Qubole AWS role abuse
Qubole Cross-Account Access Abused: Vendor IAM Credentials Used to Assume Customer AWS Roles
- Published
- 9 November 2026
- Added
- 13 November 2026, 11:40 UK
- Last updated
- 13 November 2026
5 to block now7 to hunt3 behaviours to hunt
Hunt3 platforms
Run the hunt before you block, to find past activity. The same hunt is published for each platform. Preview and copy the queries in the dashboard.
- Defender XDRKQLDefender portal > Hunting > Advanced hunting. Paste and run over 30 days.Download hunt.kql
- SplunkSPLSearch & Reporting, last 30 days or more. Reads the CIM data models.Download hunt.spl
- Google SecOpsYARA-L 2.0Rules Editor. Paste, Retrohunt over 30 days, then turn on live mode.Download hunt.yaral
These queries can return false positives. Know your environment and confirm a hit before acting.
Summary
Stolen Qubole vendor credentials used to assume customer AWS integration roles, steal secrets and download S3 data. Every AssumeRole call carried a valid External ID and succeeded, and most of the roles were otherwise unused.
Do now
- Block the 5 indicators.
- Run the hunt.
- Check for the listed behaviours.
Indicators 12
| Value | Type | Action | Copy |
|---|---|---|---|
57[.]129[.]54[.]120 | IPv4 | block | |
2001:41d0:70d:7800:: | ipv6 | block | |
65f061281c9a712e9…a65ad396e4 | SHA256 | block | |
1c7437dac21630f53…6487e23fd7 | SHA1 | block | |
086d4a83181971e88…4c44f46da2 | MD5 | block | |
45[.]83[.]220[.]211 | IPv4 | alert | |
185[.]209[.]199[.]73 | IPv4 | alert | |
89[.]37[.]63[.]175 | IPv4 | alert | |
AIDA3W7DIFLYOLTK63SFS | Other | alert | |
AIDAJYRRH5Y3A7AAJM2HW | Other | alert | |
quiam-* | Other | alert | |
805246085872 | Other | monitor |
Sources Wiz · BleepingComputer · The Hacker News · The Register
More detail
What to do
- List every IAM role whose trust policy allows account 805246085872 or any other external vendor account; delete roles for integrations you no longer use.
- Search CloudTrail from 1 October 2026 in every account with a Qubole role for AssumeRole by account 805246085872 from a non-AWS address, any activity by principal AIDA3W7DIFLYOLTK63SFS, and role sessions named quiam-*.
- For any session you find, review its Secrets Manager, SSM Parameter Store, Lambda and S3 activity, rotate every secret, parameter and Lambda environment variable the role could read, and revoke the role's active sessions.
- Block 57[.]129[.]54[.]120 and search 90 days of CloudTrail, proxy and identity-provider logs for it and for the Mullvad exits 45[.]83[.]220[.]211, 185[.]209[.]199[.]73 and 89[.]37[.]63[.]175.
- Pin vendor trust policies to the vendor's specific principal and add aws:SourceIp or aws:SourceVpce conditions; Wiz notes a source-IP condition alone would have blocked every role assumption it saw.
- Check identity-provider sign-in logs for TruffleHog user agents on service principals and Okta clients from the listed addresses.
Behaviours to hunt 3
Behaviours are leads, not confirmed indicators, and can match legitimate activity. Compare any hit against your own baseline and environment before acting.
alert Qubole account role assumption from a non-AWS address
Look forAssumeRole by AWS account 805246085872 (Qubole) from a source address that is not an AWS address, or any CloudTrail activity by principal AIDA3W7DIFLYOLTK63SFS
Why it mattersWiz saw all legitimate Qubole platform traffic come from AWS infrastructure, while every attacker role assumption came from OVH or Mullvad addresses with a valid External ID. AIDA3W7DIFLYOLTK63SFS appeared only in attacker activity. Tuning: in Defender XDR, calls whose ISP is Amazon (AWS infrastructure) or whose source is an AWS service name are excluded. In Splunk and Google SecOps, which have no ISP field here, the rule matches the vendor account only from the published attacker addresses, plus any use of AIDA3W7DIFLYOLTK63SFS; add an AWS ip-ranges lookup to widen it to any non-AWS source. Expected false positives: a Qubole support engineer assuming a role from an office address, which should itself be questioned. Wiz
Log sourceAWS CloudTrail management events, or Defender XDR CloudAppEvents with the AWS connector
QueriesKQL · SPL · YARA-L
alert quiam-* role sessions harvesting secrets or S3
Look forRole sessions named quiam-* (for example quiam-enum or quiam-scope-full), followed by ListSecrets, GetSecretValue, GetParameter, GetFunctionConfiguration or bulk S3 GetObject
Why it mattersThe actor named every assumed-role session quiam- plus a word describing the task, then harvested Lambda environment variables, Secrets Manager secrets and SSM parameters and downloaded S3 buckets. Tuning: the quiam- prefix is specific to this actor. Expected false positives: none known. Wiz
Log sourceAWS CloudTrail management and S3 data events, or Defender XDR CloudAppEvents with the AWS connector
QueriesKQL · SPL · YARA-L
alert TruffleHog credential checks from the attacker addresses
Look forGetCallerIdentity, Entra ID service-principal sign-ins or Okta client-credential token requests with a TruffleHog user agent from 57[.]129[.]54[.]120, 2001:41d0:70d:7800:: or the Mullvad exits
Why it mattersThe actor validated the keys and client secrets it stole from customer accounts with TruffleHog, in bursts lasting seconds. TruffleHog is also run by security teams, so the hunt requires one of the attacker addresses as well. Expected false positives: none when paired with the addresses. Wiz
Log sourceAWS CloudTrail, Entra ID service principal sign-in logs, Okta system log; Defender XDR CloudAppEvents and AADSpnSignInEventsBeta
QueriesKQL · SPL · YARA-L
Affected countries and sectors
- Targets
- Global
- Sectors
- Organisations using Qubole data platform integrations on AWS
Background
Wiz, working with Sentra and Mandiant, reports that between 14 and 26 October 2026 a threat actor used IAM credentials from AWS account 805246085872, which Qubole's data platform uses to reach customer accounts, to assume the cross-account integration roles that dozens of customers had created to trust Qubole. Every AssumeRole call carried a valid External ID and succeeded, and most of the roles were otherwise unused. Using session names starting quiam-, the actor enumerated S3, EC2, RDS, IAM and KMS, read Lambda environment variables, Secrets Manager secrets and SSM parameters, downloaded whole S3 buckets, and validated the credentials it found with TruffleHog against AWS, Entra ID and Okta. Traffic came from an OVH server (57[.]129[.]54[.]120, which also hosted a bootable sso_agent.iso that beacons to TCP 23458) and Mullvad VPN exits. An actor calling itself n0n has claimed the intrusion. The OVH address and the ISO hashes are on the block list; the Mullvad exits, the vendor account and its principal IDs are alert-only hunt leads.