DarkLunnen FortiGate ops
DarkLunnen: FortiGate CVE-2024-55591 Backdoor Account and Offensive Operations Against Europe
- Published
- 11 November 2026
- Added
- 13 November 2026, 11:03 UK
- Last updated
- 13 November 2026
7 to block now34 to hunt3 behaviours to hunt
Hunt3 platforms
Run the hunt before you block, to find past activity. The same hunt is published for each platform. Preview and copy the queries in the dashboard.
- Defender XDRKQLDefender portal > Hunting > Advanced hunting. Paste and run over 30 days.Download hunt.kql
- SplunkSPLSearch & Reporting, last 30 days or more. Reads the CIM data models.Download hunt.spl
- Google SecOpsYARA-L 2.0Rules Editor. Paste, Retrohunt over 30 days, then turn on live mode.Download hunt.yaral
These queries can return false positives. Know your environment and confirm a hit before acting.
Summary
An unattributed operator used a FortiGate CVE-2024-55591 exploit to create a service super-admin and ran 14 months of attacks on Europe. Exploit code in the recovered files carries Russian-language comments, but Group-IB has not linked the activity to a known….
Do now
- Block the 7 indicators.
- Run the hunt.
- Patch CVE-2024-55591 and CVE-2025-49113.
Indicators 41
| Value | Type | Action | Copy |
|---|---|---|---|
46[.]8[.]236[.]121 | IPv4 | block | |
129[.]146[.]87[.]174 | IPv4 | block | |
hxxp://129[.]146[…q/popoc.py | URL | block | |
hxxp://129[.]146[…rti-ca.txt | URL | block | |
hxxp://129[.]146[…rti_GB.txt | URL | block | |
hxxp://129[.]146[…on2.tar.gz | URL | block | |
b8a76bd31984c13d2…0956c32acb | SHA256 | block | |
d9edfa7e57067b0a1…3317f7616a | SHA256 | alert | |
e15780896245c5f8c…aac5372c07 | SHA256 | alert | |
0b65f60dc4ace2506…c7037da3bb | SHA256 | alert | |
27ddcf81362f87d86…24ef50fb46 | SHA256 | alert | |
61e706f5606e025ae…4d5529a94b | SHA256 | alert | |
8a43a9c335d9dfe64…3d0a5bfa1f | SHA256 | alert | |
3732b1ffd1a28cf0c…5ad0f075d1 | SHA256 | alert | |
482d16f6c2fa15c10…1429aeb8f7 | SHA256 | alert | |
c7a1e7f8c81e5deb8…950477b61e | SHA256 | alert | |
c2a37e9f628d7bfe2…4fce85d787 | SHA256 | alert | |
ce8faad7a4074429d…7d8de5d598 | SHA256 | alert | |
8c6969152a0e1ac53…d0e50b87fa | SHA256 | alert | |
97826498e0bdebb04…b037e21958 | SHA256 | alert | |
5ebceb30834144677…f02381aed9 | SHA256 | alert | |
73624b493febe5af0…908b9a7a2a | SHA256 | alert | |
05f6e90c037205bf2…8679760ab2 | SHA256 | alert | |
5c65130964db07a2a…f39cd10b97 | SHA256 | alert | |
6a619a8710badffad…7bc83c3a0c | SHA256 | alert | |
52e85a33f216ce6e2…84a61a10e8 | SHA256 | alert | |
d3d6c5c91d856abfc…e88793600e | SHA256 | alert | |
ffee49eed5f8095e3…edd42dbbd2 | SHA256 | alert | |
dcec7e94a3a76f9f2…e09344a8f8 | SHA256 | alert | |
73bc1226e3fafaab0…9d59aaa050 | SHA256 | alert | |
02575593e5259f5ba…e83ccac9a8 | SHA256 | alert | |
2abc95ce81460a1f0…01c48b54b7 | SHA256 | alert | |
57220bac36ac74a00…44abf6879c | SHA256 | alert | |
5e36c5b3c592172d4…719313a00e | SHA256 | alert | |
19b00abb2caa589b8…17dd97cbfe | SHA256 | alert | |
bc7870c02f5d74828…b45bc87b3c | SHA256 | alert | |
103[.]28[.]71[.]82 | IPv4 | alert | |
108[.]175[.]14[.]121 | IPv4 | alert | |
122[.]155[.]11[.]107 | IPv4 | alert | |
144[.]91[.]77[.]125 | IPv4 | alert | |
all-smart[.]freeddns[.]org | Domain | alert |
Sources Group-IB
More detail
What to do
- Block 46[.]8[.]236[.]121 and 129[.]146[.]87[.]174, the staging URLs on 129[.]146[.]87[.]174:18080, and the SHA256 of popoc.py, and search proxy, firewall, DNS and EDR logs for them back to at least April 2025.
- Hunt FortiGate syslog for an administrator named service being added or given the super_admin profile from a jsconsole or websocket login (logdesc Admin added or Object attribute configured), and inspect the running config of every FortiGate for that account even if the device is already patched.
- Alert on files or processes named suo5, reGeorgSocksProxy.py, neo-reGeorg or tunnel.tomcat.5.jsp, and on a Roundcube web or PHP process spawning a shell or transfer tool.
- Alert on the other recovered-file hashes from the open directory and on the SSH hop addresses in the operator's history; do not block those hops, dltv.ac.th, education-bf.com, freeddns.org or temp.sh.
- If you find the account or the device was internet-exposed while vulnerable, rotate every secret the configuration stores (local VPN user passwords, administrator passwords, IPsec pre-shared keys, and LDAP or RADIUS credentials), review VPN logs for those accounts, and take HTTP and HTTPS administrative access off internet-facing interfaces.
- Patch FortiOS and FortiProxy against CVE-2024-55591 and the other edge-device bugs in Group-IB's targeted-vulnerabilities table.
Behaviours to hunt 3
Behaviours are leads, not confirmed indicators, and can match legitimate activity. Compare any hit against your own baseline and environment before acting.
alert FortiGate super-admin named service added from jsconsole
Look forA FortiGate administrator named service being added or given the super_admin profile from a jsconsole or websocket login (logdesc 'Admin added' or 'Object attribute configured')
Why it mattersDarkLunnen's modified CVE-2024-55591 exploit creates a backdoor super-admin named service through the jsconsole websocket used by the authentication bypass. A patch does not remove an account already created, so hunt patched devices too and inspect the running config for an unexpected service super_admin. Tuning: match only FortiGate or Fortinet events whose logdesc is Admin added or Object attribute configured; the account must be the admin named service (user, cfgobj, or the 'added new administrator service' message), not the ordinary FortiGate service= protocol field; the ui or method must be jsconsole or websocket. Expected false positives: a legitimate administrator who is actually named service and is created or changed from the FortiGate GUI CLI (jsconsole) by your own staff. Confirm the source address and whether the change was approved. The hunt returns nothing until FortiGate syslog is ingested. Group-IB
Log sourceFortiGate syslog ingested into Defender XDR or Sentinel (CommonSecurityLog or a FortiGate custom table), Splunk (forti/fgt sourcetypes) or Google SecOps (Fortinet UDM)
QueriesKQL · SPL · YARA-L
alert suo5 or Neo-reGeorg/reGeorg tunnelling tools
Look forFiles or processes named suo5, reGeorgSocksProxy.py, neo-reGeorg or tunnel.tomcat.5.jsp
Why it mattersDarkLunnen deployed suo5 and Neo-reGeorg/reGeorg tunnelling webshells on compromised Exchange and other web servers. These tool names are distinctive. Tuning: match the file or process name, or a command line that contains suo5, reGeorgSocksProxy, neo-reGeorg, neoreGeorg or tunnel.tomcat.5.jsp. Generic names such as tunnel.php or tunnel.aspx are left out because they are too common. Expected false positives: a security, red-team or research process that runs the public tools. Group-IB
Log sourceDefender XDR DeviceFileEvents and DeviceProcessEvents; Splunk endpoint file and process logs; Google SecOps file and process UDM
QueriesKQL · SPL · YARA-L
alert Roundcube web process spawning a shell or transfer tool
Look forA Roundcube web or PHP process spawning a shell, Python, Perl, or a transfer tool such as curl, wget or netcat
Why it mattersDarkLunnen's shell history shows CVE-2025-49113 exploitation attempts against Roundcube. A successful exploit gives code execution in the webmail process, which then often starts a shell or transfer tool. Tuning: the parent must be a web or PHP process (php-fpm, php, php-cgi, httpd, apache2 or nginx) and the child a shell, Python, Perl, curl, wget or netcat; and either the parent or child path or command line contains roundcube, or a file under a roundcube path is created or modified on the same device within 2 minutes of the spawn. Expected false positives: an administrator or cron job updating Roundcube, which can both touch files under the application path and start a shell script. Confirm whether a change or update was expected. Group-IB
Log sourceDefender XDR DeviceProcessEvents and DeviceFileEvents; Splunk endpoint process and file logs; Google SecOps process UDM
QueriesKQL · SPL · YARA-L
Affected countries and sectors
- Targets
- Ukraine, Romania, Poland, Germany, Czech Republic, Turkey, Azerbaijan, Algeria, Europe
- Sectors
- Government, Defence, Aviation, ICS/OT, Healthcare
Background
Group-IB, writing on 11 November 2026 and updating the post on 13 November, describes an open directory on a Latvia-hosted server (46[.]8[.]236[.]121:8090) that exposed 14 months of work by an unattributed operator they name DarkLunnen. Exploit code in the recovered files carries Russian-language comments, but Group-IB has not linked the activity to a known group. The operator used a modified watchTowr proof of concept for FortiGate CVE-2024-55591 that creates a backdoor super-admin account named service; a stolen FortiGate configuration from a Romanian organisation contained that same account, and the operator extracted 10 cleartext VPN passwords from it. Scan results listed about 600 vulnerable FortiGates in Turkey, 16 in Ukraine, 14 in Azerbaijan and one in Algeria. Other recovered activity includes VNC brute force against about 5,800 endpoints (roughly a quarter with industrial HMI desktop names), Hikvision camera scans in Ukraine and Poland, attempted source-code collection from Ukrainian defence and aviation sites, Exchange webshells, a possible German-network intrusion with a stolen NTLM hash, restic access to an S3 backup, and Roundcube CVE-2025-49113 attempts. A second server at 129[.]146[.]87[.]174 on Oracle Cloud staged the exploit scripts. Both addresses, the staging URLs and the modified exploit hash are on the block list. The other recovered-file hashes from the open directory, and the SSH hop addresses in the operator's history, are alert only and must not be blocked.
Downloads
MITRE ATT&CK11
- T1190Exploit Public-Facing Application
- T1136.001Create Account: Local Account
- T1078Valid Accounts
- T1572Protocol Tunneling
- T1505.003Web Shell
- T1071Application Layer Protocol
- T1105Ingress Tool Transfer
- T1110.001Password Guessing
- T1003OS Credential Dumping
- T1550.002Pass the Hash
- T1567Exfiltration Over Web Service