Crimeware / cryptominingCriticalTLP:CLEAR

MSSQL miner and Gh0st

MSSQL T-SQL Brute-Force Campaign Delivering an XMRig Miner and Gh0st RAT

Published
12 November 2026
Added
12 November 2026, 22:55 UK
Last updated
12 November 2026

19 to block now4 to hunt3 behaviours to hunt

Hunt3 platforms

Run the hunt before you block, to find past activity. The same hunt is published for each platform. Preview and copy the queries in the dashboard.

  • Defender XDRKQLDefender portal > Hunting > Advanced hunting. Paste and run over 30 days.Download hunt.kql
  • SplunkSPLSearch & Reporting, last 30 days or more. Reads the CIM data models.Download hunt.spl
  • Google SecOpsYARA-L 2.0Rules Editor. Paste, Retrohunt over 30 days, then turn on live mode.Download hunt.yaral

These queries can return false positives. Know your environment and confirm a hit before acting.

Summary

Exposed SQL Servers brute-forced then abused with T-SQL to drop an XMRig miner and Gh0st RAT. Later stages drop an XMRig miner disguised as MicrosoftEdgeUpdate.exe and a Themida-packed Gh0st RAT as winlogon.exe, which talks to server[.]vietnam852[.]com:8000 and www.swordaa.com:8000.

Do now

  1. Block the 19 indicators.
  2. Run the hunt.
  3. Check for sqlservr.exe.

Indicators 23

ValueTypeActionCopy
vietnam852[.]comDomainblock
site[.]vietnam852[.]comDomainblock
ftp[.]vietnam852[.]comDomainblock
server[.]vietnam852[.]comDomainblock
swordaa[.]comDomainblock
hxxp://site[.]vie…:88/ip.phpURLblock
hxxp://site[.]vie…8/down.exeURLblock
8ce2cd98ef6ceeece…5bf6c0076dSHA256block
f5444e8e9e9e01969…a017588eb4SHA256block
2a0d2889241885d5e…9c0225b379SHA256block
79596cf6e267ef5cb…2b5dd5666cSHA256block
e9d3fd9093c476b8b…ba4ea31ac9SHA256block
124774698fd3ede08…2978f7f4d0SHA256block
125d3a0efe7699bb2…6a5b14c427SHA256block
20983573b840447e1…4ec5051cb0SHA256block
58db0ca2054abe298…d56c7e8f05SHA256block
2a23e10bfc097e982…ca216c3061SHA256block
da4128aa5d006e05c…c7a3498724SHA256block
3f64b0146b323c571…470a29e1a0SHA256block
2018.sqlFile namealert
%TEMP%\Result.txtFile namealert
MicrosoftEdgeUpda…E74B016A2}Otheralert
MicrosoftEdgeUpda…A4911C159}Otheralert

Sources Fortinet · URLhaus · MalwareBazaar

More detail
Note FortiGuard Labs did not name victims. sqlcmd.exe was among the files downloaded from the attacker server but that hash is omitted here because it may be a copy of the legitimate Microsoft tool. xmr-ru.kryptex.network is a public mining pool and is not listed as a block.

What to do

  1. Block vietnam852[.]com, site[.]vietnam852[.]com, ftp[.]vietnam852[.]com, server[.]vietnam852[.]com and swordaa[.]com, and the published payload URLs and SHA-256 hashes, and search 90 days of proxy, firewall, DNS and EDR logs for them.
  2. Hunt internet-facing SQL Server hosts for xp_cmdshell being enabled, sqlservr.exe writing executables under C:\Users\Public, and the scheduled-task names MicrosoftEdgeUpdateTaskMachineUA{CEC15D9B-F4BB-446A-B6E1-C61E74B016A2} and MicrosoftEdgeUpdateTaskMachineCore{4C33CE3F-7722-4257-AF83-351A4911C159}.
  3. If confirmed, isolate the SQL Server, rotate its credentials and any accounts in the dumped lists, remove the fake Edge Update tasks and dropped binaries, and check for the Gh0st RAT and miner stages.
  4. Do not block public Kryptex mining pools; use the attacker domains and the XMRig Reporter user-agent as the network hunt.

Behaviours to hunt 3

Behaviours are leads, not confirmed indicators, and can match legitimate activity. Compare any hit against your own baseline and environment before acting.

  1. alert sqlservr.exe enabling xp_cmdshell

    Look forsqlservr.exe enabling xp_cmdshell, then downloading a file from site[.]vietnam852[.]com or ftp[.]vietnam852[.]com and writing Google.exe, payload.exe or Secs.exe under C:\Users\Public

    Why it mattersAfter a successful brute force, the campaign's 2018.sql T-SQL enables xp_cmdshell and pulls a loader that drops a miner and a Gh0st RAT. FortiGuard Labs observed this chain against internet-facing SQL Server instances in early October 2026. Fortinet

    Log sourceSQL Server logs, EDR process and file events, proxy and firewall logs

    QueriesNone yet: check by hand

  2. alert Scheduled tasks named...

    Look forScheduled tasks named MicrosoftEdgeUpdateTaskMachineUA{CEC15D9B-F4BB-446A-B6E1-C61E74B016A2} (every 30 minutes) or MicrosoftEdgeUpdateTaskMachineCore{4C33CE3F-7722-4257-AF83-351A4911C159} (daily 01:00 running C:\Users\Public\Secs.exe)

    Why it mattersThe orchestrator and later stage persist under fake Microsoft Edge Update task names. These GUIDs are specific to this campaign. Fortinet

    Log sourceWindows scheduled-task events (4698), EDR process events, schtasks queries

    QueriesNone yet: check by hand

  3. alert Outbound HTTP to site[.]vietnam852[.]com:88/ip.php or /tj/xmr.php

    Look forOutbound HTTP to site[.]vietnam852[.]com:88/ip.php or /tj/xmr.php, FTP to ftp[.]vietnam852[.]com, or TCP 8000 to server[.]vietnam852[.]com or www.swordaa.com, and a user-agent XMRig Reporter

    Why it mattersip.php supplies scan ranges, the FTP host stages payloads, /tj/xmr.php is the miner reporter, and port 8000 is the Gh0st C2. Do not block public Kryptex mining pools; hunt the reporter and the attacker domains instead. Fortinet

    Log sourceProxy, firewall and DNS logs

    QueriesNone yet: check by hand

Affected countries and sectors

Targets
Global
Sectors
Any internet-facing Microsoft SQL Server

Background

FortiGuard Labs reports an early-October 2026 campaign against internet-facing Microsoft SQL Server instances that brute-forces logins and then abuses T-SQL to deploy malware. A UPX-packed Go orchestrator, named dllhost.exe and embedding the Naabu scanner, fetches a target range from site[.]vietnam852[.]com:88/ip.php, probes TCP 1433, writes hits to %TEMP%\Result.txt and hands them to dwm.exe with user and password lists. After a successful login, 2018.sql enables xp_cmdshell and downloads a loader from the same site or from ftp[.]vietnam852[.]com, saving it under C:\Users\Public as Google.exe or payload.exe. Later stages drop an XMRig miner disguised as MicrosoftEdgeUpdate.exe and a Themida-packed Gh0st RAT as winlogon.exe, which talks to server[.]vietnam852[.]com:8000 and www.swordaa.com:8000. Persistence uses scheduled tasks that imitate Microsoft Edge Update. The attacker domains, payload URLs and published hashes are on the block list. Do not block public Kryptex mining pools; hunt the XMRig Reporter check-ins to site[.]vietnam852[.]com instead.

Downloads

View folder in repository

MITRE ATT&CK9

Open in the live dashboard Get the blocklist