Malware / macOSCriticalTLP:CLEAR

Phexia macOS stealer

Phexia: macOS ClickFix Stealer with Polygon C2

Published
4 November 2026
Added
10 November 2026, 15:14 UK
Last updated
10 November 2026

25 to block now23 to hunt

Hunt3 platforms

Run the hunt before you block, to find past activity. The same hunt is published for each platform. Preview and copy the queries in the dashboard.

  • Defender XDRKQLDefender portal > Hunting > Advanced hunting. Paste and run over 30 days.Download hunt.kql
  • SplunkSPLSearch & Reporting, last 30 days or more. Reads the CIM data models.Download hunt.spl
  • Google SecOpsYARA-L 2.0Rules Editor. Paste, Retrohunt over 30 days, then turn on live mode.Download hunt.yaral

These queries can return false positives. Know your environment and confirm a hit before acting.

Summary

macOS ClickFix backdoor and stealer that resolves C2 from a Polygon smart contract. WithSecure has tracked infections since late 2025, with a growing number of cases in 2026.

Do now

  1. Block the 25 indicators.
  2. Run the hunt.
  3. Block the C2 and delivery domains and the stolen-data upload address….

Indicators 48

ValueTypeActionCopy
hf98x4d[.]siteDomainblock
apdhlhs3[.]xyzDomainblock
j9af4sr[.]guruDomainblock
67sixcebeh[.]surfDomainblock
stv4ec5[.]shopDomainblock
vg5sgxv[.]lolDomainblock
d9mjs[.]sbsDomainblock
jse8x92s[.]meDomainblock
couhe79[.]xyzDomainblock
xzttyt[.]xyzDomainblock
secdarvin2026[.]icuDomainblock
oreshnik[.]topDomainblock
svo-zv[.]proDomainblock
dhsbdgs[.]icuDomainblock
hackersteersman[.]digitalDomainblock
coeuzgoq[.]bahisbiz[.]comDomainblock
kefavkd[.]nextbahis[.]sexDomainblock
d9j[.]everunningshoes[.]comDomainblock
nox[.]usa-synadentix[.]comDomainblock
zwa8[.]meritbethi…igir[.]comDomainblock
355uz90z[.]bolnhu…lly[.]siteDomainblock
7ulk[.]irvinaurus[.]fitDomainblock
hxxps://coeuzgoq[…/update.shURLblock
62[.]60[.]226[.]50IPv4block
hxxp://62[.]60[.]…upload.phpURLblock
pool[.]hashvault[.]shDomainalert
pool[.]supportxmr[.]comDomainalert
~/Library/LaunchA…ers>.plistFile namealert
~/Library/LaunchA…ers>.plistFile namealert
~/.passphraseFile namealert
~/.txidFile namealert
~/tempFolderC/File namealert
/tmp/updstat.txtFile namealert
/tmp/rigupdater/File namealert
/tmp/applecomlistupdate/File namealert
0xA3a603F8a454a9c…8F7C15C2A0Ethereum/Polygon addressmonitor
0x3445fB8Df432320…0C6664C960Ethereum/Polygon addressmonitor
0x2686eceaFunction selectormonitor
polygon[.]drpc[.]orgOthermonitor
polygon[.]publicnode[.]comOthermonitor
polygon-mainnet[.…tatum[.]ioOthermonitor
tenderly[.]rpc[.]…]communityOthermonitor
4ApYm7Cp1QKHYd34e…o3vNWJxx2LMonero addressmonitor
82hSZSZNcbCdWd3ES…kvmLFuRLFvMonero addressmonitor
update.shFile namemonitor
script.shFile namemonitor
clear-cache.shFile namemonitor
Terminal.shFile namemonitor

Sources WithSecure · ThreatFox · ThreatFox (2) · ThreatFox (3) · ThreatFox (4) · ThreatFox (5) · ThreatFox (6) · ThreatFox (7) · ThreatFox (8) · ThreatFox (9) · ThreatFox (10) · ThreatFox (11) · ThreatFox (12) · ThreatFox (13) · ThreatFox (14) · ThreatFox (15)

More detail

What to do

  1. Block the C2 and delivery domains and the stolen-data upload address 62[.]60[.]226[.]50; do not block the public Polygon RPC endpoints or the mining pools, which are legitimate services.
  2. Hunt DeviceProcessEvents for a Terminal-spawned curl piped to bash, osascript droppers, dscl . authonly password checks, security find-generic-password keychain reads, and eth_call lookups of the published Polygon contracts.
  3. Inspect ~/Library/LaunchAgents for com.<16 lowercase letters> and com.Apple.<16 lowercase letters> plists whose arguments pipe base64 into osascript; unload each confirmed job before deleting it, and look for more than one build.
  4. On a confirmed infection, collect ~/.passphrase, ~/.txid and the staging folders, then from a trusted device reset affected passwords, revoke sessions and tokens, and check for XMRig under /tmp/rigupdater or /tmp/applecomlistupdate.

Affected countries and sectors

Targets
Not stated
Sectors
Not stated

Background

Phexia is a modular macOS backdoor and infostealer sold to several criminal groups and delivered through ClickFix lures that get the victim to paste a curl-to-bash command into Terminal. WithSecure has tracked infections since late 2025, with a growing number of cases in 2026. From May 2026 the latest builds have fetched their C2 hostname from a Polygon smart contract (EtherHiding) rather than a hardcoded domain, so taking a C2 domain down does not stop new lookups. Once running, the backdoor steals the login password, keychain material, and browser and password-manager data, and has been used to deploy the XMRig Monero miner. A second contract appeared in a build installed on 27 October 2026. Older C2 domains can remain in use after the contract changes, and reinfection can leave more than one build active on the same Mac.

Downloads

View folder in repository

MITRE ATT&CK7

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