Espionage / APTHighTLP:CLEAR

Lazarus FlashHole

Lazarus Operation FlashHole: CrossWeb EX Abuse, GitHub-Issue C2 and Post-Quantum LPEClient

Published
21 October 2026
Added
12 November 2026, 12:25 UK
Last updated
12 November 2026

9 to block now13 to hunt4 behaviours to hunt

Hunt3 platforms

Run the hunt before you block, to find past activity. The same hunt is published for each platform. Preview and copy the queries in the dashboard.

  • Defender XDRKQLDefender portal > Hunting > Advanced hunting. Paste and run over 30 days.Download hunt.kql
  • SplunkSPLSearch & Reporting, last 30 days or more. Reads the CIM data models.Download hunt.spl
  • Google SecOpsYARA-L 2.0Rules Editor. Paste, Retrohunt over 30 days, then turn on live mode.Download hunt.yaral

These queries can return false positives. Know your environment and confirm a hit before acting.

Summary

Lazarus abusing CrossWeb EX with GitHub-issue C2 (TechHub) and compromised Korean sites for Cubridge and ClientHub. Kaspersky's GReAT documented Operation FlashHole, a Lazarus Group follow-up to Operation SyncHole that it presented at SAS on 11 November 2026.

Do now

  1. Block the 9 indicators.
  2. Run the hunt.
  3. Update INISAFE CrossWeb EX now.

Indicators 22

ValueTypeActionCopy
pythonapischool[.]comDomainblock
hxxps://pythonapi…api/detachURLblock
hxxps://javadevho…ery.min.jsURLblock
hxxps://cubedesig…[.]kr/newsURLblock
hxxps://cubedesig…le/fashionURLblock
hxxps://fp-news[.…/shop/cartURLblock
hxxps://k-wbc[.]c…l_view.phpURLblock
hxxps://rcsh[.]co…utForm.phpURLblock
hxxps://www[.]kso…handle.phpURLblock
javadevhouse[.]co[.]krDomainalert
ec84d6cb2ae797476…c246b50a3eOtheralert
a28cba214058fcae2…cffc883abdOtheralert
c105d6b16f5445827…159f24c00aOtheralert
2f8475a90a25624ed…18d4e6d65dOtheralert
676fabe30a28b5392…8e34b35986Otheralert
b4a7eff35f048f06f…7631f23a7dOtheralert
ff07641dc56914dd9…d7404d7ad7Otheralert
C:\Windows\System…scoree.dllOtheralert
C:\Windows\System…scoree.dllOtheralert
C:\Windows\System…nStore.datOtheralert
C:\Program Files\…\msadc.incOtheralert
C:\ProgramData\desktops.iniOtheralert

Sources Kaspersky · Safeguard

More detail
Note Kaspersky's report was published on 21 October 2026 and presented at SAS on 11 November; the January activity may be older than the indicators suggest. Six C2 URLs sit on compromised legitimate South Korean sites, so block the exact URLs, not the domains. javadevhouse[.]co[.]kr no longer resolves and its ownership is unconfirmed, so it is alert only. Hashes are MD5 only. Do not block GitHub, GitHub Pages, Dropbox or CrossWeb EX; hunt for unusual processes using them.

What to do

  1. Block the eight URLs and pythonapischool[.]com, alert on javadevhouse[.]co[.]kr, and search 90 days of proxy and DNS logs for all of them.
  2. Update INISAFE CrossWeb EX to the vendor's latest release or remove it where it is not required, and alert on INISAFECrossWebEXSvc.exe starting fsquirt.exe, a shell or any unsigned process.
  3. Hunt for mscoree.dll and ActivationStore.dat in System32\RasConv, System32\DrvConh and the ProgramData folders listed, and for services whose binary sits in those folders.
  4. Hunt for non-browser processes (fsquirt.exe, svchost.exe, rundll32.exe) calling api.github.com or the Dropbox API.
  5. If anything matches, isolate the host and collect memory: the first stage runs only in memory.

Behaviours to hunt 4

Behaviours are leads, not confirmed indicators, and can match legitimate activity. Compare any hit against your own baseline and environment before acting.

  1. alert CrossWeb EX service starting fsquirt or a shell

    Look forINISAFE CrossWeb EX service (INISAFECrossWebEXSvc.exe) starting fsquirt.exe, a shell or another unexpected child process

    Why it mattersIn FlashHole the chain began under INISAFECrossWebEXSvc.exe (CrossWeb EX V3 3[.]4[.]1[.]2) at high integrity, and the Bluetooth transfer tool fsquirt.exe was injected with the TechHub downloader. fsquirt.exe has no reason to run under that service. Kaspersky

    Log sourceEDR process events on Windows endpoints with CrossWeb EX installed

    QueriesKQL · SPL · YARA-L

  2. alert FlashHole side-loading DLL or payload file in odd folders

    Look formscoree.dll, ActivationStore.dat or msadc.inc in System32\RasConv, System32\DrvConh, Common Files\System\msadc or the ProgramData folders RasConv, Apple, ssh, qorestor and Dell

    Why it mattersTouchShift is side-loaded as mscoree.dll from these folders, the service-based TechHub reads ActivationStore.dat, and ClientHub keeps its SNOW-encrypted C2 list in msadc.inc. The real mscoree.dll lives in System32 itself, not in these subfolders. Kaspersky

    Log sourceEDR file and image-load events

    QueriesKQL · SPL · YARA-L

  3. alert Service pointing into System32 RasConv or DrvConh

    Look forA new service whose binary or ServiceDll sits in System32\RasConv or System32\DrvConh, named after a netsvcs service with two extra letters

    Why it mattersTouchHub copies a legitimate netsvcs service name, adds two random letters and registers a service that loads the side-loaded TouchShift DLL, so the service looks almost genuine. Kaspersky

    Log sourceEDR registry events; Windows System 7045 (service installed)

    QueriesKQL · SPL · YARA-L

  4. hunt Non-browser process calling GitHub or Dropbox APIs

    Look forNon-browser processes such as fsquirt.exe, rundll32.exe or a service host calling api.github.com or the Dropbox API

    Why it mattersTechHub uses a private GitHub repository and its issues as C2 (an issue titled 1 plus the host ID, body hel then hey), and one ClientHub build uses the Dropbox API. GitHub and Dropbox are legitimate, so the lead is the calling process. Kaspersky

    Log sourceEDR network events; proxy logs

    QueriesKQL · SPL

Affected countries and sectors

Targets
South Korea, East Asia
Sectors
Software, Construction, Telecommunications equipment

Background

Kaspersky's GReAT documented Operation FlashHole, a Lazarus Group follow-up to Operation SyncHole that it presented at SAS on 11 November 2026. Targets in South Korea's software, construction and wired-communication equipment sectors received tailored phishing links to fake résumé and portfolio sites on GitHub Pages; the sites loaded scripts from javadevhouse[.]co[.]kr and pythonapischool[.]com, and the infection ran through INISAFE CrossWeb EX 3[.]4[.]1[.]2, a security plug-in that Korean banking and government sites require. Under INISAFECrossWebEXSvc.exe, the Windows binary fsquirt.exe was injected with the TechHub downloader, which uses a private GitHub repository as C2: it opens an issue titled 1 plus a host ID with the body hel, swaps keys through repository files and changes the body to hey when ready. TechHub loads the Cubridge orchestrator, TouchHub installs a service for the TouchShift loader (side-loaded as mscoree.dll), and a second TechHub brings in ClientHub, which uses SNOW-encrypted config and compromised Korean websites or Dropbox as C2, and LPEClient, which now uses ML-KEM-1024. The two script hosts' URLs, pythonapischool[.]com and six C2 paths on compromised sites are on the block list.

Downloads

View folder in repository

MITRE ATT&CK11

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