NIKKE launcher k2f-agent
NIKKE Launcher Abused to Deliver the k2f-agent Stealer
- Published
- 12 November 2026
- Added
- 12 November 2026, 22:55 UK
- Last updated
- 12 November 2026
5 to block now4 to hunt3 behaviours to hunt
Hunt3 platforms
Run the hunt before you block, to find past activity. The same hunt is published for each platform. Preview and copy the queries in the dashboard.
- Defender XDRKQLDefender portal > Hunting > Advanced hunting. Paste and run over 30 days.Download hunt.kql
- SplunkSPLSearch & Reporting, last 30 days or more. Reads the CIM data models.Download hunt.spl
- Google SecOpsYARA-L 2.0Rules Editor. Paste, Retrohunt over 30 days, then turn on live mode.Download hunt.yaral
These queries can return false positives. Know your environment and confirm a hit before acting.
Summary
NIKKE PC launcher task channel abused to deliver a Lua stealer targeting browsers, wallets and developer secrets. Stolen data left through the launcher's normal telemetry, and the download, collection, exfiltration and cleanup finished in under ten minutes.
Do now
- Block the 5 indicators.
- Run the hunt.
- Check for the listed behaviours.
Indicators 9
| Value | Type | Action | Copy |
|---|---|---|---|
insightjs[.]com | Domain | block | |
analytics[.]insightjs[.]com | Domain | block | |
89[.]127[.]233[.]127 | IPv4 | block | |
hxxps://analytics…ght.bundle | URL | block | |
cc0ad05bfe85940a6…d0b35973ec | SHA256 | block | |
Launcher\log\tiny…yget.*.log | File name | alert | |
%TEMP%\k2f-bcreds-*.db | File name | alert | |
722b99d8d0e9 | Other | alert | |
k2f_chan registered | Other | alert |
Sources Bitdefender
More detail
What to do
- Block insightjs[.]com, analytics[.]insightjs[.]com and 89[.]127[.]233[.]127, and the payload URL and SHA-256 hash, and search 90 days of DNS, proxy and firewall logs for them.
- On PCs that ran the NIKKE launcher from late October, look for k2f_chan registered in Launcher\intl_service\debug.log, LuaJIT bytecode in Launcher\log\tinyget\tinyget.*.log, and %TEMP%\k2f-bcreds-*.db, and for the signed launcher opening browser credential stores.
- If the agent ran, rotate passwords stored in Chrome, Edge and Opera, move assets from the targeted wallet extensions onto new seed phrases generated on a clean machine, and rotate SSH, GPG, Git, Kubernetes and Windows Credential Manager secrets.
- Do not block official NIKKE, Shift Up or Level Infinite domains or the signed launcher by name alone.
Behaviours to hunt 3
Behaviours are leads, not confirmed indicators, and can match legitimate activity. Compare any hit against your own baseline and environment before acting.
alert A signed NIKKE game-launcher process opening Chrome
Look forA signed NIKKE game-launcher process opening Chrome, Edge or Opera Login Data, Login Data For Account, Local State, or cryptocurrency-wallet extension Local Extension Settings .ldb files
Why it mattersk2f-agent runs inside the legitimate launcher and harvests browser passwords, cookies (including Chrome App-Bound Encryption) and wallet extensions (MetaMask, Phantom, Coinbase Wallet, Keplr, TronLink), plus developer secrets. The whole collection and cleanup can finish in under ten minutes. Bitdefender
Log sourceEDR file and process events (DeviceFileEvents, DeviceProcessEvents), Sysmon 11 and 1
QueriesNone yet: check by hand
alert A .log file under Launcher\log\tinyget
Look forA .log file under Launcher\log\tinyget, especially tinyget.*.log larger than about 50 KB, whose first bytes are LuaJIT bytecode (\x1bLJ\x01) rather than text
Why it mattersThe stealer arrived as obfuscated LuaJIT bytecode disguised as an ordinary log file, fetched through the launcher's server-pushed task channel. The file is usually deleted quickly. Bitdefender
Log sourceEndpoint file events, forensic collection of the NIKKE Launcher log folder
QueriesNone yet: check by hand
alert The launcher process connecting to insightjs[.]com or analytics[.]insightjs[.]com
Look forThe launcher process connecting to insightjs[.]com or analytics[.]insightjs[.]com, or the string k2f_chan registered in Launcher\intl_service\debug.log, or %TEMP%\k2f-bcreds-*.db
Why it mattersThose domains hosted the payload. k2f_chan registered shows the Lua agent executed. The temporary database holds stolen browser credentials. Do not block NIKKE, Shift Up or Level Infinite infrastructure; the launcher itself was abused, not trojanised in the game distribution. Bitdefender
Log sourceProxy, DNS and firewall logs; launcher debug.log; endpoint file events
QueriesNone yet: check by hand
Affected countries and sectors
- Targets
- Global
- Sectors
- Consumers, Gaming, Software developers
Background
Bitdefender reports that from 30 October 2026 attackers abused the Goddess of Victory: NIKKE PC launcher's server-pushed task channel to deliver k2f-agent, a 46-module Lua stealer, without patching the signed launcher or the game distribution. The payload arrived as obfuscated LuaJIT bytecode disguised as a log file, ran inside the launcher's embedded browser, and harvested Chrome, Edge and Opera passwords and cookies, including those protected by Chrome App-Bound Encryption, plus MetaMask, Phantom, Coinbase Wallet, Keplr and TronLink extension data and developer secrets such as SSH and GPG keys, Git credentials and Kubernetes configs. Stolen data left through the launcher's normal telemetry, and the download, collection, exfiltration and cleanup finished in under ten minutes. The delivery domain insightjs[.]com was registered on 27 September 2026 and hosted in Iceland at 89[.]127[.]233[.]127; the provider has taken the server down. The domains, IP, payload URL and SHA-256 hash are on the block list. Bitdefender has no evidence that Shift Up or Level Infinite took part in the attack; do not block the game vendor's own infrastructure.