Nation-state / espionageHighTLP:CLEAR

LIMINAL PANDA GTPDoor

LIMINAL PANDA GTPDoor v3 and SilentAir Mobile-Network Espionage

Published
11 November 2026
Added
13 November 2026, 11:03 UK
Last updated
13 November 2026

2 to block nowNothing to hunt1 behaviour to hunt

Hunt3 platforms

Run the hunt before you block, to find past activity. The same hunt is published for each platform. Preview and copy the queries in the dashboard.

  • Defender XDRKQLDefender portal > Hunting > Advanced hunting. Paste and run over 30 days.Download hunt.kql
  • SplunkSPLSearch & Reporting, last 30 days or more. Reads the CIM data models.Download hunt.spl
  • Google SecOpsYARA-L 2.0Rules Editor. Paste, Retrohunt over 30 days, then turn on live mode.Download hunt.yaral

These queries can return false positives. Know your environment and confirm a hit before acting.

Summary

China-nexus actors hide mobile-network C2 in GTP-U and abuse SS7 and Diameter to intercept calls, texts and 2FA. Enea also publishes an MD5 for SCTPE, a kernel-level tool that sends and receives SS7 and Diameter, as a sample reference.

Do now

  1. Block the 2 indicators.
  2. Run the hunt.
  3. Check for the listed behaviours.

Indicators 2

ValueTypeActionCopy
35f0d4d0c5519a295…448fce53bcMD5block
da35d98c9a22e8ede…d21fe7e63eMD5block

Sources Enea

More detail
Note Enea published only MD5s, with no SHA256 or network indicators. A raw-socket or libpcap process on a telco node is too common (packet capture, probes, signalling firewalls) to hunt on its own without a published process name or path, so that behaviour is omitted. SilentAir's link to LIMINAL PANDA is unconfirmed.

What to do

  1. Block the MD5s 35f0d4d0c5519a2957338e448fce53bc (GTPDoor v3) and da35d98c9a22e8ede93595d21fe7e63e (SCTPE), and hunt file and process hashes on Linux hosts, especially telco and signalling nodes.
  2. On mobile-operator networks, deploy or tighten GTP-C and GTP-U security and align it with SS7 and Diameter signalling defences.
  3. For high-risk people who may be SilentAir targets, stop relying on SMS two-factor authentication.

Behaviours to hunt 1

Behaviours are leads, not confirmed indicators, and can match legitimate activity. Compare any hit against your own baseline and environment before acting.

  1. alert GTPDoor v3 or SCTPE MD5 on a Linux host

    Look forA file or process whose MD5 is 35f0d4d0c5519a2957338e448fce53bc (GTPDoor v3) or da35d98c9a22e8ede93595d21fe7e63e (SCTPE) on a Linux host, especially a telco or signalling node

    Why it mattersThese are the only indicators Enea published for GTPDoor v3 and SCTPE. A hash match is high fidelity. This activity is specific to mobile-operator and signalling networks; a generic raw-socket or libpcap process on a telco node is too common (packet capture, probes, signalling firewalls) to hunt without a published process name, so that behaviour is omitted. Expected false positives: none of practical concern for an exact MD5 match. Enea

    Log sourceDefender XDR DeviceFileEvents and DeviceProcessEvents, Splunk endpoint file and process logs, Google SecOps file and process UDM

    QueriesSPL · YARA-L

Affected countries and sectors

Targets
Taiwan, Asia, Europe
Sectors
Telecommunications, Government

Background

Enea, writing on 11 November 2026 and adding key takeaways on 12 November, reports ongoing 2026 activity by the China-nexus actor LIMINAL PANDA inside mobile-operator networks, and names a second signalling-plane actor, SilentAir, whose activity it also believes aligns with China-nexus operations, with the link between the two unconfirmed. SilentAir has been observed in at least six Asian operators, with Taiwanese subscribers the primary target and high-profile people in about a dozen other countries, Europe included; it abuses SS7 and Diameter to track location, intercept calls and text messages (including two-factor authentication codes) and send silent SMS. LIMINAL PANDA now uses GTPDoor v3, which hides command-and-control inside GTP-U rather than GTP-C and captures traffic with libpcap instead of a raw-socket receive path. Enea also publishes an MD5 for SCTPE, a kernel-level tool that sends and receives SS7 and Diameter, as a sample reference. Both hashes are on the block list. This activity is specific to mobile-operator and signalling networks.

Downloads

View folder in repository

MITRE ATT&CK5

Open in the live dashboard Get the blocklist