GhostFrame ESXi implant
GhostFrame: ESXi Hypervisor Implant Linked to Settra Ransomware (TAG-218)
- Published
- 10 November 2026
- Added
- 11 November 2026, 07:54 UK
- Last updated
- 11 November 2026
4 to block nowNothing to hunt4 behaviours to hunt
Hunt3 platforms
Run the hunt before you block, to find past activity. The same hunt is published for each platform. Preview and copy the queries in the dashboard.
- Defender XDRKQLDefender portal > Hunting > Advanced hunting. Paste and run over 30 days.Download hunt.kql
- SplunkSPLSearch & Reporting, last 30 days or more. Reads the CIM data models.Download hunt.spl
- Google SecOpsYARA-L 2.0Rules Editor. Paste, Retrohunt over 30 days, then turn on live mode.Download hunt.yaral
These queries can return false positives. Know your environment and confirm a hit before acting.
Summary
ESXi hypervisor implant used by a Settra-linked group after VPN appliance intrusions in the US and Europe. The implant tries six C2 ports at once (53, 2222, 3389, 4444, 8443 and 9443), which gives a distinctive network pattern.
Do now
- Block the 4 indicators.
- Run the hunt.
- Patch and review SonicWall now.
Indicators 4
| Value | Type | Action | Copy |
|---|---|---|---|
45[.]158[.]196[.]81 | IPv4 | block | |
45[.]158[.]196[.]141 | IPv4 | block | |
193[.]5[.]65[.]114 | IPv4 | block | |
a05eae6d07b82e2e5…3e15353a10 | SHA256 | block |
Sources Recorded Future · MalwareBazaar
More detail
What to do
- Block the two GhostFrame C2 addresses and the MeshCentral server, and search 30 days of firewall and proxy logs for connections from ESXi management addresses and VPN appliances to them.
- Alert when one host opens near-simultaneous connections to the same external IP on ports 53, 2222, 3389, 4444, 8443 and 9443.
- On every ESXi host, check /etc/rc.local.d/local.sh and /opt for vmhostd-core, confirm the firewall is enabled and execInstalledOnly is set, and look for unexpected snapshots or VNC enabled on VMs.
- Patch and review SonicWall, Palo Alto Networks and Fortinet VPN appliances, keep ESXi management off the internet and rotate credentials for accounts on VMs hosted on an affected hypervisor.
Behaviours to hunt 4
Behaviours are leads, not confirmed indicators, and can match legitimate activity. Compare any hit against your own baseline and environment before acting.
alert One host trying six C2 ports at once
Look forOne host opening near-simultaneous TCP connections to the same external IP on ports 53, 2222, 3389, 4444, 8443 and 9443, retried every 5 to 12 seconds
Why it mattersGhostFrame tries all six ports at once and keeps the first that answers. The pattern survives C2 rotation. Recorded Future
Log sourceFirewall, NetFlow or EDR network events from ESXi management addresses
QueriesKQL · SPL
alert GhostFrame persistence on ESXi
Look forChanges to /etc/rc.local.d/local.sh, a file at /opt/vmhostd-core, or a process named vmhostd (not vmware-hostd)
Why it mattersGhostFrame persists by copying itself to /opt/vmhostd-core and editing local.sh, then disguises its process name as vmhostd. Recorded Future
Log sourceESXi shell.log and syslog, host file checks
QueriesKQL · SPL · YARA-L
alert ESXi firewall disabled again and again
Look forThe ESXi firewall being disabled (esxcli network firewall set --enabled false) or execInstalledOnly set to 0, again and again
Why it mattersThe implant re-disables both controls about every five seconds. Re-enabling them is not enough; find the persistence. Recorded Future
Log sourceESXi shell.log, hostd.log and syslog
QueriesKQL · SPL · YARA-L
hunt VNC, snapshot and tunnel activity on ESXi
Look forVNC enabled on VMs, unexpected snapshots or power changes, and the ESXi Host Client reached through an unusual tunnel
Why it mattersGhostFrame operators snapshot VMs to harvest credentials with VMkatz and relay VNC sessions to the guests. Recorded Future
Log sourceESXi and vCenter events
QueriesNone yet: check by hand
Affected countries and sectors
- Targets
- United States, Europe
- Sectors
- Not stated
Background
Recorded Future's Insikt Group reports GhostFrame, a previously undocumented command-and-control and post-exploitation framework for compromised VMware ESXi hosts, used by TAG-218, a group whose activity overlaps with Settra ransomware. Between late August and October 2026 TAG-218 servers targeted VPN appliances in the US and Europe, mainly SonicWall, Palo Alto Networks and Fortinet, and four of the targeted organisations later appeared on the Settra leak site. GhostFrame needs existing root access on the hypervisor: its implant, vmhostd-core, runs from a datastore, persists through /etc/rc.local.d/local.sh, keeps disabling the ESXi firewall and unsigned-binary protection, and masquerades as vmhostd. Operators can list, power off and snapshot VMs, relay VNC sessions, tunnel the ESXi Host Client, pivot with the gfsox SOCKS5 proxy, and harvest Windows credentials from VM memory, disks and datastores with sdkmon and VMkatz. The implant tries six C2 ports at once (53, 2222, 3389, 4444, 8443 and 9443), which gives a distinctive network pattern.