Outlook NTLM hash leak
Outlook CVE-2026-124194: Exploited NTLM Hash Leak (Hunt Only)
- Published
- 10 November 2026
- Added
- 12 November 2026, 09:25 UK
- Last updated
- 12 November 2026
Nothing to block1 to hunt3 behaviours to hunt
Hunt3 platforms
Run the hunt before you block, to find past activity. The same hunt is published for each platform. Preview and copy the queries in the dashboard.
- Defender XDRKQLDefender portal > Hunting > Advanced hunting. Paste and run over 30 days.Download hunt.kql
- SplunkSPLSearch & Reporting, last 30 days or more. Reads the CIM data models.Download hunt.spl
- Google SecOpsYARA-L 2.0Rules Editor. Paste, Retrohunt over 30 days, then turn on live mode.Download hunt.yaral
These queries can return false positives. Know your environment and confirm a hit before acting.
Summary
Exploited Outlook flaw that leaks NTLMv2 hashes, with no published network indicators. The Preview Pane is not an attack vector.
Do now
- Run the hunt.
- Patch CVE-2026-124194 now.
- Check for OUTLOOK.EXE.
Indicators 1
| Value | Type | Action | Copy |
|---|---|---|---|
CVE-2026-124194 | Other | monitor |
Sources Microsoft · CISA · atarussecurity.com · ctxsec.com · isecradar.com · socprime.com · zerohunt.ai · Symantec Threat Hunter Team · The Hacker News · SecurityWeek · Tenable · Malwarebytes
More detail
What to do
- Install the November 2026 Office updates: Office LTSC 2024 16.0.17932.21140, Office LTSC 2021 16.0.14334.21048, or the fixed Microsoft 365 Apps build for your channel.
- Block outbound TCP 445 and 139 to the internet at the perimeter and in the host firewall for laptops on public networks, and review whether WebDAV to arbitrary hosts is allowed.
- Set Network security: Restrict NTLM: Outgoing NTLM traffic to remote servers to Audit all, then Deny all with an exception list; on Windows 11 24H2 and Windows Server 2025, block NTLM for remote outbound SMB.
- Fill in the allowlist placeholders in the hunts with your own public ranges, partner file shares and WebDAV domains, then run them over the last 30 days.
- If a hunt fires, treat the user's NTLMv2 response as exposed: reset the password, revoke sessions, and search mail for the same sender, subject or attachment across other recipients.
Behaviours to hunt 3
Behaviours are leads, not confirmed indicators, and can match legitimate activity. Compare any hit against your own baseline and environment before acting.
alert Outlook message file opened, then SMB to a new public address
Look forSMB (TCP 445 or 139) to a public address that is new to the estate, made by OUTLOOK.EXE, or by the System kernel SMB client within 2 minutes after Outlook opens a .msg or .eml file on the same device
Why it mattersOpening a crafted message file makes Outlook connect to the attacker's server without the external-content warning, and Windows sends the user's NTLMv2 response. The SMB client often runs in the kernel, so the connection is logged against System rather than Outlook. Tuning: public addresses only; Azure Files endpoints and your own allowlisted ranges are excluded; the address must be new to the estate (not seen on SMB from any device in the first day of the window, and the hit within a day of its first sighting); System connections count only within 2 minutes after a message-file open on the same device. Blocked or failed attempts still match, because they mean the file was opened. Expected false positives: a new, legitimate partner or cloud file share reached by IP right after opening a message. Allowlist it once. atarussecurity.com
Log sourceDefender XDR DeviceNetworkEvents, DeviceFileEvents and DeviceProcessEvents; Sysmon event 3 with event 1 and 11 in Splunk or Google SecOps
QueriesKQL · SPL · YARA-L
alert Outlook message file opened, then WebDAV to a public host
Look forWebDAV fallback: rundll32 davclnt.dll,DavSetCookie to a public, non-Microsoft host within 2 minutes after Outlook opens a .msg or .eml file, or after a failed SMB attempt to the same address
Why it mattersWhen outbound SMB is blocked, Windows retries the same path over WebDAV through the WebClient service, which starts rundll32 davclnt.dll,DavSetCookie with the target URL and still sends NTLM. The rundll32 parent is svchost, not Outlook, so the hunt ties it to Outlook by time and device instead of process tree. Tuning: SharePoint, OneDrive, Office, Live and other Microsoft hosts are excluded, as are private and single-label hosts, and your own domains through the allowlist pattern; the WebDAV call must follow a message-file open within 2 minutes, or follow an SMB attempt to the same IP. Expected false positives: a message that links to an approved external WebDAV server, such as a partner's Nextcloud. Allowlist the domain. Symantec Threat Hunter Team
Log sourceDefender XDR DeviceProcessEvents, DeviceFileEvents and DeviceNetworkEvents; Sysmon event 1 and 11 in Splunk or Google SecOps
QueriesKQL · SPL · YARA-L
hunt Outlook message file opened, then NTLM sent to a public IP
Look forOutgoing NTLM (Microsoft-Windows-NTLM/Operational event 8001) to a public IP address within 2 minutes after Outlook opens a .msg or .eml file on the same device
Why it mattersEvent 8001 records every NTLM authentication a workstation attempts to a remote server, whichever program was tricked, and covers SMB and WebDAV. Tuning: only targets that are public IP addresses (cifs/, http/, host/ or ldap/ followed by an IP) count; private, loopback, link-local, CGNAT and multicast ranges and your allowlisted ranges are dropped; the event must follow a message-file open on the same host within 2 minutes. Generic 4624 and 4648 logons are left out because they cannot show the destination of an outgoing NTLM attempt. Expected false positives: an approved external server reached by IP right after opening a message. Allowlist it. The hunt returns nothing until the audit policy is on. ctxsec.com
Log sourceMicrosoft-Windows-NTLM/Operational on workstations (WindowsEvent or Event table in Sentinel, WinEventLog in Splunk), with Defender XDR DeviceFileEvents and DeviceProcessEvents for the Outlook open. Needs the policy Network security: Restrict NTLM: Outgoing NTLM traffic to remote servers set to Audit all
QueriesKQL · SPL
Affected countries and sectors
- Targets
- Not stated
- Sectors
- Not stated
Background
Microsoft patched CVE-2026-124194 on 10 November 2026 and marks it Exploitation Detected; CISA added it to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog the same day, with a 24 November deadline. A user who opens a crafted message file (.msg or .eml) makes Outlook connect to an attacker-controlled network location without the usual external-content warning, and Windows sends the user's NTLMv2 response, which can be cracked or relayed. The Preview Pane is not an attack vector. Microsoft, CISA and the researchers who covered the flaw have published no attacker IP addresses, domains, file hashes, sender addresses or file names, so this entry is hunt and alert only. Its three correlated hunts tie a message-file open in Outlook to SMB, WebDAV or NTLM traffic to a new public address on the same device within 2 minutes.