Exploitation / edge deviceCriticalTLP:CLEAR

Check Point PHP2Shell

PHP2Shell on Check Point Gateways: TSGA Backdoor, TSProxy and destroy_v6 ESXi Wiper

Published
12 November 2026
Added
12 November 2026, 15:52 UK
Last updated
13 November 2026

10 to block now1 to hunt5 behaviours to hunt

Hunt3 platforms

Run the hunt before you block, to find past activity. The same hunt is published for each platform. Preview and copy the queries in the dashboard.

  • Defender XDRKQLDefender portal > Hunting > Advanced hunting. Paste and run over 30 days.Download hunt.kql
  • SplunkSPLSearch & Reporting, last 30 days or more. Reads the CIM data models.Download hunt.spl
  • Google SecOpsYARA-L 2.0Rules Editor. Paste, Retrohunt over 30 days, then turn on live mode.Download hunt.yaral

These queries can return false positives. Know your environment and confirm a hit before acting.

Summary

PHP2Shell exploitation of Check Point Mobile Access gateways leading to the TSGA backdoor and a destroy_v6 wiper on ESXi. Both attacker IPs and all eight hashes are on the block list.

Do now

  1. Block the 10 indicators.
  2. Run the hunt.
  3. Patch the published CVEs.

Indicators 11

ValueTypeActionCopy
130[.]94[.]19[.]204IPv4block
130[.]94[.]19[.]168IPv4block
edb3e92eb7bda7413…e4c3fda2b3SHA256block
4171b521fa6441382…46b37a2ec8SHA256block
d7549671c7189979f…720eca0c63SHA256block
3b51080a909023f7d…6bfcd2db90SHA256block
c7d9477309fac6c63…6c36003237SHA256block
0522937c0c0337be5…515f3a96f7SHA256block
ee16e1695711b9d60…e16d2a39d7SHA256block
fb1a6235eb6bce8c9…adf26654daSHA256block
CVE-2026-123039Othermonitor

Sources Check Point Research · WeLiveSecurity · Spamhaus · Check Point · Check Point (2)

More detail
Note Attribution is unclear: Check Point lists a China-nexus actor, an access broker or a false flag as possible. The IP addresses sit on LightNode VPS space and may be reassigned later, so review hits in context. The gogo hash is a specific sample; gogo itself is a public scanner.

What to do

  1. Patch Check Point Security Gateways for PHP2Shell (CVE-2026-109618, CVE-2026-109619) and CVE-2026-123039, and restrict who can reach Mobile Access portals.
  2. Block 130[.]94[.]19[.]204 and 130[.]94[.]19[.]168 and search 90 days of firewall, VPN and gateway logs for them from 30 October 2026.
  3. On gateways, look for zz*.tpl files or challenge_render.tpl in the portal templates directory, /tmp/.up.tpl, /tmp/CPconfigdaemon, slot_CPconfigdaemon, /tmp/.bd.log, /lib/libcpfwcommon.so, /tmp/.p_sock and a listener on TCP 11072; treat any hit as a full gateway compromise.
  4. On every Gaia gateway, management and log server, grep /var/log/dynamicCli.log for Received = lines without the Clish wrapper (CPprofile.sh >> /dev/null; export SP_DISTRIBUTE=0; set -o noglob;) and, after the Jumbo Hotfix, for Rejected connection from unauthorized uid; either is a CVE-2026-123039 escalation attempt. If the hotfix cannot go on yet, stop dynamic_server as sk1000362 describes.
  5. Check ESXi hosts for SSH logins as vpxuser from a gateway, /tmp/des and DREAM_ANNEXATION.txt files, and rotate the vpxuser and gateway credentials if a gateway was exposed.

Behaviours to hunt 5

Behaviours are leads, not confirmed indicators, and can match legitimate activity. Compare any hit against your own baseline and environment before acting.

  1. hunt PHP2Shell session artefacts on the Mobile Access portal

    Look forPHP session files containing the upload_progress_pwn marker under /opt/CPcvpn-*/tmp/, together with bursts of segmentation faults in the Mobile Access portal Apache/PHP workers

    Why it mattersCheck Point Research saw these session artefacts and hundreds of worker crashes on 30 October 2026 as the first sign of PHP2Shell exploitation of the Mobile Access portal. Check Point Research

    Log sourceCheck Point gateway file system and system logs (forwarded syslog), EDR file events where a sensor is installed

    QueriesKQL · SPL

  2. alert DynamicCLI root commands without the Clish wrapper (CVE-2026-123039)

    Look fordynamicCli.log entries showing CVE-2026-123039: Received = lines without the Clish wrapper, or Rejected connection from unauthorized uid

    Why it mattersCheck Point's sk1000362 says the root dynamic_server daemon logs every command it receives. Legitimate requests use the wrapper . /opt/CPshared/5.0/tmp/.CPprofile.sh >> /dev/null; export SP_DISTRIBUTE=0; set -o noglob; and anything else was run as root through the world-writable /tmp/dynamic_socket, the escalation used after PHP2Shell. After the November Jumbo Hotfix, blocked attempts log Rejected connection from unauthorized uid with a UID such as 99 (nobody). Tuning: both conditions come from the vendor's own indicator of compromise. Expected false positives: none known; confirm any hit with Check Point TAC. Check Point

    Log sourceCheck Point Gaia /var/log/dynamicCli.log on gateways, management and log servers, forwarded by syslog to Splunk or Google SecOps (not in Defender XDR)

    QueriesSPL

  3. alert zz*.tpl webshells in the portal templates

    Look forFiles named zz*.tpl or challenge_render.tpl written into the Mobile Access login templates directory, or a file at /tmp/.up.tpl

    Why it mattersThe attacker wrote base64-decoded PHP webshells as zz<random>.tpl files (printf ... | base64 -d), stored uploads at /tmp/.up.tpl and copied them into the portal as challenge_render.tpl. The expanded shell needs the key zz2026. Check Point Research

    Log sourceCheck Point gateway file integrity checks, EDR file events

    QueriesKQL · SPL · YARA-L

  4. alert TSGA backdoor, TSProxy library or port 11072 listener

    Look forA process named CPconfigdaemon or slot_CPconfigdaemon started from /tmp or the boot persistence directory, output redirected to /tmp/.bd.log, the library /lib/libcpfwcommon.so, the socket /tmp/.p_sock, or a listener on TCP 11072

    Why it mattersThis is the TSGA backdoor: it was started with nohup /tmp/CPconfigdaemon >/tmp/.bd.log, relaunches as slot_CPconfigdaemon, injects the TSProxy library /lib/libcpfwcommon.so into appliance processes, and talks over TCP 11072 and /tmp/.p_sock. Check Point Research

    Log sourceCheck Point gateway process list and file checks, EDR process, file and network events

    QueriesKQL · SPL · YARA-L

  5. alert vpxuser SSH to ESXi and the destroy_v6 wiper

    Look forSSH login to a VMware ESXi host as vpxuser from a firewall or VPN gateway address, followed by files at /tmp/des or DREAM_ANNEXATION.txt

    Why it mattersFrom the compromised gateway the attacker ran the gogo scanner, logged in to ESXi over SSH with the vpxuser service account, staged the destroy_v6 wiper as /tmp/des and left DREAM_ANNEXATION.txt in each wiped directory. Check Point Research

    Log sourceESXi auth and shell logs (syslog), EDR file events, firewall logs for gateway-to-ESXi SSH

    QueriesKQL · SPL · YARA-L

Affected countries and sectors

Targets
Israel, Middle East
Sectors
Not stated

Background

Check Point Research reports that from 30 October 2026, about a week after the fix shipped, an attacker scanned and exploited unpatched Check Point Security Gateways through their Mobile Access portals using PHP2Shell (CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619). The first wave hit Israeli organisations and included destructive activity; a broader second wave on 2 November reached organisations in many countries and sectors with no sign of destruction. In the investigated intrusion the attacker escalated from the portal service account to root through the DynamicCLI interface (CVE-2026-123039), planted zz*.tpl PHP webshells in the portal templates directory, then launched the TSGA backdoor from /tmp/CPconfigdaemon, which relaunches as slot_CPconfigdaemon, listens on TCP 11072 and drops the TSProxy library as /lib/libcpfwcommon.so. They ran the gogo scanner, moved to a VMware ESXi host over SSH with the vpxuser account, and ran the destroy_v6 wiper, leaving DREAM_ANNEXATION.txt notes. TSGA and TSProxy are modified PhiliKit tools, which ESET tied to China-nexus UNC5221 and Ivanti attacks, but Check Point does not attribute the operation with high confidence. Both attacker IPs and all eight hashes are on the block list.

Downloads

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MITRE ATT&CK11

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