Nation-state / espionageCriticalTLP:CLEAR

Kimsuky NodeLinkRAT

Kimsuky Uses Note-Page C2 and NodeLinkRAT Against South Korean Policy Experts

Published
16 November 2026
Added
16 November 2026, 04:58 UK
Last updated
16 November 2026

11 to block now5 to hunt3 behaviours to hunt

Hunt3 platforms

Run the hunt before you block, to find past activity. The same hunt is published for each platform. Preview and copy the queries in the dashboard.

  • Defender XDRKQLDefender portal > Hunting > Advanced hunting. Paste and run over 30 days.Download hunt.kql
  • SplunkSPLSearch & Reporting, last 30 days or more. Reads the CIM data models.Download hunt.spl
  • Google SecOpsYARA-L 2.0Rules Editor. Paste, Retrohunt over 30 days, then turn on live mode.Download hunt.yaral

These queries can return false positives. Know your environment and confirm a hit before acting.

Summary

North Korea-linked Kimsuky ran code from an anotepad.com note page and installed NodeLinkRAT on Node.js to spy on South Korean policy experts. Genians Security Center reported on 16 November 2026 a spear-phishing campaign it attributes to North Korea's Kimsuky with….

Do now

  1. Block the 11 indicators.
  2. Run the hunt.
  3. Check for node.exe.

Indicators 16

ValueTypeActionCopy
207[.]148[.]112[.]166IPv4block
103[.]81[.]116[.]10IPv4block
epaper[.]dothome[.]co[.]krDomainblock
oppsite[.]dothome[.]co[.]krDomainblock
nid[.]weffm[.]p-e[.]krDomainblock
6985f297c03520a58…a385322d8dMD5block
a151531b792b1df1e…a6a8e1ded5MD5block
a15df586bf29e7c1a…d603cee382MD5block
cbcb66b530fb4f03d…55271b2ce4MD5block
7575d230350299cfd…993d761333MD5block
ef317291bf8865166…be84f115f0MD5block
211[.]223[.]14[.]75IPv4alert
185[.]27[.]134[.]207IPv4alert
185[.]27[.]134[.]120IPv4alert
inmain[.]22web[.]orgDomainalert
owna[.]loveslife[.]bizDomainalert

Sources Genians · Korea JoongAng Daily

More detail
Note Genians attributes the campaign to Kimsuky with moderate confidence. anotepad.com, Dropbox, MEGA, nodejs.org and the npm registry are legitimate services the actor abused and must not be blocked. 185[.]27[.]134[.]207, 185[.]27[.]134[.]120 and 211[.]223[.]14[.]75 sit on shared free hosting or a fixed-line ISP and are alert only; inmain[.]22web[.]org and owna[.]loveslife[.]biz date from a 2024 phishing wave and are alert only. Task and file names may change per victim.

What to do

  1. Block 207[.]148[.]112[.]166, 103[.]81[.]116[.]10, epaper[.]dothome[.]co[.]kr, oppsite[.]dothome[.]co[.]kr and nid[.]weffm[.]p-e[.]kr and the six published hashes, and search DNS, proxy, firewall and EDR logs back to June 2026.
  2. Hunt for node.exe or teamview.js under C:\Users\Public\Music, the CommonMaintenanceHost scheduled task, wscript.exe running a .Jcu file and UPA.ps1 in AppData.
  3. Alert on PowerShell, wscript or curl.exe reaching anotepad.com or dothome.co.kr hosts, and on outbound connections to port 3000 from node.exe.
  4. Warn staff who work on North Korea policy that a sender who asks them to reply before sending an attachment may be setting up a trusted follow-up lure, and block LNK files inside ZIP attachments at the mail gateway.

Behaviours to hunt 3

Behaviours are leads, not confirmed indicators, and can match legitimate activity. Compare any hit against your own baseline and environment before acting.

  1. alert node.exe or teamview.js in the Public Music folder

    Look fornode.exe running teamview.js from C:\Users\Public\Music\njs, or teamview.js / unins000.dat written to C:\Users\Public\Music

    Why it mattersGenians shows the note-page script downloading the official Node.js zip, extracting it to C:\Users\Public\Music, renaming the folder to njs, dropping an empty unins000.dat marker and the Base64-decoded RAT as teamview.js, then running node.exe teamview.js in a hidden window. Genuine Node.js installs live under Program Files, the user profile or nvm folders, never the Public Music folder, so a node.exe image under \Users\Public\Music\ or a teamview.js file there has no known legitimate source. Expected false positives: none known; the file names alone are generic, so the hunt requires the Public\Music path. Genians

    Log sourceDefender XDR DeviceProcessEvents and DeviceFileEvents; EDR process and file events

    QueriesKQL · SPL · YARA-L

  2. alert CommonMaintenanceHost task, .Jcu VBScript or UPA.ps1

    Look forScheduled task CommonMaintenanceHost, or wscript.exe running a .Jcu file that launches UPA.ps1 from AppData

    Why it mattersGenians shows the second-stage loader writing a VBScript with a .Jcu extension and UPA.ps1 to %APPDATA%, then registering a task named CommonMaintenanceHost that starts a minute later and repeats every 38 minutes, running wscript against the .Jcu file, which launches UPA.ps1 hidden to fetch the next stage from a note page. Windows has no built-in task by that name and wscript does not normally run files with a .Jcu extension. The task name and file names can change between victims, so treat a miss as inconclusive; expected false positives: none known. Genians

    Log sourceDefender XDR DeviceEvents (ScheduledTaskCreated) and DeviceProcessEvents; Windows Security 4698

    QueriesKQL · SPL · YARA-L

  3. hunt Script hosts reading anotepad.com or Dothome hosts

    Look forPowerShell, wscript or curl.exe reaching anotepad.com, or curl.exe started by PowerShell fetching from a dothome.co.kr host

    Why it mattersGenians shows the LNK launching a hidden PowerShell that rebuilds a curl.exe command to pull a polymorphic loader from epaper[.]dothome[.]co[.]kr and run it with iex, and UPA.ps1 then downloading an anotepad.com page every 38 minutes and executing the Base64 text between the markers 887wgJs8 and nfJgcBl. Script hosts and curl.exe have no reason to read a public note-sharing site, while users who browse it do so from a browser, which this hunt excludes. Expected false positives: rare admin scripts that use anotepad.com or Dothome free hosting; check the parent chain back to an LNK or a scheduled task. Genians

    Log sourceDefender XDR DeviceNetworkEvents and DeviceProcessEvents; proxy logs

    QueriesKQL

Affected countries and sectors

Targets
South Korea, East Asia
Sectors
Government, Think tanks and policy research

Background

Genians Security Center reported on 16 November 2026 a spear-phishing campaign it attributes to North Korea's Kimsuky with moderate confidence. Posing as a lawmaker's senior aide, the actor emailed a National Assembly seminar attendee in September, sent a ZIP only after the victim replied, and the ZIP held an LNK disguised as an HWP payment form. The LNK runs a hidden PowerShell that uses curl.exe to pull a polymorphic loader from epaper[.]dothome[.]co[.]kr, which drops a .Jcu VBScript and UPA.ps1 in AppData and registers a scheduled task, CommonMaintenanceHost, that every 38 minutes runs whatever Base64 code the actor posts on an anotepad.com note page. From June to October that code moved from an in-memory XenoRAT build to Dropbox, MEGA and Dothome exfiltration scripts and finally NodeLinkRAT, a JavaScript RAT run by an official Node.js runtime installed in C:\Users\Public\Music\njs as teamview.js, talking Socket.IO to 207[.]148[.]112[.]166:3000. The XenoRAT and NodeLinkRAT C2 addresses, the actor's Dothome and free-DNS hosts and the six published hashes are on the block list; older 2024 phishing hosts on shared free hosting are alert only.

Downloads

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MITRE ATT&CK14

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