Supply chain / identityMediumTLP:CLEAR

MSP Process GDAP breach

MSP Process GDAP Breach: Entra Token Abuse in Partner Tenants

Published
9 November 2026
Added
10 November 2026, 13:43 UK
Last updated
10 November 2026

Nothing to block57 to hunt5 behaviours to hunt

Hunt3 platforms

Run the hunt before you block, to find past activity. The same hunt is published for each platform. Preview and copy the queries in the dashboard.

  • Defender XDRKQLDefender portal > Hunting > Advanced hunting. Paste and run over 30 days.Download hunt.kql
  • SplunkSPLSearch & Reporting, last 30 days or more. Reads the CIM data models.Download hunt.spl
  • Google SecOpsYARA-L 2.0Rules Editor. Paste, Retrohunt over 30 days, then turn on live mode.Download hunt.yaral

These queries can return false positives. Know your environment and confirm a hit before acting.

Summary

Stolen partner app secrets used for Graph token abuse in MSP customer tenants. Password-spray and client-secret attempts from a residential proxy pool preceded the breach on 6–7 November.

Do now

  1. Run the hunt.
  2. Check for the listed behaviours.
  3. Rotate the client secret of every Entra app connected to MSP….

Indicators 57

ValueTypeActionCopy
172[.]169[.]63[.]30IPv4alert
172[.]169[.]207[.]227IPv4alert
172[.]169[.]187[.]35IPv4alert
172[.]169[.]63[.]29IPv4alert
172[.]169[.]63[.]35IPv4alert
172[.]169[.]29[.]166IPv4alert
172[.]169[.]58[.]181IPv4alert
172[.]169[.]206[.]55IPv4alert
172[.]168[.]41[.]166IPv4alert
172[.]168[.]117[.]170IPv4alert
172[.]168[.]253[.]63IPv4alert
64[.]236[.]112[.]134IPv4alert
64[.]236[.]112[.]237IPv4alert
64[.]236[.]112[.]251IPv4alert
64[.]236[.]112[.]221IPv4alert
64[.]236[.]112[.]120IPv4alert
64[.]236[.]112[.]111IPv4alert
64[.]236[.]113[.]15IPv4alert
64[.]236[.]113[.]23IPv4alert
64[.]236[.]113[.]32IPv4alert
52[.]230[.]237[.]27IPv4alert
52[.]230[.]237[.]16IPv4alert
52[.]230[.]237[.]18IPv4alert
52[.]230[.]237[.]21IPv4alert
52[.]230[.]237[.]13IPv4alert
52[.]230[.]237[.]9IPv4alert
52[.]228[.]167[.]149IPv4alert
52[.]228[.]167[.]121IPv4alert
52[.]154[.]255[.]0IPv4alert
40[.]89[.]240[.]243IPv4alert
40[.]89[.]240[.]113IPv4alert
40[.]83[.]16[.]22IPv4alert
13[.]89[.]111[.]197IPv4alert
20[.]84[.]171[.]92IPv4alert
130[.]131[.]144[.]244IPv4alert
135[.]233[.]107[.]143IPv4alert
172[.]215[.]180[.]155IPv4alert
143[.]198[.]68[.]206IPv4alert
187[.]15[.]92[.]123IPv4alert
178[.]61[.]224[.]154IPv4alert
46[.]148[.]159[.]8IPv4alert
109[.]171[.]38[.]144IPv4alert
213[.]5[.]16[.]40IPv4alert
91[.]210[.]236[.]74IPv4alert
202[.]44[.]193[.]79IPv4alert
24[.]220[.]57[.]81IPv4alert
188[.]137[.]78[.]112IPv4alert
188[.]25[.]140[.]193IPv4alert
193[.]188[.]198[.]233IPv4alert
46[.]151[.]219[.]60IPv4alert
178[.]205[.]170[.]18IPv4alert
188[.]137[.]76[.]53IPv4alert
213[.]226[.]214[.]89IPv4alert
177[.]52[.]113[.]45IPv4alert
46[.]253[.]235[.]237IPv4alert
138[.]118[.]86[.]78IPv4alert
64[.]236[.]54[.]139IPv4monitor

Sources Inforcer · The Stack

More detail

What to do

  1. Rotate the client secret of every Entra app connected to MSP Process and revoke the admin refresh token used to connect it.
  2. Review Entra service-principal and non-interactive sign-ins for MSP Process app IDs from any IP other than 64[.]236[.]54[.]139.
  3. Audit app role assignments, new app secrets and GDAP security-group membership changes since 6 November 2026.
  4. Alert on 172[.]169[.]63[.]30 in Entra sign-ins; it is a shared Microsoft Azure IP, as are 143[.]198[.]68[.]206 (DigitalOcean) and most other addresses, so do not blanket-block.

Behaviours to hunt 5

Behaviours are leads, not confirmed indicators, and can match legitimate activity. Compare any hit against your own baseline and environment before acting.

  1. alert App sign-ins from outside the MSP Process address

    Look forService principal sign-ins for the app connected to MSP Process from any address other than 64[.]236[.]54[.]139, from 09:56 UTC on 7 November 2026

    Why it mattersMSP Process says to treat any other address as suspicious. The stolen secrets were used to get Microsoft Graph tokens without a user sign-in. Inforcer

    Log sourceEntra service principal sign-in logs, in the MSP's own tenant where the app is registered

    QueriesKQL · SPL

  2. hunt One address trying several partner app secrets

    Look forOne address using several partner app secrets within seconds, first failing (invalid client secret, missing service principal) and succeeding about an hour later

    Why it mattersInforcer saw this scripted pattern from 172[.]169[.]63[.]30 between 10:28 and 11:31 UTC on 7 November. The address is shared Azure space, so the pattern matters more than the IP. Inforcer

    Log sourceEntra service principal sign-in logs

    QueriesNone yet: check by hand

  3. alert Admin refresh token used from another address

    Look forNon-interactive user sign-ins with the connecting admin's refresh token from an address other than 64[.]236[.]54[.]139

    Why it mattersStolen refresh tokens show up here. Inforcer found the attempts failed where the token had expired through inactivity. Inforcer

    Log sourceEntra non-interactive user sign-in logs

    QueriesNone yet: check by hand

  4. alert Tenant changes made by the MSP Process app

    Look forNew app credentials, app role assignments, new users or GDAP security-group membership changes initiated by the MSP Process app since 6 November 2026

    Why it mattersThe app permissions MSP Process asked for (AppRoleAssignment.ReadWrite.All, Application.ReadWrite.All, Directory.ReadWrite.All) allow exactly these changes. Inforcer

    Log sourceEntra audit logs

    QueriesKQL · SPL

  5. hunt Graph requests with the app's tokens from another address

    Look forMicrosoft Graph requests made with the app's tokens from an address other than 64[.]236[.]54[.]139

    Why it mattersSign-in and audit logs cannot show what a token read; Graph activity logs can, and UniqueTokenIdentifier links a sign-in to its Graph requests. Inforcer

    Log sourceMicrosoft Graph activity logs (only if already enabled on 7 November)

    QueriesNone yet: check by hand

Affected countries and sectors

Targets
Not stated
Sectors
Managed service providers, MSP customers

Background

On 7 November 2026 MSP Process, a GDAP tooling vendor serving over 1,000 MSPs, told partners that an attacker had accessed one of its storage accounts (09:56–14:40 UTC) holding partners' Entra app client IDs and secrets, admin refresh tokens and GDAP relationship lists. The attacker used the stolen secrets to get Microsoft Graph tokens in partner and customer tenants with no user sign-in or MFA, and Huntress reported successful malicious token grants in 47 tenants. Password-spray and client-secret attempts from a residential proxy pool preceded the breach on 6–7 November. Any tenant connected to MSP Process should be treated as exposed.

Downloads

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MITRE ATT&CK4

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