RansomwareHighTLP:CLEAR

Citrus ransomware

Citrus Ransomware: Certighost AD CS Exploitation, Xray VLESS Tunnels and Sn00py

Published
11 November 2026
Added
12 November 2026, 12:25 UK
Last updated
12 November 2026

2 to block now12 to hunt5 behaviours to hunt

Hunt3 platforms

Run the hunt before you block, to find past activity. The same hunt is published for each platform. Preview and copy the queries in the dashboard.

  • Defender XDRKQLDefender portal > Hunting > Advanced hunting. Paste and run over 30 days.Download hunt.kql
  • SplunkSPLSearch & Reporting, last 30 days or more. Reads the CIM data models.Download hunt.spl
  • Google SecOpsYARA-L 2.0Rules Editor. Paste, Retrohunt over 30 days, then turn on live mode.Download hunt.yaral

These queries can return false positives. Know your environment and confirm a hit before acting.

Summary

Contractor-account ransomware using Certighost AD CS certificates, Xray VLESS tunnels and a fake Kaspersky GPO to push Sn00py. Kaspersky describes Citrus, a previously undocumented Russian-speaking ransomware group that has hit Russian organisations, mainly in finance, agriculture and retail.

Do now

  1. Block the 2 indicators.
  2. Run the hunt.
  3. Patch every Enterprise CA now.

Indicators 14

ValueTypeActionCopy
91[.]210[.]109[.]118IPv4block
91[.]210[.]108[.]180IPv4block
d631627131b90d576…bf530e1abeOtheralert
7107fb029e7c63523…5fc8e56b38Otheralert
e251df2d0b7c36829…4d2009a2f4Otheralert
17b29b6c9de80402a…1bbe1168faOtheralert
KasperskyGPO_Deploy_64.exeFile namealert
Deploy-KasperskyGPO.ps1File namealert
build_64.exeFile namealert
CITRUS_README.txtFile namealert
.citrusOtheralert
KasperskyAgentInstallTaskOtheralert
Java rpchost agentOtheralert
GHOST[A-Z]{8}Otheralert

Sources Kaspersky · Kaspersky (2) · GBHackers

More detail
Note Kaspersky published MD5 hashes only, so the four hashes are listed as alert items and are not in the SHA-256 block list. Victims so far are in Russia, but the Certighost technique works against any unpatched Enterprise CA. Xray and 7-Zip are legitimate tools and mirror.yandex.ru is a legitimate site: hunt for them in unusual places, never block them.

What to do

  1. Patch every Enterprise CA for CVE-2026-54121 and turn on AD CS auditing (events 4886 and 4887); Defender for Identity raises a Potential Certighost alert for attempts.
  2. Block 91[.]210[.]109[.]118 and 91[.]210[.]108[.]180 and search 90 days of firewall, VPN and proxy logs for them.
  3. Alert on new computer accounts named GHOST plus eight capital letters (event 4741). If one exists, revoke every certificate issued to it, delete the account, and treat the domain as compromised if a certificate was issued.
  4. Hunt for GPOs or scheduled tasks named after Kaspersky that are not from your Kaspersky deployment, for build_64.exe or KasperskyAgent.exe in SYSVOL, and for KasperskyAgentInstallTask, Sysvc and Java rpchost agent tasks.
  5. Hunt for Xray or renamed binaries (mst.exe, sabycenter.exe, webex.exe, rpchost.exe) running from C:\ProgramData, certutil or BITS downloading executables, and files ending .citrus.
  6. Review contractor accounts: require MFA on VPN and RDP, limit their logon hours and hosts, and reset any that show unusual activity.

Behaviours to hunt 5

Behaviours are leads, not confirmed indicators, and can match legitimate activity. Compare any hit against your own baseline and environment before acting.

  1. alert Certighost GHOST computer account or cdc certificate request

    Look forComputer accounts named GHOST plus eight capital letters, or Machine-template certificate requests whose cdc attribute points at an outside address

    Why it mattersThe public Certighost (CVE-2026-54121) exploit creates a GHOST computer account for each attempt and asks the CA to verify the request against a server the attacker controls (cdc:91[.]210[.]109[.]118 in Citrus intrusions). An issued certificate lets the attacker log in as a domain controller. Kaspersky

    Log sourceDefender for Identity directory events; domain controller Security log 4741; AD CS CA log 4886/4887

    QueriesKQL · SPL

  2. alert Fake Kaspersky GPO or task deploying ransomware

    Look forA Group Policy Object or scheduled task named after Kaspersky that deploys an executable from SYSVOL (KasperskyGPO_Deploy_64.exe, Deploy-KasperskyGPO.ps1, KasperskyAgentInstallTask, Sysvc)

    Why it mattersCitrus pushes Sn00py through a malicious GPO called Kaspersky GPO: a self-extracting archive copies the ransomware to SYSVOL, imports and links the GPO, and the GPO creates a scheduled task on every machine. Kaspersky

    Log sourceEDR process and file events on domain controllers and endpoints; Windows Security 5136/5137 (GPO changes); Task Scheduler 4698

    QueriesKQL · SPL · YARA-L

  3. alert Xray tunnel binary in ProgramData or Citrus server traffic

    Look forXray or a renamed tunnel binary (mst.exe, sabycenter.exe, webex.exe, rpchost.exe) running from C:\ProgramData, or certutil and BITS downloading executables there

    Why it mattersCitrus fetches Xray with certutil or BITS, renames it after familiar software, and runs reverse VLESS tunnels on port 443 that use REALITY to look like traffic to mirror.yandex.ru. Kaspersky

    Log sourceEDR process and network events on Windows

    QueriesKQL · SPL · YARA-L

  4. alert Citrus .citrus files, ransom note or bcedit

    Look forFiles renamed with the .citrus extension, CITRUS_README.txt notes, or a process calling bcedit

    Why it mattersSn00py encrypts user files with RSA-2048 and ChaCha20, appends .citrus, drops CITRUS_README.txt and tries to change boot settings by calling bcedit (a typo for bcdedit). Kaspersky

    Log sourceEDR file and process events

    QueriesKQL · SPL · YARA-L

  5. hunt Impacket atexec scheduled-task command

    Look forImpacket atexec: cmd.exe started by the Task Scheduler service writing its output to a random .tmp file in C:\Windows\Temp

    Why it mattersCitrus used Impacket atexec to run commands on other hosts through short-lived scheduled tasks. The tool's default command line redirects output to an eight-character .tmp file in Windows\Temp. Kaspersky

    Log sourceEDR process events; Task Scheduler 4698/4699

    QueriesKQL · SPL

Affected countries and sectors

Targets
Russia, Eastern Europe
Sectors
Financial services, Agriculture, Retail

Background

Kaspersky describes Citrus, a previously undocumented Russian-speaking ransomware group that has hit Russian organisations, mainly in finance, agriculture and retail. Citrus logs in with stolen contractor accounts over VPN or internet-facing RDP, then tries to escalate with CVE-2026-54121 (Certighost), an AD CS flaw patched in July 2026: each attempt creates a computer account named GHOST plus eight capital letters and requests a Machine-template certificate whose cdc attribute points the CA at the attacker's server 91[.]210[.]109[.]118, so a success gives a certificate for a domain controller. The group also used Impacket atexec, Metasploit and weak 1C:Enterprise servers, PowerShell written with large language models, and Xray reverse VLESS tunnels on port 443 disguised with REALITY as traffic to mirror.yandex.ru. It stole messenger data with 7-Zip, then pushed the Go-based Sn00py ransomware through a malicious GPO named Kaspersky GPO, created by KasperskyGPO_Deploy_64.exe, which runs it through the KasperskyAgentInstallTask or Sysvc scheduled task; files get the .citrus extension and a CITRUS_README.txt note. Both Citrus servers are on the block list.

Downloads

View folder in repository

MITRE ATT&CK14

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