Barracuda XDR breach
Barracuda Managed XDR Integration Credential Store Breach
- Published
- 1 November 2026
- Added
- 13 November 2026, 11:23 UK
- Last updated
- 13 November 2026
2 to block now3 to hunt1 behaviour to hunt
Hunt3 platforms
Run the hunt before you block, to find past activity. The same hunt is published for each platform. Preview and copy the queries in the dashboard.
- Defender XDRKQLDefender portal > Hunting > Advanced hunting. Paste and run over 30 days.Download hunt.kql
- SplunkSPLSearch & Reporting, last 30 days or more. Reads the CIM data models.Download hunt.spl
- Google SecOpsYARA-L 2.0Rules Editor. Paste, Retrohunt over 30 days, then turn on live mode.Download hunt.yaral
These queries can return false positives. Know your environment and confirm a hit before acting.
Summary
Barracuda Managed XDR integration credentials were reachable after a 1-2 November cloud intrusion; hunt sign-ins from the published addresses and the read-only-audit user agent. Initial access was a third-party cloud access key.
Do now
- Block the 2 indicators.
- Run the hunt.
- Check for the listed behaviours.
Indicators 5
| Value | Type | Action | Copy |
|---|---|---|---|
180[.]178[.]56[.]10 | IPv4 | block | |
52[.]128[.]238[.]126 | IPv4 | block | |
221[.]146[.]68[.]107 | IPv4 | alert | |
2a09:bac1:7680:3d0::26b:5b | ipv6 | alert | |
Mozilla/5.0 (comp…nly-audit) | Other | alert |
Sources Barracuda
More detail
What to do
- If Barracuda notified you, revoke and recreate Managed XDR Cloud or Monitored Endpoint integration credentials (Microsoft 365, Google Workspace and endpoint connectors) and review connected-system logs since 1 November 2026.
- Block 180[.]178[.]56[.]10 and 52[.]128[.]238[.]126 as individual hosts (N963/Netsec hosting, not Azure). Do not block 221[.]146[.]68[.]107 (Korea Telecom) or 2a09:bac1:7680:3d0::26b:5b (Cloudflare WARP), and do not widen the blocks to the surrounding ranges.
- Hunt Entra ID, Cloud App and AWS CloudTrail sign-ins and API calls from those four addresses, or with the user agent Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; read-only-audit), since 1 November, especially Barracuda connector service principals and OAuth apps.
- Treat Boto3/1.43.122, curl/8.5.0, curl/7.81.0 and Python-urllib/3.10 as context only, not as indicators.
Behaviours to hunt 1
Behaviours are leads, not confirmed indicators, and can match legitimate activity. Compare any hit against your own baseline and environment before acting.
alert Cloud or identity sign-ins from the Barracuda addresses or the read-only-audit user agent
Look forCloud or identity sign-ins and API calls from 180[.]178[.]56[.]10, 52[.]128[.]238[.]126, 221[.]146[.]68[.]107 or 2a09:bac1:7680:3d0::26b:5b, or with the user agent Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; read-only-audit), since 1 November 2026, especially by Barracuda connector service principals or OAuth apps
Why it mattersBarracuda published these four addresses and the distinctive read-only-audit user agent as the source of the 1-2 November 2026 intrusion into the store that holds Managed XDR integration credentials. A hit on a Barracuda connector service principal or OAuth app is the highest-priority case, but any sign-in or API call from those indicators since 1 November is worth investigating. Tuning: match only those four addresses or a user agent containing read-only-audit; do not hunt the generic Boto3, curl or Python-urllib agents from the advisory. 221[.]146[.]68[.]107 is Korea Telecom subscriber space and 2a09:bac1:7680:3d0::26b:5b is Cloudflare WARP, so a match on those two is an alert lead, not a reason to block the network. Expected false positives: a legitimate user or service reaching your tenant through that exact Cloudflare WARP address or that Korea Telecom subscriber; or an internal audit tool that already uses the read-only-audit user agent. Confirm whether the principal is a Barracuda connector and whether the activity was expected. Barracuda
Log sourceDefender XDR EntraIdSignInEvents, AADSignInEventsBeta, EntraIdSpnSignInEvents, AADSpnSignInEventsBeta and CloudAppEvents; AWS CloudTrail (AWSCloudTrail in Sentinel). The CloudTrail and some web tables need Microsoft Sentinel connected to the Defender portal.
QueriesKQL · SPL · YARA-L
Affected countries and sectors
- Targets
- Worldwide
- Sectors
- Cloud services, Managed security, Enterprise IT
Background
Barracuda, writing on its Trust Center, says it found unauthorised activity in parts of its internal cloud between 1 and 2 November 2026. Initial access was a third-party cloud access key. One affected system stores credentials that Barracuda Managed XDR uses to collect data from customer integrations such as Microsoft 365, Google Workspace and endpoint security platforms. Barracuda says it has found no direct evidence those customer credentials were viewed or used, has rotated its own secrets, and has notified only the customers whose integrations may have been affected. Those organisations should revoke and recreate the credentials and review connected-system logs since 1 November; Barracuda says organisations that were not notified do not need to take action. The activity looks financially motivated: the operator searched for cryptocurrency wallets and related secrets. Two attacker source addresses on N963/Netsec hosting (180[.]178[.]56[.]10 and 52[.]128[.]238[.]126; the latter is APNIC space, not Microsoft Azure) are on the block list, as hosts only. A Korea Telecom address and a Cloudflare WARP IPv6 are alert only and must not be blocked. Hunt cloud and identity sign-ins and API calls from all four addresses, or with the distinctive user agent Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; read-only-audit), since 1 November, especially Barracuda connector service principals and OAuth apps. The other user agents Barracuda listed (Boto3, curl and Python-urllib) are ordinary client strings and are not indicators.