Malware / RATCriticalTLP:CLEAR

Fake Zillow NetSupport

Fake Zillow Pages Deliver NetSupport RAT through ClickFix

Published
12 November 2026
Added
13 November 2026, 03:50 UK
Last updated
13 November 2026

21 to block now4 to hunt4 behaviours to hunt

Hunt3 platforms

Run the hunt before you block, to find past activity. The same hunt is published for each platform. Preview and copy the queries in the dashboard.

  • Defender XDRKQLDefender portal > Hunting > Advanced hunting. Paste and run over 30 days.Download hunt.kql
  • SplunkSPLSearch & Reporting, last 30 days or more. Reads the CIM data models.Download hunt.spl
  • Google SecOpsYARA-L 2.0Rules Editor. Paste, Retrohunt over 30 days, then turn on live mode.Download hunt.yaral

These queries can return false positives. Know your environment and confirm a hit before acting.

Summary

EfficientIP Research Labs, writing on 12 November 2026, traces a ClickFix campaign that used fake Zillow apartment-re... Clicking Continue copied a PowerShell command that fetched a script from the decimal address 1495423691, which is 89[.]34[.]90[.]203, at /winup2.

Do now

  1. Block the 21 indicators.
  2. Run the hunt.
  3. Check for explorer.exe.

Indicators 25

ValueTypeActionCopy
apartments-review…9831[.]sbsDomainblock
apartments-review…9031[.]sbsDomainblock
apartments-review…5431[.]sbsDomainblock
apartments-review…9200[.]sbsDomainblock
apartments-review…8768[.]sbsDomainblock
apartments-review…4860[.]sbsDomainblock
apartments-review…4643[.]sbsDomainblock
asgomd[.]comDomainblock
bksju[.]comDomainblock
bksnb[.]comDomainblock
decrmd[.]comDomainblock
jpgomd[.]comDomainblock
nogomd[.]comDomainblock
asgrsv[.]comDomainblock
decrsv[.]comDomainblock
jpgrsv[.]comDomainblock
89[.]34[.]90[.]203IPv4block
45[.]227[.]254[.]179IPv4block
45[.]227[.]254[.]10IPv4block
hxxp://89[.]34[.]…203/winup2URLblock
hxxp://89[.]34[.]…estos2.zipURLblock
winup2.ps1File namealert
mestos2.zipFile namealert
apartments-review[0-9]+\.sbsOtheralert
1495423691Otheralert

Sources EfficientIP · Help Net Security · ThreatFox · ThreatFox (2) · URLhaus

More detail
Note The landing domains were short-lived and sat behind Cloudflare; those Cloudflare anycast addresses also serve unrelated sites and must not be blocked. NetSupport Manager is legitimate remote administration software: block only the attacker staging and gateway infrastructure, and hunt the ClickFix command and mestos2.zip install path rather than the product name alone. EfficientIP did not publish a sample hash or confirm victims.

What to do

  1. Block the seven apartments-review*.sbs landing domains, 89[.]34[.]90[.]203, the /winup2 and /mestos2.zip URLs, the nine gateway domains and the two Flyservers addresses (they are in the Defender XDR import file), and search 90 days of DNS, proxy and firewall logs for them and for the decimal address 1495423691.
  2. Hunt for explorer.exe launching PowerShell that uses iwr to fetch winup2, for %TEMP%\winup2.ps1, and for a Startup-folder NetSupport.lnk whose target is Service.exe under %APPDATA%\NetSupport after a hidden PowerShell or Python download.
  3. Treat genuine NetSupport Manager installs as legitimate; do not block the product. If a host ran the ClickFix command, isolate it, remove the Startup shortcut and the %APPDATA%\NetSupport copy, and rotate credentials the logged-on user could reach.

Behaviours to hunt 4

Behaviours are leads, not confirmed indicators, and can match legitimate activity. Compare any hit against your own baseline and environment before acting.

  1. alert ClickFix PowerShell iwr of winup2 from the decimal IP

    Look forexplorer.exe launching powershell.exe that uses Invoke-WebRequest (iwr) to fetch winup2 from 89[.]34[.]90[.]203 or the decimal address 1495423691

    Why it mattersEfficientIP recovered the ClickFix clipboard command: after the victim pressed Win+R, explorer.exe launched PowerShell, which downloaded /winup2 from the decimal DWORD 1495423691 (89[.]34[.]90[.]203) to %TEMP%\winup2.ps1 and ran it. EfficientIP

    Log sourceDefender XDR DeviceProcessEvents

    QueriesKQL · SPL · YARA-L

  2. alert winup2.ps1 or mestos2.zip written or downloaded

    Look forPowerShell writing or running %TEMP%\winup2.ps1, or downloading hxxp://89[.]34[.]90[.]203/mestos2.zip

    Why it matterswinup2.ps1 relaunches itself hidden, writes an embedded Python script and uses a downloaded Python runtime to retrieve mestos2.zip from the same host, then unpacks NetSupport RAT. EfficientIP

    Log sourceDefender XDR DeviceProcessEvents and DeviceFileEvents

    QueriesKQL · SPL · YARA-L

  3. alert Startup NetSupport.lnk pointing at AppData Service.exe

    Look forA Startup-folder shortcut named NetSupport.lnk whose target is Service.exe under %APPDATA%\NetSupport

    Why it mattersThe downloader copies the ZIP contents to %APPDATA%\NetSupport, finds Service.exe and drops NetSupport.lnk in the user Startup folder, then starts Service.exe hidden. Genuine NetSupport Manager can also live under AppData, so treat this as a lead unless winup2 or mestos2.zip is also present. EfficientIP

    Log sourceDefender XDR DeviceFileEvents and DeviceProcessEvents

    QueriesKQL · SPL · YARA-L

  4. alert Lookups for apartments-review*.sbs or the gateway domains

    Look forDNS or web requests for apartments-review followed by digits on the .sbs TLD, or for the NetSupport gateway domains asgomd[.]com, asgrsv[.]com and the related -md and -rsv hosts

    Why it mattersThe landing pages used the apartments-review<digits>.sbs pattern, including *.verify.apartments-review*.sbs wildcards. The installed NetSupport client used asgomd[.]com and asgrsv[.]com, and EfficientIP found seven further short gateway names on the same Flyservers addresses. EfficientIP

    Log sourceDefender XDR DeviceNetworkEvents, DNS and proxy logs

    QueriesKQL · SPL · YARA-L

Affected countries and sectors

Targets
Not stated
Sectors
Not stated

Background

EfficientIP Research Labs, writing on 12 November 2026, traces a ClickFix campaign that used fake Zillow apartment-review pages on short-lived apartments-review<digits>.sbs domains, first spotted in passive DNS in August 2026. Clicking Continue copied a PowerShell command that fetched a script from the decimal address 1495423691, which is 89[.]34[.]90[.]203, at /winup2. The script hid its window, used a downloaded Python runtime to pull hxxp://89[.]34[.]90[.]203/mestos2.zip, installed NetSupport RAT into %APPDATA%\NetSupport and dropped a NetSupport.lnk shortcut in the user Startup folder pointing at Service.exe. The installed client was configured to use the gateway domains asgomd[.]com and asgrsv[.]com; pivoting on their Flyservers addresses 45[.]227[.]254[.]179 and 45[.]227[.]254[.]10 uncovered seven further short -md and -rsv domains on the same hosts. Help Net Security reported the same findings on 13 November. The landing domains, payload host, URLs and gateway infrastructure are on the block list. Do not block the Cloudflare addresses that only fronted the short-lived landing pages, and do not treat legitimate NetSupport Manager as malware.

Downloads

View folder in repository

MITRE ATT&CK8

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