BlackNevas ESXi ransomware
BlackNevas: Ransomware Wipes ESXi and vCenter Through Legitimate Management Features
- Published
- 13 November 2026
- Added
- 13 November 2026, 20:22 UK
- Last updated
- 13 November 2026
8 to block nowNothing to hunt4 behaviours to hunt
Hunt3 platforms
Run the hunt before you block, to find past activity. The same hunt is published for each platform. Preview and copy the queries in the dashboard.
- Defender XDRKQLDefender portal > Hunting > Advanced hunting. Paste and run over 30 days.Download hunt.kql
- SplunkSPLSearch & Reporting, last 30 days or more. Reads the CIM data models.Download hunt.spl
- Google SecOpsYARA-L 2.0Rules Editor. Paste, Retrohunt over 30 days, then turn on live mode.Download hunt.yaral
These queries can return false positives. Know your environment and confirm a hit before acting.
Summary
Stolen admin credentials and vCenter Host Profiles used to open SSH on ESXi and wipe every VM and the backups. Backup services were stopped and the backup servers encrypted first.
Do now
- Block the 8 indicators.
- Run the hunt.
- Check for the listed behaviours.
Indicators 8
| Value | Type | Action | Copy |
|---|---|---|---|
45[.]149[.]154[.]135 | IPv4 | block | |
91[.]92[.]242[.]121 | IPv4 | block | |
31[.]41[.]33[.]212 | IPv4 | block | |
188[.]240[.]57[.]94 | IPv4 | block | |
api[.]cloudvflare[.]com | Domain | block | |
28f8da19ddcdf26e4…4a79bc1c33 | SHA1 | block | |
15dc419b7fbeb50c5…0149574baf | SHA256 | block | |
5a9b7a0d3f25757ae…5ed7a12f78 | SHA256 | block |
Sources Kaspersky
More detail
What to do
- Block the five network indicators and the three file hashes, and search 30 days of firewall, proxy and DNS logs for them, including traffic from vCenter and backup servers.
- Alert on any executable run from /tmp on ESXi, on the vmware-vdma unit on a vCenter appliance, and on a vspbind Windows service.
- Alert when a Host Profile change enables TSM-SSH and an SSH session to the same host follows within 15 minutes.
- Treat vCenter as Tier 0: separate virtualisation and backup admin accounts from domain admins, forward ESXi and vCenter logs off-host, and keep execInstalledOnly on.
Behaviours to hunt 4
Behaviours are leads, not confirmed indicators, and can match legitimate activity. Compare any hit against your own baseline and environment before acting.
alert ESXi encryptor run from /tmp against /vmfs
Look forAn executable run from /tmp on an ESXi host with BlackNevas-style switches: /selftest, or /p /vmfs/ together with /wipe, /allsys or /detach
Why it mattersKaspersky saw the encryptor uploaded to /tmp, made executable, test-run with ./tmp/esx64 /selftest about three hours before detonation, then run as ./tmp/esx64 /p /vmfs/ /depth 5 /wipe /allsys /detach. The forward-slash switches match SentinelOne's BlackNevas notes. Tuning: needs both the /tmp path and the switches. Expected false positives: none known; admins do not run binaries from /tmp against /vmfs. A /selftest hit is the pre-impact window to act. Kaspersky
Log sourceESXi shell.log forwarded by syslog
QueriesKQL · SPL · YARA-L
alert Fake vmware-vdma tunnel service on vCenter
Look forA systemd unit named vmware-vdma, or a service running /opt/vmware/bin/agent described as "DNS, time, VM settings sync", on a vCenter Server Appliance
Why it mattersThe operator installed Ligolo-ng v0.8.2 as /etc/systemd/system/vmware-vdma.service with Restart=always, calling out to api[.]cloudvflare[.]com:443, about four hours after first SSH login, through MeshAgent. vmware-vdma is not a VMware service. Tuning: exact unit name and description. Expected false positives: none known; also compare all units under /etc/systemd/system against a clean VCSA build. Kaspersky
Log sourcevCenter appliance syslog (systemd) and file checks of /etc/systemd/system
QueriesKQL · SPL · YARA-L
alert vspbind remote-management service
Look forA Windows service named vspbind (the operator's MeshAgent install)
Why it mattersKaspersky lists vspbind as the Windows service for the remote-management agent in this intrusion. Tuning: exact service key name. Expected false positives: none known; check any hit for MeshAgent files and traffic to 45[.]149[.]154[.]135. Kaspersky
Log sourceDefender XDR DeviceRegistryEvents; Windows 7045 or Sysmon 13 in Splunk or Google SecOps
QueriesKQL · SPL
hunt Host Profile turns on SSH, then SSH from vCenter
Look forA Host Profile change that sets TSM-SSH (or TSM) to running on an ESXi host outside a change window, followed within 15 minutes by an SSH login to that host from the vCenter or another management appliance
Why it mattersIn this case the profile push came 10 minutes after the profile was read, SSH reached RUNNING 33 seconds later, and the next SSH session came from the vCenter IP. Each step is normal on its own; Kaspersky rates the sequence Critical. Tuning: join on the ESXi host, 15-minute window, exclude approved change windows. Expected false positives: planned maintenance that enables SSH through Host Profiles; check the change record. Kaspersky
Log sourcevCenter Events and Tasks, ESXi vpxa.log, vobd.log, hostprofiletrace.log and auth.log
QueriesNone yet: check by hand
Affected countries and sectors
- Targets
- Not stated
- Sectors
- Not stated
Background
Kaspersky GERT describes a 10-day BlackNevas intrusion that destroyed four ESXi hosts, every VM on them, both vCenter Server Appliances and the backup estate without exploiting any VMware flaw. The operator reused stolen admin credentials to log in to vCenter, installed MeshAgent and a Ligolo-ng tunnel disguised as the systemd service vmware-vdma, then used a Host Profile change to switch on SSH (TSM-SSH) on the ESXi hosts and connected from the trusted vCenter address. Backup services were stopped and the backup servers encrypted first. The encryptor was uploaded by SFTP to /tmp, test-run with /selftest about three hours early, then run as esx64 /p /vmfs/ /depth 5 /wipe /allsys /detach, stopping all VMs within 23 seconds.