RansomwareHighTLP:CLEAR

GodDamn ransomware

GodDamn Ransomware, the Latest Beast Rebrand, Uses a Signed PoisonX Driver to Kill Defences

Published
12 November 2026
Added
16 November 2026, 07:55 UK
Last updated
16 November 2026

4 to block nowNothing to hunt3 behaviours to hunt

Hunt3 platforms

Run the hunt before you block, to find past activity. The same hunt is published for each platform. Preview and copy the queries in the dashboard.

  • Defender XDRKQLDefender portal > Hunting > Advanced hunting. Paste and run over 30 days.Download hunt.kql
  • SplunkSPLSearch & Reporting, last 30 days or more. Reads the CIM data models.Download hunt.spl
  • Google SecOpsYARA-L 2.0Rules Editor. Paste, Retrohunt over 30 days, then turn on live mode.Download hunt.yaral

These queries can return false positives. Know your environment and confirm a hit before acting.

Summary

GodDamn ransomware kills security tools with a Microsoft-signed PoisonX driver. The encryptor, PoisonX driver, fake symantec.exe and Mimikatz hashes are on the block list.

Do now

  1. Block the 4 indicators.
  2. Run the hunt.
  3. Check for symantec.exe.

Indicators 4

ValueTypeActionCopy
e097f3b445b63b07a…a1f7e29a69SHA256block
2d91a78e739891c98…dd1c20145dSHA256block
b29f91a440527fb62…1d5ae880a8SHA256block
31eb1de7e840a342f…01d539a0fcSHA256block

Sources Symantec Threat Hunter Team · MalwareBazaar · MalwareBazaar (2)

More detail
Note AnyDesk, PsExec and the NirSoft utilities are legitimate tools and are not blocked; the published AnyDesk relay addresses belong to AnyDesk and are not blocked either. Hunt for how they were configured instead. The initial access vector is unknown, and the hashes come from one incident, so other GodDamn builds will differ.

What to do

  1. Block the four SHA256 hashes and add the PoisonX driver hash to your driver block list (Microsoft vulnerable driver blocklist or WDAC).
  2. Hunt for AnyDesk command lines that set ad.security.interactive_access, for sc.exe creating AnyDesk services with --conf-dir, and for anydesk.exe or symantec.exe running from a user Music folder.
  3. Alert on new kernel drivers written to System32\drivers by user-launched processes, on Set-MpPreference -DisableRealtimeMonitoring and on PsExec fan-out from one host.
  4. If AnyDesk is not approved software, block it by application control; if it is, require it to be installed only from a managed package.

Behaviours to hunt 3

Behaviours are leads, not confirmed indicators, and can match legitimate activity. Compare any hit against your own baseline and environment before acting.

  1. alert AnyDesk set for unattended access or added as a custom service

    Look forAnyDesk set for unattended access (ad.security.interactive_access written from the command line) or added as a custom service with --conf-dir

    Why it mattersSymantec shows the GodDamn operators writing ad.security.interactive_access=2 into an AnyDesk system.conf with PowerShell so incoming sessions need no user approval, piping a password into AnyDesk and creating two auto-start services, AnyDeskService and AnyDesk_D, that point at --conf-dir=d:\ad_data, on at least ten hosts before the ransomware ran. Managed AnyDesk installs are configured from the package or console, not by sc.exe or PowerShell on each host. Expected false positives: admin scripts that pre-configure AnyDesk; check the parent and account. Symantec Threat Hunter Team

    Log sourceDefender XDR DeviceProcessEvents; EDR process events

    QueriesKQL · SPL · YARA-L

  2. alert Fake symantec.exe in Music, or g11.sys driver written

    Look forsymantec.exe started from a user Music folder, or a driver named g11.sys written to System32\drivers

    Why it mattersThe defence evasion tool posed as symantec.exe in the user's Music folder and dropped the PoisonX driver as System32\drivers\g11.sys to kill security products. Genuine Symantec products run from Program Files, and a driver written by a process in a user folder has no legitimate reason. Expected false positives: none known. Symantec Threat Hunter Team

    Log sourceDefender XDR DeviceProcessEvents and DeviceFileEvents; EDR process and file events

    QueriesKQL · SPL · YARA-L

  3. hunt Mimikatz and NirSoft kit in a Music\mimik folder

    Look forCredential toolkit staged in a Music\mimik folder (Mimikatz renamed mimik.exe with NirSoft password viewers)

    Why it mattersThe operators staged Mimikatz as mimik.exe and 13 NirSoft password tools, with NetScan, under the user profile's Music\mimik\pass folder. The same habit of staging tools in Music folders runs through the whole attack. Expected false positives: rare; a penetration test using the same folder names. Symantec Threat Hunter Team

    Log sourceDefender XDR DeviceFileEvents; EDR file events

    QueriesKQL · SPL

Affected countries and sectors

Targets
Not stated
Sectors
Not stated

Background

Symantec's Threat Hunter Team reported on 12 November 2026 that GodDamn ransomware, first seen on 21 May 2026, is the third brand of the Hyadina group after Monster (2022) and Beast (2024). In an attack in late May and early June 2026 the operators placed AnyDesk in a user's Music folder, staged Mimikatz renamed mimik.exe and 13 NirSoft password viewers under Music\mimik\pass, and ran a fake symantec.exe that installs the PoisonX driver as System32\drivers\g11.sys. PoisonX is a malicious driver signed through Microsoft's hardware compatibility programme that terminates security processes and strips user-mode hooks; it was earlier used to kill CrowdStrike Falcon. They spread with PsExec, turned off Defender real-time monitoring, set AnyDesk to accept connections without a prompt (ad.security.interactive_access=2), registered it as two services pointing at D:\ad_data, rebooted at least ten hosts and then ran encrypter-windows-gui-x86.exe, which renamed files with the victim's name or .God8Damn. The encryptor, PoisonX driver, fake symantec.exe and Mimikatz hashes are on the block list.

Downloads

View folder in repository

MITRE ATT&CK9

Open in the live dashboard Get the blocklist