Nation-state / espionageHighTLP:CLEAR

Mustang Panda LOTUSLITE V2

Mustang Panda LOTUSLITE V2 Side-Loads via Signed PDFgear in Thailand Espionage Campaign

Published
15 November 2026
Added
16 November 2026, 08:55 UK
Last updated
16 November 2026

4 to block now1 to hunt3 behaviours to hunt

Hunt3 platforms

Run the hunt before you block, to find past activity. The same hunt is published for each platform. Preview and copy the queries in the dashboard.

  • Defender XDRKQLDefender portal > Hunting > Advanced hunting. Paste and run over 30 days.Download hunt.kql
  • SplunkSPLSearch & Reporting, last 30 days or more. Reads the CIM data models.Download hunt.spl
  • Google SecOpsYARA-L 2.0Rules Editor. Paste, Retrohunt over 30 days, then turn on live mode.Download hunt.yaral

These queries can return false positives. Know your environment and confirm a hit before acting.

Summary

Thailand-focused campaign side-loads the LOTUSLITE V2 .NET backdoor, linked to Mustang Panda, through a signed executable in ProgramData\Microsoft\DeviceSync. A public Zoho WorkDrive link served Integrated_Assessment_Indo-Pacific_Economic_and_Security.zip, whose executable creates C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\DeviceSync, stages RegExt.exe and CommonLib.dll there and side-loads the DLL.

Do now

  1. Block the 4 indicators.
  2. Run the hunt.
  3. Check for RegExt.exe.

Indicators 5

ValueTypeActionCopy
31[.]59[.]184[.]185IPv4block
103[.]175[.]50[.]32IPv4block
d74fee10090cae176…7297e5014fSHA256block
4748571d98c6af34f…af8aa78937SHA256block
33cf56f15b9e069e3…e1968515eaSHA256alert

Sources Antares Research · MalwareBazaar · GBHackers

More detail
Note The Mustang Panda attribution is Antares Research's assessment from code lineage and targeting, not independently confirmed. The executable hash 33cf56f1... is a signed file with no detections and is alert only; do not block it. Zoho WorkDrive is a legitimate service the actor abused and must not be blocked.

What to do

  1. Block 31[.]59[.]184[.]185, 103[.]175[.]50[.]32, the ZIP and the CommonLib.dll hash, and search firewall, proxy, DNS and EDR logs back to October 2026.
  2. Hunt for RegExt.exe, CommonLib.dll or PDFLauncher.exe under C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\DeviceSync, and for Run or Windows\Load values and PdfGear.App.1 open commands that point there.
  3. Alert on downloads of Zoho WorkDrive ZIP files followed by a new executable in ProgramData on the same device, and warn government and policy staff in South-East Asia about Indo-Pacific assessment lures.

Behaviours to hunt 3

Behaviours are leads, not confirmed indicators, and can match legitimate activity. Compare any hit against your own baseline and environment before acting.

  1. alert LOTUSLITE V2 files in ProgramData\Microsoft\DeviceSync

    Look forRegExt.exe, CommonLib.dll or PDFLauncher.exe written to or run from C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\DeviceSync, or CommonLib.dll loaded from that folder

    Why it mattersAntares shows the assessment-named .NET executable creating C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\DeviceSync, dropping RegExt.exe and CommonLib.dll there and RegExt.exe side-loading CommonLib.dll, with PDFLauncher.exe in the same folder as the hijacked PDF handler. Windows and PDFgear do not use a DeviceSync folder under ProgramData\Microsoft (PDFgear installs under Program Files), so these file names in that path have no known legitimate source. Expected false positives: none known; the folder name may change in later builds, so a miss is inconclusive. Antares Research

    Log sourceDefender XDR DeviceFileEvents, DeviceProcessEvents and DeviceImageLoadEvents; EDR file, process and module-load events

    QueriesKQL · SPL

  2. alert Run, Load or PdfGear.App.1 values pointing to DeviceSync

    Look forRun, Windows\Load or PdfGear.App.1 open-command registry values pointing into \Microsoft\DeviceSync\

    Why it mattersAntares shows TrySetPersistKey writing the executable to the system Run key when running as SYSTEM and otherwise to the user's Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows\Load value, and RegExt.exe rewriting the PdfGear.App.1 shell open command to run PDFLauncher.exe from DeviceSync with %1. The hunt requires the value data to point into \Microsoft\DeviceSync\, which no legitimate software uses. Expected false positives: none known. Antares Research

    Log sourceDefender XDR DeviceRegistryEvents; Sysmon event 13

    QueriesKQL

  3. hunt DeviceSync process connecting to the internet

    Look forProcess running from C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\DeviceSync making outbound connections to public addresses

    Why it mattersAntares shows the side-loaded implant beaconing over WSS on ports 443, 80, 22, 21, 8080 and 1080 or UDP 53 with retries after 1, 3, 5, 10 and 30 seconds. A process image in \ProgramData\Microsoft\DeviceSync\ reaching a public address is a strong lead even after the C2 addresses rotate. The hunt excludes private, loopback and link-local destinations. Expected false positives: none known. Antares Research

    Log sourceDefender XDR DeviceNetworkEvents; firewall logs

    QueriesKQL

Affected countries and sectors

Targets
Thailand, South-East Asia
Sectors
Not stated

Background

Antares Research reported on 15 November 2026 a Thailand-focused campaign delivering LOTUSLITE V2, a .NET rewrite of the LOTUSLITE backdoor that earlier research attributed to the China-nexus actor Mustang Panda (Earth Preta); Antares links V2 to LOTUSLITE with high confidence, and the Mustang Panda link is its assessment. A public Zoho WorkDrive link served Integrated_Assessment_Indo-Pacific_Economic_and_Security.zip, whose executable creates C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\DeviceSync, stages RegExt.exe and CommonLib.dll there and side-loads the DLL. Persistence uses an HKLM Run value when running as SYSTEM or the HKCU Windows\Load value otherwise, and the PdfGear.App.1 open command is hijacked to run PDFLauncher.exe from DeviceSync. The implant holds the mutex PDFgear_DeviceSync_Mutex and talks to 31[.]59[.]184[.]185 and 103[.]175[.]50[.]32 over WSS on ports 443, 80, 22, 21, 8080 and 1080 or UDP 53, using a new PRO1 (0x50524F31) magic and AES-256-GCM. Both C2 addresses, the ZIP and the CommonLib.dll hash are on the block list; the signed executable hash is alert only.

Downloads

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MITRE ATT&CK10

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