APT / browser implantCriticalTLP:CLEAR

Falcon C2 Antino

Falcon C2 (XG): Browser Framework and Antino Implant Targeting Government Webmail

Published
11 November 2026
Added
12 November 2026, 09:25 UK
Last updated
12 November 2026

27 to block nowNothing to hunt5 behaviours to hunt

Hunt3 platforms

Run the hunt before you block, to find past activity. The same hunt is published for each platform. Preview and copy the queries in the dashboard.

  • Defender XDRKQLDefender portal > Hunting > Advanced hunting. Paste and run over 30 days.Download hunt.kql
  • SplunkSPLSearch & Reporting, last 30 days or more. Reads the CIM data models.Download hunt.spl
  • Google SecOpsYARA-L 2.0Rules Editor. Paste, Retrohunt over 30 days, then turn on live mode.Download hunt.yaral

These queries can return false positives. Know your environment and confirm a hit before acting.

Summary

Browser C2 framework and Antino implant used against government webmail, with a malicious extension and OneDrive C2. Do not block OneDrive or other Microsoft services; hunt for Antino's OneDrive paths and the GatherOSStateKit persistence folder instead.

Do now

  1. Block the 27 indicators.
  2. Run the hunt.
  3. Check for DllSafeCheck64.dll.

Indicators 27

ValueTypeActionCopy
fonts[.]tarotfree101[.]topDomainblock
fonts[.]chrorne[.]comDomainblock
robot[.]avbliud[.]comDomainblock
microsoft-flash[.]comDomainblock
wps-cn[.]comDomainblock
mbidcmlcbgbphpoac…fpohcimjjiOtherblock
3e535d63af8a95221…85ee8cb6e9SHA256block
f8b86238e179d88a9…b0944a3b92SHA256block
88e8b07bdf294ace0…806dae0862SHA256block
065d18fcfeddbd718…d4b41f29ceSHA256block
3eab406d841fa22a4…0aef732016SHA256block
5711586125909863b…4405cddfe2SHA256block
b6a7be724871ed3e8…46b2d49fdaSHA256block
2ed834d92bfefc9d0…8706388fcdSHA256block
356b96c2267c5f2d8…732da5a00cSHA256block
32af8413cbd38ce8b…dc22d999f4SHA256block
e2b6b1becdbcc3401…9c45ac3dbbSHA256block
265c2b36060e4b21c…b5b38222e0SHA256block
66e9098551a1c0c74…94e61c442dSHA256block
3e923f11db08413fc…7110428da2SHA256block
2ebe36f1322b77264…5dd27c0575SHA256block
857429faffe0e0747…89bedf072cSHA256block
b33f2e95943e3ff0a…13ec161ad7SHA256block
898656c33effb51e1…ae75bd3af6SHA256block
b3d8ea89b19a87bf2…6a1b2315ceSHA256block
24d69139cb2d32598…b50b4128f7SHA256block
0c39264337a1186b2…887af578bdSHA256block

Sources Unit 42 · MalwareBazaar

More detail
Note Single-source indicators (Unit 42). The observed activity is from March to May 2026. Do not block OneDrive or other Microsoft services.

What to do

  1. Block the Falcon domains and file hashes (they are in the Defender XDR import file), and hunt 30 days of DNS, proxy and endpoint logs for them.
  2. Search browser extension inventories, file paths and registry keys for Chrome extension ID mbidcmlcbgbphpoacojjbmfpohcimjji.
  3. Hunt for files under %LOCALAPPDATA%\Windows GatherOSStateKit, sdiagnhost.exe launching PowerShell, and OneDrive or Graph activity to antino/heartbeat/ or antino/antino_upload/ paths. Do not block OneDrive or Microsoft services.
  4. On internal or government web applications, look for unexpected third-party JavaScript and for Hm_lvt_$ local-storage keys or an Hm_lvt__ cookie with a long-lived expiry.

Behaviours to hunt 5

Behaviours are leads, not confirmed indicators, and can match legitimate activity. Compare any hit against your own baseline and environment before acting.

  1. alert Malicious Falcon Chrome extension ID

    Look forA Chrome or Firefox extension with ID mbidcmlcbgbphpoacojjbmfpohcimjji, or that extension's files on disk

    Why it mattersUnit 42 published this Chrome extension ID as the malicious Falcon extension used to steal passwords, emails and session cookies. Unit 42

    Log sourceEndpoint file, registry and browser-extension inventory events

    QueriesKQL · SPL · YARA-L

  2. alert Antino GatherOSStateKit persistence folder

    Look forFiles or processes under %LOCALAPPDATA%\Windows GatherOSStateKit, including a tmp########.exe drop and DllSafeCheck64.dll or slc.dll copied beside it

    Why it mattersUnit 42 says Antino copies itself to this hard-coded folder and has used DllSafeCheck64.dll for sideloading in older versions. Unit 42

    Log sourceEDR file and process events

    QueriesKQL · SPL · YARA-L

  3. hunt sdiagnhost used to add an Antino Run key

    Look forsdiagnhost.exe launching PowerShell that adds a Run-key value, shortly after a GatherOSStateKit drop

    Why it mattersUnit 42 observed Antino executing sdiagnhost.exe so that a PowerShell snippet in a diagnostic answer file adds Antino to the Run key. Unit 42

    Log sourceEDR process events

    QueriesKQL · SPL

  4. hunt Antino OneDrive heartbeat or upload paths

    Look forOAuth or OneDrive file activity to a tenant that is not yours, with repeated small JSON writes to paths such as antino/heartbeat/ or antino/antino_upload/

    Why it mattersAntino beacons by uploading hostname and username to antino/heartbeat/.json and exchanges commands and stolen files under antino/antino_upload/. Hunt these paths; do not block OneDrive or other Microsoft services. Unit 42

    Log sourceCloud App events and OneDrive or Microsoft Graph audit logs

    QueriesKQL · SPL

  5. hunt Falcon Hm_lvt session cookie or local storage

    Look forHm_lvt_$ keys in browser local storage, or an Hm_lvt__ cookie set to 1 with a long-lived expiry (Unit 42 saw expiry in 2099), on internal or government web applications where Baidu Analytics has no legitimate reason to appear

    Why it mattersFalcon stores its session ID as Hm_lvt_$ in local storage and as the Hm_lvt__ cookie, mimicking Baidu Analytics identifiers. Unit 42

    Log sourceWeb application logs, HTTP cookie headers, and browser forensic artefacts

    QueriesNone yet: check by hand

Affected countries and sectors

Targets
Middle East, Southeast Asia
Sectors
Government, Law enforcement, Defence

Background

Unit 42 describes Falcon, also called XG or Xiang Ge, a browser-based command-and-control framework that runs malicious JavaScript on compromised webmail portals and government web applications. Between March and May 2026 it was used against ministries of foreign affairs, defence and interior, and law enforcement in one Middle Eastern country and four Southeast Asian countries. The framework steals passwords, emails, session cookies and communications, sideloads a malicious Chrome or Firefox extension, and in some cases delivers Antino, a Rust implant that uses Microsoft OneDrive as its C2 channel. The published domains, extension ID and file hashes come from Unit 42 and are on the block list (Block or BlockAndRemediate in the Defender import file). Do not block OneDrive or other Microsoft services; hunt for Antino's OneDrive paths and the GatherOSStateKit persistence folder instead.

Downloads

View folder in repository

MITRE ATT&CK6

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