MSP Process GDAP breach
MSP Process GDAP Breach: Entra Token Abuse in Partner Tenants
- Published
- 9 November 2026
- Added
- 10 November 2026, 13:43 UK
- Last updated
- 10 November 2026
Nothing to block57 to hunt5 behaviours to hunt
Hunt3 platforms
Run the hunt before you block, to find past activity. The same hunt is published for each platform. Preview and copy the queries in the dashboard.
- Defender XDRKQLDefender portal > Hunting > Advanced hunting. Paste and run over 30 days.Download hunt.kql
- SplunkSPLSearch & Reporting, last 30 days or more. Reads the CIM data models.Download hunt.spl
- Google SecOpsYARA-L 2.0Rules Editor. Paste, Retrohunt over 30 days, then turn on live mode.Download hunt.yaral
These queries can return false positives. Know your environment and confirm a hit before acting.
Summary
Stolen partner app secrets used for Graph token abuse in MSP customer tenants. Password-spray and client-secret attempts from a residential proxy pool preceded the breach on 6–7 November.
Do now
- Run the hunt.
- Check for the listed behaviours.
- Rotate the client secret of every Entra app connected to MSP….
Indicators 57
| Value | Type | Action | Copy |
|---|---|---|---|
172[.]169[.]63[.]30 | IPv4 | alert | |
172[.]169[.]207[.]227 | IPv4 | alert | |
172[.]169[.]187[.]35 | IPv4 | alert | |
172[.]169[.]63[.]29 | IPv4 | alert | |
172[.]169[.]63[.]35 | IPv4 | alert | |
172[.]169[.]29[.]166 | IPv4 | alert | |
172[.]169[.]58[.]181 | IPv4 | alert | |
172[.]169[.]206[.]55 | IPv4 | alert | |
172[.]168[.]41[.]166 | IPv4 | alert | |
172[.]168[.]117[.]170 | IPv4 | alert | |
172[.]168[.]253[.]63 | IPv4 | alert | |
64[.]236[.]112[.]134 | IPv4 | alert | |
64[.]236[.]112[.]237 | IPv4 | alert | |
64[.]236[.]112[.]251 | IPv4 | alert | |
64[.]236[.]112[.]221 | IPv4 | alert | |
64[.]236[.]112[.]120 | IPv4 | alert | |
64[.]236[.]112[.]111 | IPv4 | alert | |
64[.]236[.]113[.]15 | IPv4 | alert | |
64[.]236[.]113[.]23 | IPv4 | alert | |
64[.]236[.]113[.]32 | IPv4 | alert | |
52[.]230[.]237[.]27 | IPv4 | alert | |
52[.]230[.]237[.]16 | IPv4 | alert | |
52[.]230[.]237[.]18 | IPv4 | alert | |
52[.]230[.]237[.]21 | IPv4 | alert | |
52[.]230[.]237[.]13 | IPv4 | alert | |
52[.]230[.]237[.]9 | IPv4 | alert | |
52[.]228[.]167[.]149 | IPv4 | alert | |
52[.]228[.]167[.]121 | IPv4 | alert | |
52[.]154[.]255[.]0 | IPv4 | alert | |
40[.]89[.]240[.]243 | IPv4 | alert | |
40[.]89[.]240[.]113 | IPv4 | alert | |
40[.]83[.]16[.]22 | IPv4 | alert | |
13[.]89[.]111[.]197 | IPv4 | alert | |
20[.]84[.]171[.]92 | IPv4 | alert | |
130[.]131[.]144[.]244 | IPv4 | alert | |
135[.]233[.]107[.]143 | IPv4 | alert | |
172[.]215[.]180[.]155 | IPv4 | alert | |
143[.]198[.]68[.]206 | IPv4 | alert | |
187[.]15[.]92[.]123 | IPv4 | alert | |
178[.]61[.]224[.]154 | IPv4 | alert | |
46[.]148[.]159[.]8 | IPv4 | alert | |
109[.]171[.]38[.]144 | IPv4 | alert | |
213[.]5[.]16[.]40 | IPv4 | alert | |
91[.]210[.]236[.]74 | IPv4 | alert | |
202[.]44[.]193[.]79 | IPv4 | alert | |
24[.]220[.]57[.]81 | IPv4 | alert | |
188[.]137[.]78[.]112 | IPv4 | alert | |
188[.]25[.]140[.]193 | IPv4 | alert | |
193[.]188[.]198[.]233 | IPv4 | alert | |
46[.]151[.]219[.]60 | IPv4 | alert | |
178[.]205[.]170[.]18 | IPv4 | alert | |
188[.]137[.]76[.]53 | IPv4 | alert | |
213[.]226[.]214[.]89 | IPv4 | alert | |
177[.]52[.]113[.]45 | IPv4 | alert | |
46[.]253[.]235[.]237 | IPv4 | alert | |
138[.]118[.]86[.]78 | IPv4 | alert | |
64[.]236[.]54[.]139 | IPv4 | monitor |
More detail
What to do
- Rotate the client secret of every Entra app connected to MSP Process and revoke the admin refresh token used to connect it.
- Review Entra service-principal and non-interactive sign-ins for MSP Process app IDs from any IP other than 64[.]236[.]54[.]139.
- Audit app role assignments, new app secrets and GDAP security-group membership changes since 6 November 2026.
- Alert on 172[.]169[.]63[.]30 in Entra sign-ins; it is a shared Microsoft Azure IP, as are 143[.]198[.]68[.]206 (DigitalOcean) and most other addresses, so do not blanket-block.
Behaviours to hunt 5
Behaviours are leads, not confirmed indicators, and can match legitimate activity. Compare any hit against your own baseline and environment before acting.
alert App sign-ins from outside the MSP Process address
Look forService principal sign-ins for the app connected to MSP Process from any address other than 64[.]236[.]54[.]139, from 09:56 UTC on 7 November 2026
Why it mattersMSP Process says to treat any other address as suspicious. The stolen secrets were used to get Microsoft Graph tokens without a user sign-in. Inforcer
Log sourceEntra service principal sign-in logs, in the MSP's own tenant where the app is registered
QueriesKQL · SPL
hunt One address trying several partner app secrets
Look forOne address using several partner app secrets within seconds, first failing (invalid client secret, missing service principal) and succeeding about an hour later
Why it mattersInforcer saw this scripted pattern from 172[.]169[.]63[.]30 between 10:28 and 11:31 UTC on 7 November. The address is shared Azure space, so the pattern matters more than the IP. Inforcer
Log sourceEntra service principal sign-in logs
QueriesNone yet: check by hand
alert Admin refresh token used from another address
Look forNon-interactive user sign-ins with the connecting admin's refresh token from an address other than 64[.]236[.]54[.]139
Why it mattersStolen refresh tokens show up here. Inforcer found the attempts failed where the token had expired through inactivity. Inforcer
Log sourceEntra non-interactive user sign-in logs
QueriesNone yet: check by hand
alert Tenant changes made by the MSP Process app
Look forNew app credentials, app role assignments, new users or GDAP security-group membership changes initiated by the MSP Process app since 6 November 2026
Why it mattersThe app permissions MSP Process asked for (AppRoleAssignment.ReadWrite.All, Application.ReadWrite.All, Directory.ReadWrite.All) allow exactly these changes. Inforcer
Log sourceEntra audit logs
QueriesKQL · SPL
hunt Graph requests with the app's tokens from another address
Look forMicrosoft Graph requests made with the app's tokens from an address other than 64[.]236[.]54[.]139
Why it mattersSign-in and audit logs cannot show what a token read; Graph activity logs can, and UniqueTokenIdentifier links a sign-in to its Graph requests. Inforcer
Log sourceMicrosoft Graph activity logs (only if already enabled on 7 November)
QueriesNone yet: check by hand
Affected countries and sectors
- Targets
- Not stated
- Sectors
- Managed service providers, MSP customers
Background
On 7 November 2026 MSP Process, a GDAP tooling vendor serving over 1,000 MSPs, told partners that an attacker had accessed one of its storage accounts (09:56–14:40 UTC) holding partners' Entra app client IDs and secrets, admin refresh tokens and GDAP relationship lists. The attacker used the stolen secrets to get Microsoft Graph tokens in partner and customer tenants with no user sign-in or MFA, and Huntress reported successful malicious token grants in 47 tenants. Password-spray and client-secret attempts from a residential proxy pool preceded the breach on 6–7 November. Any tenant connected to MSP Process should be treated as exposed.