LIMINAL PANDA GTPDoor
LIMINAL PANDA GTPDoor v3 and SilentAir Mobile-Network Espionage
- Published
- 11 November 2026
- Added
- 13 November 2026, 11:03 UK
- Last updated
- 13 November 2026
2 to block nowNothing to hunt1 behaviour to hunt
Hunt3 platforms
Run the hunt before you block, to find past activity. The same hunt is published for each platform. Preview and copy the queries in the dashboard.
- Defender XDRKQLDefender portal > Hunting > Advanced hunting. Paste and run over 30 days.Download hunt.kql
- SplunkSPLSearch & Reporting, last 30 days or more. Reads the CIM data models.Download hunt.spl
- Google SecOpsYARA-L 2.0Rules Editor. Paste, Retrohunt over 30 days, then turn on live mode.Download hunt.yaral
These queries can return false positives. Know your environment and confirm a hit before acting.
Summary
China-nexus actors hide mobile-network C2 in GTP-U and abuse SS7 and Diameter to intercept calls, texts and 2FA. Enea also publishes an MD5 for SCTPE, a kernel-level tool that sends and receives SS7 and Diameter, as a sample reference.
Do now
- Block the 2 indicators.
- Run the hunt.
- Check for the listed behaviours.
Indicators 2
| Value | Type | Action | Copy |
|---|---|---|---|
35f0d4d0c5519a295…448fce53bc | MD5 | block | |
da35d98c9a22e8ede…d21fe7e63e | MD5 | block |
Sources Enea
More detail
What to do
- Block the MD5s 35f0d4d0c5519a2957338e448fce53bc (GTPDoor v3) and da35d98c9a22e8ede93595d21fe7e63e (SCTPE), and hunt file and process hashes on Linux hosts, especially telco and signalling nodes.
- On mobile-operator networks, deploy or tighten GTP-C and GTP-U security and align it with SS7 and Diameter signalling defences.
- For high-risk people who may be SilentAir targets, stop relying on SMS two-factor authentication.
Behaviours to hunt 1
Behaviours are leads, not confirmed indicators, and can match legitimate activity. Compare any hit against your own baseline and environment before acting.
alert GTPDoor v3 or SCTPE MD5 on a Linux host
Look forA file or process whose MD5 is 35f0d4d0c5519a2957338e448fce53bc (GTPDoor v3) or da35d98c9a22e8ede93595d21fe7e63e (SCTPE) on a Linux host, especially a telco or signalling node
Why it mattersThese are the only indicators Enea published for GTPDoor v3 and SCTPE. A hash match is high fidelity. This activity is specific to mobile-operator and signalling networks; a generic raw-socket or libpcap process on a telco node is too common (packet capture, probes, signalling firewalls) to hunt without a published process name, so that behaviour is omitted. Expected false positives: none of practical concern for an exact MD5 match. Enea
Log sourceDefender XDR DeviceFileEvents and DeviceProcessEvents, Splunk endpoint file and process logs, Google SecOps file and process UDM
QueriesSPL · YARA-L
Affected countries and sectors
- Targets
- Taiwan, Asia, Europe
- Sectors
- Telecommunications, Government
Background
Enea, writing on 11 November 2026 and adding key takeaways on 12 November, reports ongoing 2026 activity by the China-nexus actor LIMINAL PANDA inside mobile-operator networks, and names a second signalling-plane actor, SilentAir, whose activity it also believes aligns with China-nexus operations, with the link between the two unconfirmed. SilentAir has been observed in at least six Asian operators, with Taiwanese subscribers the primary target and high-profile people in about a dozen other countries, Europe included; it abuses SS7 and Diameter to track location, intercept calls and text messages (including two-factor authentication codes) and send silent SMS. LIMINAL PANDA now uses GTPDoor v3, which hides command-and-control inside GTP-U rather than GTP-C and captures traffic with libpcap instead of a raw-socket receive path. Enea also publishes an MD5 for SCTPE, a kernel-level tool that sends and receives SS7 and Diameter, as a sample reference. Both hashes are on the block list. This activity is specific to mobile-operator and signalling networks.