FaceStealer fake meetings
FaceStealer: BlueNoroff Fake Zoom and Teams Meetings, Stolen Webcam Video and ClickFix Lures
- Published
- 12 November 2026
- Added
- 13 November 2026, 00:20 UK
- Last updated
- 13 November 2026
120 to block now14 to hunt5 behaviours to hunt
Hunt3 platforms
Run the hunt before you block, to find past activity. The same hunt is published for each platform. Preview and copy the queries in the dashboard.
- Defender XDRKQLDefender portal > Hunting > Advanced hunting. Paste and run over 30 days.Download hunt.kql
- SplunkSPLSearch & Reporting, last 30 days or more. Reads the CIM data models.Download hunt.spl
- Google SecOpsYARA-L 2.0Rules Editor. Paste, Retrohunt over 30 days, then turn on live mode.Download hunt.yaral
These queries can return false positives. Know your environment and confirm a hit before acting.
Summary
North Korean fake Zoom and Teams calls replaying stolen webcam video to trick targets into running a malicious fix. The domains, IPs, payload URLs and lure hashes are on the block list; the strongest hunts are the paste-and-run cradles.
Do now
- Block the 120 indicators.
- Run the hunt.
- Check for curl.exe.
Indicators 134
| Value | Type | Action | Copy |
|---|---|---|---|
uu01webzoom[.]us | Domain | block | |
teams[.]livemeet[.]us | Domain | block | |
104[.]168[.]149[.]230 | IPv4 | block | |
104[.]168[.]149[.]182 | IPv4 | block | |
104[.]168[.]149[.]21 | IPv4 | block | |
hxxps://vip[.]nov…BX3xe292n0 | URL | block | |
hxxps://updatesdk…k-18731628 | URL | block | |
hxxps://updatesdk…k-49661181 | URL | block | |
hxxps://updatesdk…k-06166443 | URL | block | |
hxxps://docview[.…6a7cjHHgIc | URL | block | |
hxxps://docview[.…mD1eCY8u09 | URL | block | |
hxxps://calendly[…atch/DyPck | URL | block | |
hxxps://chromeupd…1X56zrQlC1 | URL | block | |
hxxps://chromeupd…i9937o3D8T | URL | block | |
hxxps://calendly[…sue-092267 | URL | block | |
hxxps://calendly[…hccbXvUAZM | URL | block | |
02live[.]com[.]co | Domain | block | |
02live[.]us[.]com | Domain | block | |
05live[.]us[.]com | Domain | block | |
live-teams[.]com[.]co | Domain | block | |
me-0live[.]com | Domain | block | |
me-live[.]it[.]com | Domain | block | |
me-live[.]online | Domain | block | |
me-live[.]xyz | Domain | block | |
microso1t[.]com | Domain | block | |
ms-live[.]cc | Domain | block | |
ms-live[.]co[.]com | Domain | block | |
ms-live[.]online | Domain | block | |
ms-meet[.]store | Domain | block | |
ms-meeting[.]co | Domain | block | |
ms-meeting[.]com[.]co | Domain | block | |
ms-meeting[.]live | Domain | block | |
ms-room[.]online | Domain | block | |
ms-teams[.]co | Domain | block | |
ms-teams[.]in | Domain | block | |
protected-view[.]online | Domain | block | |
teams-live[.]cam | Domain | block | |
teams-live[.]com[.]co | Domain | block | |
teams-live[.]com[.]im | Domain | block | |
teams-live[.]eu[.]com | Domain | block | |
teams-live[.]it[.]com | Domain | block | |
teams-live[.]vip | Domain | block | |
teams-live[.]work | Domain | block | |
teams-meet[.]cc | Domain | block | |
teams-meet[.]cloud | Domain | block | |
teams-meet[.]co | Domain | block | |
teams-meet[.]com[.]co | Domain | block | |
teams-meet[.]in | Domain | block | |
teams-meeting[.]co | Domain | block | |
teams-meeting[.]in | Domain | block | |
teams-meets[.]cc | Domain | block | |
teams-meets[.]com | Domain | block | |
teams-meets[.]in | Domain | block | |
teams-meets[.]online | Domain | block | |
teams-meets[.]us[.]com | Domain | block | |
teams-room[.]us | Domain | block | |
teams02live[.]com | Domain | block | |
teams02live[.]us | Domain | block | |
teams02live[.]us[.]com | Domain | block | |
teams05live[.]com | Domain | block | |
teams05live[.]us[.]com | Domain | block | |
teams06live[.]com | Domain | block | |
teams07live[.]com | Domain | block | |
teams0live[.]com | Domain | block | |
teamscloud[.]us[.]com | Domain | block | |
teamslive[.]cloud | Domain | block | |
teamslive[.]us[.]com | Domain | block | |
us02live[.]co | Domain | block | |
us05cloud[.]co | Domain | block | |
us05cloud[.]com | Domain | block | |
us05cloud[.]live | Domain | block | |
us09live[.]us | Domain | block | |
web-live[.]com[.]co | Domain | block | |
web-live[.]us | Domain | block | |
call-in[.]co | Domain | block | |
call-in[.]online | Domain | block | |
call-live[.]com | Domain | block | |
call-on[.]online | Domain | block | |
call-room[.]online | Domain | block | |
meet-in[.]co | Domain | block | |
meet-on[.]online | Domain | block | |
meet-room[.]online | Domain | block | |
meet-room[.]xyz | Domain | block | |
meeting-on[.]online | Domain | block | |
room-live[.]com | Domain | block | |
room-meet[.]us | Domain | block | |
room-meet[.]xyz | Domain | block | |
room-on[.]online | Domain | block | |
room-on[.]xyz | Domain | block | |
team-meet[.]xyz | Domain | block | |
web-meet[.]us | Domain | block | |
web-teams[.]us | Domain | block | |
novaplayer[.]online | Domain | block | |
novaplayer[.]xyz | Domain | block | |
videolan[.]online | Domain | block | |
videolan[.]store | Domain | block | |
videoviewer[.]online | Domain | block | |
instantsecscan[.]online | Domain | block | |
instantsecscan[.]xyz | Domain | block | |
ipblock[.]watch | Domain | block | |
scanmypc[.]online | Domain | block | |
scanmypc[.]xyz | Domain | block | |
securealliance[.]xyz | Domain | block | |
securemypc[.]life | Domain | block | |
securemypc[.]xyz | Domain | block | |
ashnote[.]blog | Domain | block | |
cloud-docs[.]online | Domain | block | |
cobolabs[.]cloud | Domain | block | |
docsend[.]space | Domain | block | |
notionshare[.]online | Domain | block | |
agenda[.]pw | Domain | block | |
idcheck[.]watch | Domain | block | |
ipcheck[.]watch | Domain | block | |
sealteam911[.]online | Domain | block | |
theworldofluck[.]online | Domain | block | |
docdock[.]online | Domain | block | |
ca14040cc48fbc3b0…8436f7668a | SHA256 | block | |
57201b105d64ecf90…ce74b68718 | SHA256 | block | |
1a9663641958e9e7c…6c9675bb8e | SHA256 | block | |
540da969ed2a0d828…c7db0dbeae | SHA256 | block | |
docsend[.]blog | Domain | alert | |
docsend[.]site | Domain | alert | |
docsend[.]store | Domain | alert | |
docview[.]ink | Domain | alert | |
docview[.]pw | Domain | alert | |
docview[.]vip | Domain | alert | |
mailview[.]online | Domain | alert | |
sealteam911[.]com | Domain | alert | |
shiabank[.]com | Domain | alert | |
theworldofluck[.]site | Domain | alert | |
document.wflow | File name | alert | |
NovaStreamHelper.scpt | File name | alert | |
Calendly Verification.scpt | File name | alert | |
%TEMP%\update.ps1 | File name | alert |
Sources FBI IC3 · justice.gov · Arctic Wolf · Arctic Wolf (2) · MalwareBazaar
More detail
What to do
- Block the listed domains, the three Hostwinds addresses 104[.]168[.]149[.]230, 104[.]168[.]149[.]182 and 104[.]168[.]149[.]21, the payload URLs and the lure hashes, and search 90 days of DNS, proxy and EDR logs for them.
- Hunt for PowerShell or curl command lines containing [Console]::In.ReadToEnd() with iex, iwr downloads of %TEMP%\update.ps1 run with -ep bypass, osacompile or osascript fed by curl on macOS, and curl -fsSL -k piped to bash on Linux.
- Alert on DNS for any updatesdk.<domain> host or a calendly.<domain> host outside calendly.com.
- Brief executives, finance, crypto and open-source maintainer staff: join meetings from the official app with an invite code, keep the webcam off until the inviter is confirmed, never run a fix command during a call, and confirm invites out of band.
- After any contact, terminate all Telegram and other messaging sessions, rotate browser-stored credentials and developer tokens, and move wallet funds to new seed phrases from a clean device.
Behaviours to hunt 5
Behaviours are leads, not confirmed indicators, and can match legitimate activity. Compare any hit against your own baseline and environment before acting.
alert Pasted curl into PowerShell ReadToEnd and iex cradle
Look forcurl.exe or powershell.exe with [Console]::In.ReadToEnd() and iex / Invoke-Expression, typically pasted from a meeting "fix" prompt
Why it mattersArctic Wolf says BlueNoroff changed every visible lure but kept the same fix command: the page asks the target to paste a curl into PowerShell cradle that reads the payload from standard input and runs it. The FBI says FaceStealer victims are walked through exactly this kind of command during a fake Zoom or Teams call. Arctic Wolf
Log sourceEDR process events (DeviceProcessEvents), PowerShell 4104, Windows 4688 with command line
QueriesKQL · SPL · YARA-L
alert update.ps1 fetched to %TEMP% and run with -ep bypass
Look foriwr -UseBasicParsing downloading $env:TEMP\update.ps1, followed by powershell -ep bypass -f on that file
Why it mattersThe docview[.]ink LNK chain fetches update.ps1 into %TEMP%, runs it with execution policy bypass and deletes it. Arctic Wolf
Log sourceEDR process events, PowerShell 4104
QueriesKQL · SPL · YARA-L
alert Lookups for updatesdk.* or calendly.<lookalike> hosts
Look forDNS or web requests to any updatesdk.<domain> host, or a calendly.<domain> host that is not calendly.com
Why it mattersArctic Wolf calls these subdomain patterns fingerprints with no legitimate use: updatesdk hosts serve the fake SDK fix and calendly.<lookalike> hosts serve the verification lures. Arctic Wolf
Log sourceDNS, proxy and EDR network logs (DeviceNetworkEvents)
QueriesKQL · SPL · YARA-L
alert macOS curl into osacompile or Automator from Downloads
Look formacOS osacompile or osascript fed by curl, or a .scpt or Automator document.wflow launched from ~/Downloads
Why it mattersThe macOS branches of the lures pipe curl into osacompile, run long osascript -e strings, or launch an Automator workflow from a ZIP to fetch the next stage. Arctic Wolf
Log sourceDefender for Endpoint on macOS process events, unified log
QueriesKQL · SPL · YARA-L
alert Linux curl -fsSL -k piped to bash
Look forLinux curl -fsSL -k piped to bash from an interactive shell
Why it mattersThe Linux branch of the fake update tells the target to run curl -fsSL -k against an updatesdk or chromeupdate host and pipe it to bash. Arctic Wolf
Log sourceEDR process events on Linux, auditd execve
QueriesKQL · SPL · YARA-L
Affected countries and sectors
- Targets
- Global
- Sectors
- Cryptocurrency and Web3, Venture capital, Open-source software maintainers, Executives
Background
On 12 November 2026 the FBI published FLASH AC-111226-MS on FaceStealer, a North Korean scheme it attributes to the actors known as Sapphire Sleet, UNC1069, BlueNoroff and APT38. Hijacked Telegram, LinkedIn, Slack or Discord accounts invite a contact to a catch-up, a Calendly invite follows, and shortly before the call the target receives a typo-squatted Zoom or Teams link such as uu01webzoom[.]us or teams[.]livemeet[.]us. The fake meeting plays secretly recorded webcam video of earlier victims, or deepfakes of well-known industry figures, then stages an audio fault and talks the target into running a fix that installs a cookie harvester, keylogger, screen capture and backdoor while recording their webcam for the next round. The FBI says the scheme stole more than $400 million in 18 months, seized over 900 victim videos, and nearly poisoned a JavaScript library with tens of millions of weekly downloads. The same day Arctic Wolf reported that BlueNoroff now also uses fake document viewers, a NovaStream media player, Chrome PDF updates, identity checks and security scanners, published 98 high-confidence domains on three Hostwinds servers, and noted the fix commands have barely changed. The domains, IPs, payload URLs and lure hashes are on the block list; the strongest hunts are the paste-and-run cradles.