Espionage / APTHighTLP:CLEAR

DarkLunnen FortiGate ops

DarkLunnen: FortiGate CVE-2024-55591 Backdoor Account and Offensive Operations Against Europe

Published
11 November 2026
Added
13 November 2026, 11:03 UK
Last updated
13 November 2026

7 to block now34 to hunt3 behaviours to hunt

Hunt3 platforms

Run the hunt before you block, to find past activity. The same hunt is published for each platform. Preview and copy the queries in the dashboard.

  • Defender XDRKQLDefender portal > Hunting > Advanced hunting. Paste and run over 30 days.Download hunt.kql
  • SplunkSPLSearch & Reporting, last 30 days or more. Reads the CIM data models.Download hunt.spl
  • Google SecOpsYARA-L 2.0Rules Editor. Paste, Retrohunt over 30 days, then turn on live mode.Download hunt.yaral

These queries can return false positives. Know your environment and confirm a hit before acting.

Summary

An unattributed operator used a FortiGate CVE-2024-55591 exploit to create a service super-admin and ran 14 months of attacks on Europe. Exploit code in the recovered files carries Russian-language comments, but Group-IB has not linked the activity to a known….

Do now

  1. Block the 7 indicators.
  2. Run the hunt.
  3. Patch CVE-2024-55591 and CVE-2025-49113.

Indicators 41

ValueTypeActionCopy
46[.]8[.]236[.]121IPv4block
129[.]146[.]87[.]174IPv4block
hxxp://129[.]146[…q/popoc.pyURLblock
hxxp://129[.]146[…rti-ca.txtURLblock
hxxp://129[.]146[…rti_GB.txtURLblock
hxxp://129[.]146[…on2.tar.gzURLblock
b8a76bd31984c13d2…0956c32acbSHA256block
d9edfa7e57067b0a1…3317f7616aSHA256alert
e15780896245c5f8c…aac5372c07SHA256alert
0b65f60dc4ace2506…c7037da3bbSHA256alert
27ddcf81362f87d86…24ef50fb46SHA256alert
61e706f5606e025ae…4d5529a94bSHA256alert
8a43a9c335d9dfe64…3d0a5bfa1fSHA256alert
3732b1ffd1a28cf0c…5ad0f075d1SHA256alert
482d16f6c2fa15c10…1429aeb8f7SHA256alert
c7a1e7f8c81e5deb8…950477b61eSHA256alert
c2a37e9f628d7bfe2…4fce85d787SHA256alert
ce8faad7a4074429d…7d8de5d598SHA256alert
8c6969152a0e1ac53…d0e50b87faSHA256alert
97826498e0bdebb04…b037e21958SHA256alert
5ebceb30834144677…f02381aed9SHA256alert
73624b493febe5af0…908b9a7a2aSHA256alert
05f6e90c037205bf2…8679760ab2SHA256alert
5c65130964db07a2a…f39cd10b97SHA256alert
6a619a8710badffad…7bc83c3a0cSHA256alert
52e85a33f216ce6e2…84a61a10e8SHA256alert
d3d6c5c91d856abfc…e88793600eSHA256alert
ffee49eed5f8095e3…edd42dbbd2SHA256alert
dcec7e94a3a76f9f2…e09344a8f8SHA256alert
73bc1226e3fafaab0…9d59aaa050SHA256alert
02575593e5259f5ba…e83ccac9a8SHA256alert
2abc95ce81460a1f0…01c48b54b7SHA256alert
57220bac36ac74a00…44abf6879cSHA256alert
5e36c5b3c592172d4…719313a00eSHA256alert
19b00abb2caa589b8…17dd97cbfeSHA256alert
bc7870c02f5d74828…b45bc87b3cSHA256alert
103[.]28[.]71[.]82IPv4alert
108[.]175[.]14[.]121IPv4alert
122[.]155[.]11[.]107IPv4alert
144[.]91[.]77[.]125IPv4alert
all-smart[.]freeddns[.]orgDomainalert

Sources Group-IB

More detail
Note Group-IB recovered 35 of 457 exposed files, so the picture is incomplete and the operator remains unattributed. SSH connections from the operator's history to hosts in the Netherlands, the United States, Thailand and France may be compromised intermediaries, including two with educational TLS certificates; those addresses, the recovered-file hashes other than popoc.py, the victim and educational domains, and legitimate services such as temp.sh are alert only and must not be blocked. A patch does not remove a service super-admin account already created, so hunt patched FortiGates too.

What to do

  1. Block 46[.]8[.]236[.]121 and 129[.]146[.]87[.]174, the staging URLs on 129[.]146[.]87[.]174:18080, and the SHA256 of popoc.py, and search proxy, firewall, DNS and EDR logs for them back to at least April 2025.
  2. Hunt FortiGate syslog for an administrator named service being added or given the super_admin profile from a jsconsole or websocket login (logdesc Admin added or Object attribute configured), and inspect the running config of every FortiGate for that account even if the device is already patched.
  3. Alert on files or processes named suo5, reGeorgSocksProxy.py, neo-reGeorg or tunnel.tomcat.5.jsp, and on a Roundcube web or PHP process spawning a shell or transfer tool.
  4. Alert on the other recovered-file hashes from the open directory and on the SSH hop addresses in the operator's history; do not block those hops, dltv.ac.th, education-bf.com, freeddns.org or temp.sh.
  5. If you find the account or the device was internet-exposed while vulnerable, rotate every secret the configuration stores (local VPN user passwords, administrator passwords, IPsec pre-shared keys, and LDAP or RADIUS credentials), review VPN logs for those accounts, and take HTTP and HTTPS administrative access off internet-facing interfaces.
  6. Patch FortiOS and FortiProxy against CVE-2024-55591 and the other edge-device bugs in Group-IB's targeted-vulnerabilities table.

Behaviours to hunt 3

Behaviours are leads, not confirmed indicators, and can match legitimate activity. Compare any hit against your own baseline and environment before acting.

  1. alert FortiGate super-admin named service added from jsconsole

    Look forA FortiGate administrator named service being added or given the super_admin profile from a jsconsole or websocket login (logdesc 'Admin added' or 'Object attribute configured')

    Why it mattersDarkLunnen's modified CVE-2024-55591 exploit creates a backdoor super-admin named service through the jsconsole websocket used by the authentication bypass. A patch does not remove an account already created, so hunt patched devices too and inspect the running config for an unexpected service super_admin. Tuning: match only FortiGate or Fortinet events whose logdesc is Admin added or Object attribute configured; the account must be the admin named service (user, cfgobj, or the 'added new administrator service' message), not the ordinary FortiGate service= protocol field; the ui or method must be jsconsole or websocket. Expected false positives: a legitimate administrator who is actually named service and is created or changed from the FortiGate GUI CLI (jsconsole) by your own staff. Confirm the source address and whether the change was approved. The hunt returns nothing until FortiGate syslog is ingested. Group-IB

    Log sourceFortiGate syslog ingested into Defender XDR or Sentinel (CommonSecurityLog or a FortiGate custom table), Splunk (forti/fgt sourcetypes) or Google SecOps (Fortinet UDM)

    QueriesKQL · SPL · YARA-L

  2. alert suo5 or Neo-reGeorg/reGeorg tunnelling tools

    Look forFiles or processes named suo5, reGeorgSocksProxy.py, neo-reGeorg or tunnel.tomcat.5.jsp

    Why it mattersDarkLunnen deployed suo5 and Neo-reGeorg/reGeorg tunnelling webshells on compromised Exchange and other web servers. These tool names are distinctive. Tuning: match the file or process name, or a command line that contains suo5, reGeorgSocksProxy, neo-reGeorg, neoreGeorg or tunnel.tomcat.5.jsp. Generic names such as tunnel.php or tunnel.aspx are left out because they are too common. Expected false positives: a security, red-team or research process that runs the public tools. Group-IB

    Log sourceDefender XDR DeviceFileEvents and DeviceProcessEvents; Splunk endpoint file and process logs; Google SecOps file and process UDM

    QueriesKQL · SPL · YARA-L

  3. alert Roundcube web process spawning a shell or transfer tool

    Look forA Roundcube web or PHP process spawning a shell, Python, Perl, or a transfer tool such as curl, wget or netcat

    Why it mattersDarkLunnen's shell history shows CVE-2025-49113 exploitation attempts against Roundcube. A successful exploit gives code execution in the webmail process, which then often starts a shell or transfer tool. Tuning: the parent must be a web or PHP process (php-fpm, php, php-cgi, httpd, apache2 or nginx) and the child a shell, Python, Perl, curl, wget or netcat; and either the parent or child path or command line contains roundcube, or a file under a roundcube path is created or modified on the same device within 2 minutes of the spawn. Expected false positives: an administrator or cron job updating Roundcube, which can both touch files under the application path and start a shell script. Confirm whether a change or update was expected. Group-IB

    Log sourceDefender XDR DeviceProcessEvents and DeviceFileEvents; Splunk endpoint process and file logs; Google SecOps process UDM

    QueriesKQL · SPL · YARA-L

Affected countries and sectors

Targets
Ukraine, Romania, Poland, Germany, Czech Republic, Turkey, Azerbaijan, Algeria, Europe
Sectors
Government, Defence, Aviation, ICS/OT, Healthcare

Background

Group-IB, writing on 11 November 2026 and updating the post on 13 November, describes an open directory on a Latvia-hosted server (46[.]8[.]236[.]121:8090) that exposed 14 months of work by an unattributed operator they name DarkLunnen. Exploit code in the recovered files carries Russian-language comments, but Group-IB has not linked the activity to a known group. The operator used a modified watchTowr proof of concept for FortiGate CVE-2024-55591 that creates a backdoor super-admin account named service; a stolen FortiGate configuration from a Romanian organisation contained that same account, and the operator extracted 10 cleartext VPN passwords from it. Scan results listed about 600 vulnerable FortiGates in Turkey, 16 in Ukraine, 14 in Azerbaijan and one in Algeria. Other recovered activity includes VNC brute force against about 5,800 endpoints (roughly a quarter with industrial HMI desktop names), Hikvision camera scans in Ukraine and Poland, attempted source-code collection from Ukrainian defence and aviation sites, Exchange webshells, a possible German-network intrusion with a stolen NTLM hash, restic access to an S3 backup, and Roundcube CVE-2025-49113 attempts. A second server at 129[.]146[.]87[.]174 on Oracle Cloud staged the exploit scripts. Both addresses, the staging URLs and the modified exploit hash are on the block list. The other recovered-file hashes from the open directory, and the SSH hop addresses in the operator's history, are alert only and must not be blocked.

Downloads

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MITRE ATT&CK11

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