Exploitation / cryptominingHighTLP:CLEAR

GeoVision XMRig miner

GeoVision Camera Software Abused to Deploy XMRig Cryptominer

Published
13 November 2026
Added
13 November 2026, 15:02 UK
Last updated
13 November 2026

8 to block now4 to hunt5 behaviours to hunt

Hunt3 platforms

Run the hunt before you block, to find past activity. The same hunt is published for each platform. Preview and copy the queries in the dashboard.

  • Defender XDRKQLDefender portal > Hunting > Advanced hunting. Paste and run over 30 days.Download hunt.kql
  • SplunkSPLSearch & Reporting, last 30 days or more. Reads the CIM data models.Download hunt.spl
  • Google SecOpsYARA-L 2.0Rules Editor. Paste, Retrohunt over 30 days, then turn on live mode.Download hunt.yaral

These queries can return false positives. Know your environment and confirm a hit before acting.

Summary

Exposed GeoVision camera software is being used to run PowerShell, a vulnerable driver and a Golang loader that drops XMRig. 2[.]59[.]133[.]151, which Huntress called the likely exploit source, is alert only because it sits on shared or reused dataforest hosting.

Do now

  1. Block the 8 indicators.
  2. Run the hunt.
  3. Patch CVE-2023-52271 now.

Indicators 12

ValueTypeActionCopy
45[.]32[.]117[.]34IPv4block
hxxp://45[.]32[.]117[.]34/aURLblock
hxxp://45[.]32[.]117[.]34/bURLblock
hxxp://45[.]32[.]117[.]34/cURLblock
156[.]246[.]94[.]183IPv4block
cctv-update[.]topDomainblock
f1235751c9e48e573…d0d8c54b4cSHA256block
b673c4d707828abed…402fd3647bSHA256block
ff5dbdcf6d7ae5d97…b2653d69a8SHA256alert
2[.]59[.]133[.]151IPv4alert
kvckiller.sysFile namealert
ApplyUpdate.exeFile namealert

Sources Huntress · URLhaus · loldrivers.io

More detail
Note Do not block 2[.]59[.]133[.]151 (dataforest shared or reused hosting) or thisismy.cloud. Do not block the SHA256 of wsftprm.sys estate-wide without checking for legitimate Topaz Antifraud (Warsaw) software. Do not block BitTorrent DHT bootstrap nodes, PKARR relays, public DNS resolvers or shared mining pools. Block 45[.]32[.]117[.]34, 156[.]246[.]94[.]183 and cctv-update[.]top as listed hosts only, not the surrounding ranges or parent domains.

What to do

  1. Block 45[.]32[.]117[.]34, 156[.]246[.]94[.]183, cctv-update[.]top, the PowerShell staging URLs and the published update.exe and PowerShell script hashes, and search 90 days of proxy, DNS, firewall and EDR logs for them. Block those hosts only, not the surrounding ranges.
  2. Take internet-facing GeoVision camera software and management interfaces off the public internet; put them behind a VPN or restrict them to trusted addresses.
  3. Hunt GeoStartupAgentService.exe spawning cmd or PowerShell, IFEO Debugger values on MsMpEng.exe, SecurityHealthService.exe, SecurityHealthSystray.exe or MpCmdRun.exe, the scheduled tasks PackageUpdater and PackageUpdater_Startup, wsftprm.sys or kvckiller.sys loading from an unexpected path, and ApplyUpdate.exe with XMRig arguments.
  4. On a confirmed host, isolate it, preserve evidence, remove the tasks and dropped files, clear the IFEO Debugger values, and investigate whether Defender was tampered with before returning the host to service.
  5. Do not block 2[.]59[.]133[.]151, thisismy.cloud, public DNS resolvers, BitTorrent DHT bootstrap nodes, PKARR relays or shared mining pools, and do not block the wsftprm.sys hash estate-wide without checking for legitimate Topaz Antifraud software.

Behaviours to hunt 5

Behaviours are leads, not confirmed indicators, and can match legitimate activity. Compare any hit against your own baseline and environment before acting.

  1. alert GeoStartupAgentService.exe spawning a shell or PowerShell

    Look forGeoStartupAgentService.exe spawning cmd.exe, PowerShell or pwsh.exe

    Why it mattersEvery intrusion Huntress saw started here: the exposed GeoVision service, often running as SYSTEM, spawned a command shell that launched PowerShell to download script a from 45[.]32[.]117[.]34. GeoStartupAgentService.exe has no ordinary reason to start cmd or PowerShell. Expected false positives are rare; a GeoVision support or update procedure that shells out would be the main one, and should still be reviewed. Huntress

    Log sourceDefender XDR DeviceProcessEvents; EDR process events

    QueriesKQL · SPL · YARA-L

  2. alert wsftprm.sys or kvckiller.sys driver load or file

    Look forA driver load or file named wsftprm.sys or kvckiller.sys

    Why it mattersScript b dropped kvckiller.sys, which VirusTotal identifies as the signed Topaz Antifraud driver wsftprm.sys, and used it as a BYOVD tool against Defender. The published hash is a known legitimate, if vulnerable, driver (CVE-2023-52271) still used by some banking antifraud deployments, so a load from a normal Topaz or Warsaw install path can be a false positive. Treat a load or write from a temp, user or unexpected path, or the filename kvckiller.sys, as a high-priority lead. Huntress

    Log sourceDefender XDR DeviceEvents (DriverLoad) and DeviceFileEvents; EDR driver and file events

    QueriesKQL · SPL · YARA-L

  3. alert IFEO Debugger set on Microsoft Defender or Windows Security processes

    Look forIFEO Debugger values set on MsMpEng.exe, SecurityHealthService.exe, SecurityHealthSystray.exe or MpCmdRun.exe

    Why it mattersThe operators wrote Image File Execution Options Debugger values that redirected MsMpEng.exe, SecurityHealthService.exe and SecurityHealthSystray.exe to systray.exe, which can stop those Defender and Windows Security components starting. MpCmdRun.exe is included as the related Defender command-line process. A Debugger value under those keys, or an IFEO Debugger set to systray.exe, is not a normal administrative setting. Expected false positives are very rare; a legitimate debugger attached to those binaries should already be known to the estate. Huntress

    Log sourceDefender XDR DeviceRegistryEvents; Windows Registry auditing

    QueriesKQL · SPL · YARA-L

  4. alert PackageUpdater task or update.exe from the systemprofile folder

    Look forScheduled task PackageUpdater or PackageUpdater_Startup running update.exe, or update.exe launched from the systemprofile folder

    Why it mattersOn some hosts the loader created PackageUpdater, which runs C:\WINDOWS\system32\config\systemprofile\update.exe every 15 minutes, and PackageUpdater_Startup, which runs at system start as SYSTEM. The task names plus that systemprofile path are distinctive. update.exe in other folders is a common legitimate name and is not enough on its own. Huntress

    Log sourceDefender XDR DeviceEvents (ScheduledTaskCreated) and DeviceProcessEvents; Windows Security 4698; Task Scheduler operational log

    QueriesKQL · SPL · YARA-L

  5. alert ApplyUpdate.exe launched with XMRig arguments

    Look forApplyUpdate.exe launched with XMRig arguments

    Why it mattersThe loader dropped the XMRig miner as ApplyUpdate.exe. The filename alone can appear in legitimate updaters, so this hunt requires XMRig-style arguments such as --url, --user, --donate-level, --coin, --algo or a stratum+ address. Expected false positives are very rare. Huntress

    Log sourceDefender XDR DeviceProcessEvents; EDR process events

    QueriesKQL · SPL · YARA-L

Affected countries and sectors

Targets
Not stated
Sectors
Organizations with internet-exposed GeoVision camera software or management interfaces

Background

Huntress, writing on 13 November 2026, says its SOC saw widespread malicious activity from internet-exposed GeoVision camera software between 8 and 10 November, across ten accounts and 13 organisations in various industries. Every case started with GeoStartupAgentService.exe, often running as SYSTEM, spawning a command shell that downloaded PowerShell scripts a, b and c from 45[.]32[.]117[.]34 (Vultr, Singapore). Those scripts checked for Defender, dropped a vulnerable signed driver (wsftprm.sys, written as kvckiller.sys) used to tamper with antivirus, and set IFEO Debugger values that redirect MsMpEng.exe, SecurityHealthService.exe and SecurityHealthSystray.exe to systray.exe. A further script fetched update.exe, a Golang loader that talks to 156[.]246[.]94[.]183 (AkileCloud, Tokyo; cctv-update[.]top, registered 7 November) using BitTorrent Mainline DHT and PKARR, creates scheduled tasks PackageUpdater (every 15 minutes) and PackageUpdater_Startup, and drops XMRig as ApplyUpdate.exe. The staging IP, loader IP, domain, PowerShell URLs and the published update.exe and PowerShell script hashes are on the block list, as hosts only. 2[.]59[.]133[.]151, which Huntress called the likely exploit source, is alert only because it sits on shared or reused dataforest hosting. The wsftprm.sys hash is alert only: it is a known signed Topaz Antifraud driver (CVE-2023-52271) still used by some banking software.

Downloads

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MITRE ATT&CK12

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