26.6.5.9742 or later, and Host clients may need a reinstall. Patching does not revoke a stolen .ASPXAUTH session. Blackpoint Cyber

    Log sourceScreenConnect inventory, package and agent version reports

    QueriesNone yet: check by hand

  12. alert netsh interface portproxy rule that redirects 127[.]0[.]0[.]1:88 to a public IP

    Look fornetsh interface portproxy rule that redirects 127[.]0[.]0[.]1:88 to a public IP, or a rogue UpdateConnect.ClientService.exe running from a C:\ProgramData\Windows Update Agent (...) folder

    Why it mattersIn the 13 Nov 2026 SCKit wave Huntress saw a batch script in the ScreenConnect client folder launch msiexec to install UpdateConnect.ClientSetup.msi (c=ExploitedNOTUSA), a netsh portproxy from 127[.]0[.]0[.]1:88 to 185[.]241[.]211[.]197:80, a hosts-file change, and a LocalSystem service named Windows Update Agent running UpdateConnect.ClientService.exe. The legitimate ScreenConnect client is never named UpdateConnect and Windows has no service binary under that folder, so the file-name and folder match is sharp; the portproxy clause is limited to loopback listen addresses with a non-private connect address, and IIS/WSL or developer port forwards that point at internal hosts are excluded. Expected false positives: admin port forwards from loopback to a public jump host. Huntress

    Log sourceDefender XDR DeviceProcessEvents

    QueriesKQL

Affected countries and sectors

Targets
Not stated
Sectors
Managed service providers (MSPs), MSP-managed customer organisations

Background

Huntress's SOC is responding to an active campaign that began around 17:47 UTC on 11 November 2026 against managed service providers using cloud-hosted ConnectWise ScreenConnect. At the time of its update Huntress was tracking six compromised MSPs and more than 286 endpoints, with the numbers rising; the actor numbers each victim MSP and the observed tags start partway through the sequence, so other MSPs were probably hit first. Huntress has seen no evidence of a new vulnerability and has not confirmed how the panels were accessed; the evidence points to stolen credentials or hijacked operator sessions. With panel access, the actor uses Run Command to push a second, rogue ScreenConnect client to every managed endpoint, giving an independent backdoor that no longer needs the MSP's panel. If a technician then opens an interactive ScreenConnect session to investigate, the malware rides that session back onto the technician's workstation, drops sqlite3.exe to scrape saved browser sessions and tokens, and pivots into any other ScreenConnect panels the technician can reach. Persistence is a TrapWatch scheduled task running as SYSTEM every 10 seconds, files under C:\ProgramData\RelayTrap\ and %TEMP%\sckit-*, and a RelayTrapLiteAlert Run-key value; endpoints reinfect within minutes if isolation is lifted before these are removed. ConnectWise confirmed the campaign in a Trust Center advisory at 22:45 UTC on 11 November, said the actor appears to deploy the extra remote-access software through third-party extensions, and disabled five of them (Labtech Plus, RMM Plus, RMM+, RMM Plus Password Link and RMM+ Password Link) in about 400 partner environments; on-premises partners must disable them themselves. Sophos X-Ops independently observed the same activity: in one case curl.exe downloaded ScreenConnect.ClientSetup.msi from 185[.]99[.]255[.]28 to C:\Windows\TEMP\sc.msi, msiexec.exe installed it silently, and PowerShell with execution-policy bypass fetched the second stage from the ns[.]mo7sen[.]dev stager. Sophos saw the commands come from three ScreenConnect instance IDs that are likely compromised MSP instances (d905b2b1b165d0a9, 4b8f4089ddaac6a9 and df1f7ef0cfacd0d8) and install the same two rogue client IDs Huntress reported. Huntress's customer advisory, updated at 00:29 UTC on 12 November, adds that the toolkit installs a modified client that impersonates the MSP's own client and waits for a technician to connect. Because Huntress, Sophos and now Blackpoint saw them independently, the attacker relay 185[.]99[.]255[.]28, the ns[.]mo7sen[.]dev stager and its EadF.php URLs are high confidence and on the block-now list, and the two rogue client IDs are high-confidence hunting leads; the secondary C2 server, the dynamic-DNS and payproofkit hostnames and cdn007-digitaldownloads[.]com are also listed by Blackpoint and are on the block list at high confidence. BleepingComputer found a July 2026 SSA-themed batch file on VirusTotal that installs ScreenConnect from cdn007-digitaldownloads[.]com, contacts amexsafekeyupdate[.]com and checks for rogue client ID ed630cc2c873b091; whether that earlier activity belongs to this campaign is not confirmed, so its domain, hash and file name are alert-only. Huntress's full SCKit write-up, published on its blog late on 11 November, puts the count at 288 endpoints in 48 organisations within 90 minutes, says the current ScreenConnect releases 26.6.6.9747 and 26.7.6.9783 are affected, and breaks down the 16-file toolkit: the dropper writes C:\Windows\Temp\sckit-run.bat, fetches a host-keyed kit whose decryption key comes back in the server's response headers, and a later stage pulls sqlite3.exe from EadF.php?p=5 to read browser cookie databases. Huntress found that the worm's attempt to take over technician consoles failed in every host log it recovered, but it still advises against triaging over ScreenConnect. It also published 16 toolkit hashes; because the scripts are rebuilt per host and RelayTrap.exe is compiled on each machine, these are alert-only hunting leads, and the p=5 URL and cdn007-digitaldownloads[.]com (now listed by Huntress as C2 and recovered again by Blackpoint) are on the block list. Blackpoint Cyber's Adversary Pursuit Group, writing on 11 November, recovered the same toolkit from the ns[.]mo7sen[.]dev staging endpoint and showed that RelayTrap.cs exploits CVE-2026-84869 (CVSS 9.9), a Guest-to-Host file transfer and execute flaw fixed in ScreenConnect 26.6.5.9742 and later. In a controlled test a current patched Host never requested or executed the payload, and Blackpoint's SOC has not seen successful Guest-to-Host propagation; the trap still tries the transfer about 2.5 seconds after a technician session starts, sending Run-Lateral-Full.bat toward the Host and then pulling a loader from EadF.php. Follow-on scripts (Panel-Lateral.ps1 and LabConfig.ps1) try to recover the technician's .ASPXAUTH cookie from browser data and memory and replay it against the panel; the patch does not stop that session hijack, and no successful technician pivot has been observed. Because Blackpoint independently recovered the same relay, staging host, Access installer sources, dynamic-DNS hostnames and rogue client IDs, those indicators stay on the block list at high confidence. The Hacker News reported the same CVE attribution on 12 November. Microsoft Threat Intelligence's analysis on 13 November confirms the same relay, panel, staging and dynamic-DNS infrastructure, the two rogue client IDs and the toolkit hashes, and adds the sc.msi installer hash and SHA1 values, which are alert-only hunting leads. Huntress's 13 November update reports a second wave from 16:12 UTC hitting 205 more hosts in 41 organisations, installing a rogue UpdateConnect client from 185[.]241[.]211[.]197 (1337 Services bulletproof hosting, inside a Spamhaus DROP range) that relays to 007[.]from-ak[.]com on port 88 behind a netsh portproxy and a Windows Update Agent service; both are on the block list at high confidence.

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