Ransomware / data theft and extortionHighTLP:CLEAR

Gentlemen Azazel CI theft

Gentlemen Ransomware Affiliate Azazel: CI/CD Secret Theft, LEAKNED Extortion and MCP Command Execution

Published
5 October 2026
Added
11 November 2026, 10:21 UK
Last updated
11 November 2026

3 to block now6 to hunt6 behaviours to hunt

Hunt3 platforms

Run the hunt before you block, to find past activity. The same hunt is published for each platform. Preview and copy the queries in the dashboard.

  • Defender XDRKQLDefender portal > Hunting > Advanced hunting. Paste and run over 30 days.Download hunt.kql
  • SplunkSPLSearch & Reporting, last 30 days or more. Reads the CIM data models.Download hunt.spl
  • Google SecOpsYARA-L 2.0Rules Editor. Paste, Retrohunt over 30 days, then turn on live mode.Download hunt.yaral

These queries can return false positives. Know your environment and confirm a hit before acting.

Summary

Gentlemen ransomware affiliate stealing CI/CD secrets and leaking victims on its own LEAKNED site. CloudSEK traced an exposed open directory and storage server to Azazel, a Russian-speaking affiliate of The Gentlemen ransomware-as-a-service operation, and confirmed more than two dozen breached….

Do now

  1. Block the 3 indicators.
  2. Run the hunt.
  3. Check for the listed behaviours.

Indicators 9

ValueTypeActionCopy
23[.]236[.]169[.]183IPv4block
162[.]220[.]163[.]26IPv4block
66[.]179[.]30[.]155IPv4block
141[.]95[.]252[.]30IPv4alert
66[.]203[.]124[.]135IPv4alert
forgitlab[.]comDomainalert
ATTENTION_SENSITI…MATION.txtFile namealert
internet-census-mcp-scannerOtheralert
hermesOthermonitor

Sources CloudSEK · Bitdefender

More detail

What to do

  1. Block 23[.]236[.]169[.]183, 162[.]220[.]163[.]26 and 66[.]179[.]30[.]155 at the perimeter and in Defender XDR, and search 90 days of firewall, NetFlow and GitLab access logs for them, including SSH and outbound HTTP to port 9999.
  2. Rotate every secret held in GitLab CI/CD variables and in repository history (database passwords, API tokens, SSH keys and cloud keys), make variables masked and protected, and review CI/CD variable reads and API token use from unexpected addresses.
  3. Search Linux servers for ATTENTION_SENSITIVE_INFORMATION.txt in the root and ubuntu home directories, and for changes to /etc/motd, the sshd_config Banner setting, the PostgreSQL cluster_name and the pgAdmin login template; also check GitLab for README edits or issues opened with a pipeline token.
  4. Alert on mc mirror, aws s3 sync, pg_dump or mega-cmd-server runs to destinations you do not own, keep any MCP server bound to loopback with an approved client allowlist, and alert on MCP clients named internet-census-mcp-scanner.

Behaviours to hunt 6

Behaviours are leads, not confirmed indicators, and can match legitimate activity. Compare any hit against your own baseline and environment before acting.

  1. alert Object storage mirrored out with the MinIO client

    Look formc mirror (MinIO Client) copying a bucket to a remote destination you do not own

    Why it mattersAzazel mirrored a victim's object storage to his staging server continuously with retry logic; CloudSEK published a Sigma rule for it. CloudSEK

    Log sourceLinux process events, MinIO audit logs

    QueriesKQL · SPL · YARA-L

  2. hunt Bulk reads of GitLab CI/CD secrets

    Look forBulk reads of GitLab CI/CD variables, project exports or repository clones by a token from an unfamiliar address

    Why it mattersEvery non-AI victim was reached through secrets harvested from GitLab CI/CD variables and repository history using glato, nord-stream, gitlab-secrets, gitlab-watchman and gitleaks. CloudSEK

    Log sourceGitLab audit events and API logs

    QueriesNone yet: check by hand

  3. alert Ransom notes planted on server surfaces

    Look forRansom notes written to /etc/motd, the sshd_config Banner, the PostgreSQL cluster_name, the pgAdmin login template, a GitLab README or a new GitLab issue

    Why it mattersAzazel's va.py checked notes on eight surfaces across six hosts, including ATTENTION_SENSITIVE_INFORMATION.txt in the root and ubuntu home directories. CloudSEK

    Log sourceLinux file integrity monitoring, GitLab audit events, PostgreSQL logs

    QueriesKQL · SPL · YARA-L

  4. alert PostgreSQL killed and wiped after exfiltration

    Look forPostgreSQL process killed and its data directory deleted shortly after large pg_dump or scp transfers

    Why it mattersAfter exfiltrating a government-linked financial registry, Azazel ran a script that killed the live PostgreSQL process and deleted the production data directory. CloudSEK

    Log sourceLinux process events, PostgreSQL logs

    QueriesNone yet: check by hand

  5. hunt Exposed MCP server or MCP scanner clients

    Look forMCP server listening beyond loopback, or MCP initialize requests from clients named internet-census-mcp-scanner or hermes

    Why it mattersAzazel ran commands through an MCP exec_in_session tool and scanned the internet for exposed MCP ports. CloudSEK

    Log sourceMCP server logs, reverse proxy logs, network listeners

    QueriesSPL

  6. hunt Large uploads to MEGA or to port 9999

    Look forLarge uploads from servers to MEGA (mega-cmd-server) or HTTP POSTs to port 9999 on unfamiliar hosts

    Why it mattersStolen data went from victims to the C2 box by HTTP POST to port 9999, then to MEGA via mega-cmd-server. CloudSEK

    Log sourceFirewall, proxy and NetFlow logs, EDR network events

    QueriesSPL

Affected countries and sectors

Targets
Not stated
Sectors
Logistics, Insurance, Pharmaceuticals, Medical devices, Technology, Government

Background

CloudSEK traced an exposed open directory and storage server to Azazel, a Russian-speaking affiliate of The Gentlemen ransomware-as-a-service operation, and confirmed more than two dozen breached organisations in six countries across logistics, insurance, pharmaceuticals, medical devices, AI and government-linked services. Azazel used The Gentlemen's tooling and ransom note template but published victims on his own leak site, LEAKNED, and kept the proceeds; Bitdefender's November 2026 debrief reports more than 6 TB of stolen data. Most victims were reached through secrets harvested from GitLab CI/CD variables and repository history (database passwords, API tokens and SSH keys), and one AI platform was entered through a server-side URL fetch (SSRF). Data left through aws s3 sync, mc mirror, scp, pg_dump and HTTP POST to port 9999 on the C2 server, then moved to MEGA. After exfiltration Azazel killed a production PostgreSQL process and deleted its data directory, and planted ransom notes on eight surfaces, including /etc/motd, the SSH banner and ATTENTION_SENSITIVE_INFORMATION.txt in the root and ubuntu home directories. He also ran commands through exec_in_session, a Model Context Protocol (MCP) tool served on 127[.]0[.]0[.]1:35367, and scanned the internet for exposed MCP servers.

Downloads

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MITRE ATT&CK9

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