Phexia macOS stealer
Phexia: macOS ClickFix Stealer with Polygon C2
- Published
- 4 November 2026
- Added
- 10 November 2026, 15:14 UK
- Last updated
- 10 November 2026
25 to block now23 to hunt
Hunt3 platforms
Run the hunt before you block, to find past activity. The same hunt is published for each platform. Preview and copy the queries in the dashboard.
- Defender XDRKQLDefender portal > Hunting > Advanced hunting. Paste and run over 30 days.Download hunt.kql
- SplunkSPLSearch & Reporting, last 30 days or more. Reads the CIM data models.Download hunt.spl
- Google SecOpsYARA-L 2.0Rules Editor. Paste, Retrohunt over 30 days, then turn on live mode.Download hunt.yaral
These queries can return false positives. Know your environment and confirm a hit before acting.
Summary
macOS ClickFix backdoor and stealer that resolves C2 from a Polygon smart contract. WithSecure has tracked infections since late 2025, with a growing number of cases in 2026.
Do now
- Block the 25 indicators.
- Run the hunt.
- Block the C2 and delivery domains and the stolen-data upload address….
Indicators 48
| Value | Type | Action | Copy |
|---|---|---|---|
hf98x4d[.]site | Domain | block | |
apdhlhs3[.]xyz | Domain | block | |
j9af4sr[.]guru | Domain | block | |
67sixcebeh[.]surf | Domain | block | |
stv4ec5[.]shop | Domain | block | |
vg5sgxv[.]lol | Domain | block | |
d9mjs[.]sbs | Domain | block | |
jse8x92s[.]me | Domain | block | |
couhe79[.]xyz | Domain | block | |
xzttyt[.]xyz | Domain | block | |
secdarvin2026[.]icu | Domain | block | |
oreshnik[.]top | Domain | block | |
svo-zv[.]pro | Domain | block | |
dhsbdgs[.]icu | Domain | block | |
hackersteersman[.]digital | Domain | block | |
coeuzgoq[.]bahisbiz[.]com | Domain | block | |
kefavkd[.]nextbahis[.]sex | Domain | block | |
d9j[.]everunningshoes[.]com | Domain | block | |
nox[.]usa-synadentix[.]com | Domain | block | |
zwa8[.]meritbethi…igir[.]com | Domain | block | |
355uz90z[.]bolnhu…lly[.]site | Domain | block | |
7ulk[.]irvinaurus[.]fit | Domain | block | |
hxxps://coeuzgoq[…/update.sh | URL | block | |
62[.]60[.]226[.]50 | IPv4 | block | |
hxxp://62[.]60[.]…upload.php | URL | block | |
pool[.]hashvault[.]sh | Domain | alert | |
pool[.]supportxmr[.]com | Domain | alert | |
~/Library/LaunchA…ers>.plist | File name | alert | |
~/Library/LaunchA…ers>.plist | File name | alert | |
~/.passphrase | File name | alert | |
~/.txid | File name | alert | |
~/tempFolderC/ | File name | alert | |
/tmp/updstat.txt | File name | alert | |
/tmp/rigupdater/ | File name | alert | |
/tmp/applecomlistupdate/ | File name | alert | |
0xA3a603F8a454a9c…8F7C15C2A0 | Ethereum/Polygon address | monitor | |
0x3445fB8Df432320…0C6664C960 | Ethereum/Polygon address | monitor | |
0x2686ecea | Function selector | monitor | |
polygon[.]drpc[.]org | Other | monitor | |
polygon[.]publicnode[.]com | Other | monitor | |
polygon-mainnet[.…tatum[.]io | Other | monitor | |
tenderly[.]rpc[.]…]community | Other | monitor | |
4ApYm7Cp1QKHYd34e…o3vNWJxx2L | Monero address | monitor | |
82hSZSZNcbCdWd3ES…kvmLFuRLFv | Monero address | monitor | |
update.sh | File name | monitor | |
script.sh | File name | monitor | |
clear-cache.sh | File name | monitor | |
Terminal.sh | File name | monitor |
Sources WithSecure · ThreatFox · ThreatFox (2) · ThreatFox (3) · ThreatFox (4) · ThreatFox (5) · ThreatFox (6) · ThreatFox (7) · ThreatFox (8) · ThreatFox (9) · ThreatFox (10) · ThreatFox (11) · ThreatFox (12) · ThreatFox (13) · ThreatFox (14) · ThreatFox (15)
More detail
What to do
- Block the C2 and delivery domains and the stolen-data upload address 62[.]60[.]226[.]50; do not block the public Polygon RPC endpoints or the mining pools, which are legitimate services.
- Hunt DeviceProcessEvents for a Terminal-spawned curl piped to bash, osascript droppers, dscl . authonly password checks, security find-generic-password keychain reads, and eth_call lookups of the published Polygon contracts.
- Inspect ~/Library/LaunchAgents for com.<16 lowercase letters> and com.Apple.<16 lowercase letters> plists whose arguments pipe base64 into osascript; unload each confirmed job before deleting it, and look for more than one build.
- On a confirmed infection, collect ~/.passphrase, ~/.txid and the staging folders, then from a trusted device reset affected passwords, revoke sessions and tokens, and check for XMRig under /tmp/rigupdater or /tmp/applecomlistupdate.
Affected countries and sectors
- Targets
- Not stated
- Sectors
- Not stated
Background
Phexia is a modular macOS backdoor and infostealer sold to several criminal groups and delivered through ClickFix lures that get the victim to paste a curl-to-bash command into Terminal. WithSecure has tracked infections since late 2025, with a growing number of cases in 2026. From May 2026 the latest builds have fetched their C2 hostname from a Polygon smart contract (EtherHiding) rather than a hardcoded domain, so taking a C2 domain down does not stop new lookups. Once running, the backdoor steals the login password, keychain material, and browser and password-manager data, and has been used to deploy the XMRig Monero miner. A second contract appeared in a build installed on 27 October 2026. Older C2 domains can remain in use after the contract changes, and reinfection can leave more than one build active on the same Mac.