Falcon C2 Antino
Falcon C2 (XG): Browser Framework and Antino Implant Targeting Government Webmail
- Published
- 11 November 2026
- Added
- 12 November 2026, 09:25 UK
- Last updated
- 12 November 2026
27 to block nowNothing to hunt5 behaviours to hunt
Hunt3 platforms
Run the hunt before you block, to find past activity. The same hunt is published for each platform. Preview and copy the queries in the dashboard.
- Defender XDRKQLDefender portal > Hunting > Advanced hunting. Paste and run over 30 days.Download hunt.kql
- SplunkSPLSearch & Reporting, last 30 days or more. Reads the CIM data models.Download hunt.spl
- Google SecOpsYARA-L 2.0Rules Editor. Paste, Retrohunt over 30 days, then turn on live mode.Download hunt.yaral
These queries can return false positives. Know your environment and confirm a hit before acting.
Summary
Browser C2 framework and Antino implant used against government webmail, with a malicious extension and OneDrive C2. Do not block OneDrive or other Microsoft services; hunt for Antino's OneDrive paths and the GatherOSStateKit persistence folder instead.
Do now
- Block the 27 indicators.
- Run the hunt.
- Check for DllSafeCheck64.dll.
Indicators 27
| Value | Type | Action | Copy |
|---|---|---|---|
fonts[.]tarotfree101[.]top | Domain | block | |
fonts[.]chrorne[.]com | Domain | block | |
robot[.]avbliud[.]com | Domain | block | |
microsoft-flash[.]com | Domain | block | |
wps-cn[.]com | Domain | block | |
mbidcmlcbgbphpoac…fpohcimjji | Other | block | |
3e535d63af8a95221…85ee8cb6e9 | SHA256 | block | |
f8b86238e179d88a9…b0944a3b92 | SHA256 | block | |
88e8b07bdf294ace0…806dae0862 | SHA256 | block | |
065d18fcfeddbd718…d4b41f29ce | SHA256 | block | |
3eab406d841fa22a4…0aef732016 | SHA256 | block | |
5711586125909863b…4405cddfe2 | SHA256 | block | |
b6a7be724871ed3e8…46b2d49fda | SHA256 | block | |
2ed834d92bfefc9d0…8706388fcd | SHA256 | block | |
356b96c2267c5f2d8…732da5a00c | SHA256 | block | |
32af8413cbd38ce8b…dc22d999f4 | SHA256 | block | |
e2b6b1becdbcc3401…9c45ac3dbb | SHA256 | block | |
265c2b36060e4b21c…b5b38222e0 | SHA256 | block | |
66e9098551a1c0c74…94e61c442d | SHA256 | block | |
3e923f11db08413fc…7110428da2 | SHA256 | block | |
2ebe36f1322b77264…5dd27c0575 | SHA256 | block | |
857429faffe0e0747…89bedf072c | SHA256 | block | |
b33f2e95943e3ff0a…13ec161ad7 | SHA256 | block | |
898656c33effb51e1…ae75bd3af6 | SHA256 | block | |
b3d8ea89b19a87bf2…6a1b2315ce | SHA256 | block | |
24d69139cb2d32598…b50b4128f7 | SHA256 | block | |
0c39264337a1186b2…887af578bd | SHA256 | block |
Sources Unit 42 · MalwareBazaar
More detail
What to do
- Block the Falcon domains and file hashes (they are in the Defender XDR import file), and hunt 30 days of DNS, proxy and endpoint logs for them.
- Search browser extension inventories, file paths and registry keys for Chrome extension ID mbidcmlcbgbphpoacojjbmfpohcimjji.
- Hunt for files under %LOCALAPPDATA%\Windows GatherOSStateKit, sdiagnhost.exe launching PowerShell, and OneDrive or Graph activity to antino/heartbeat/ or antino/antino_upload/ paths. Do not block OneDrive or Microsoft services.
- On internal or government web applications, look for unexpected third-party JavaScript and for Hm_lvt_$ local-storage keys or an Hm_lvt__ cookie with a long-lived expiry.
Behaviours to hunt 5
Behaviours are leads, not confirmed indicators, and can match legitimate activity. Compare any hit against your own baseline and environment before acting.
alert Malicious Falcon Chrome extension ID
Look forA Chrome or Firefox extension with ID mbidcmlcbgbphpoacojjbmfpohcimjji, or that extension's files on disk
Why it mattersUnit 42 published this Chrome extension ID as the malicious Falcon extension used to steal passwords, emails and session cookies. Unit 42
Log sourceEndpoint file, registry and browser-extension inventory events
QueriesKQL · SPL · YARA-L
alert Antino GatherOSStateKit persistence folder
Look forFiles or processes under %LOCALAPPDATA%\Windows GatherOSStateKit, including a tmp########.exe drop and DllSafeCheck64.dll or slc.dll copied beside it
Why it mattersUnit 42 says Antino copies itself to this hard-coded folder and has used DllSafeCheck64.dll for sideloading in older versions. Unit 42
Log sourceEDR file and process events
QueriesKQL · SPL · YARA-L
hunt sdiagnhost used to add an Antino Run key
Look forsdiagnhost.exe launching PowerShell that adds a Run-key value, shortly after a GatherOSStateKit drop
Why it mattersUnit 42 observed Antino executing sdiagnhost.exe so that a PowerShell snippet in a diagnostic answer file adds Antino to the Run key. Unit 42
Log sourceEDR process events
QueriesKQL · SPL
hunt Antino OneDrive heartbeat or upload paths
Look forOAuth or OneDrive file activity to a tenant that is not yours, with repeated small JSON writes to paths such as antino/heartbeat/ or antino/antino_upload/
Why it mattersAntino beacons by uploading hostname and username to antino/heartbeat/.json and exchanges commands and stolen files under antino/antino_upload/. Hunt these paths; do not block OneDrive or other Microsoft services. Unit 42
Log sourceCloud App events and OneDrive or Microsoft Graph audit logs
QueriesKQL · SPL
hunt Falcon Hm_lvt session cookie or local storage
Look forHm_lvt_$ keys in browser local storage, or an Hm_lvt__ cookie set to 1 with a long-lived expiry (Unit 42 saw expiry in 2099), on internal or government web applications where Baidu Analytics has no legitimate reason to appear
Why it mattersFalcon stores its session ID as Hm_lvt_$ in local storage and as the Hm_lvt__ cookie, mimicking Baidu Analytics identifiers. Unit 42
Log sourceWeb application logs, HTTP cookie headers, and browser forensic artefacts
QueriesNone yet: check by hand
Affected countries and sectors
- Targets
- Middle East, Southeast Asia
- Sectors
- Government, Law enforcement, Defence
Background
Unit 42 describes Falcon, also called XG or Xiang Ge, a browser-based command-and-control framework that runs malicious JavaScript on compromised webmail portals and government web applications. Between March and May 2026 it was used against ministries of foreign affairs, defence and interior, and law enforcement in one Middle Eastern country and four Southeast Asian countries. The framework steals passwords, emails, session cookies and communications, sideloads a malicious Chrome or Firefox extension, and in some cases delivers Antino, a Rust implant that uses Microsoft OneDrive as its C2 channel. The published domains, extension ID and file hashes come from Unit 42 and are on the block list (Block or BlockAndRemediate in the Defender import file). Do not block OneDrive or other Microsoft services; hunt for Antino's OneDrive paths and the GatherOSStateKit persistence folder instead.