APT / espionageCriticalTLP:CLEAR

BO Team software-maker breach

BO Team Breaches a Software Developer Through Log4Shell in vCenter and Targets Its Code-Signing Server

Published
5 November 2026
Added
16 November 2026, 07:55 UK
Last updated
16 November 2026

12 to block now4 to hunt3 behaviours to hunt

Hunt3 platforms

Run the hunt before you block, to find past activity. The same hunt is published for each platform. Preview and copy the queries in the dashboard.

  • Defender XDRKQLDefender portal > Hunting > Advanced hunting. Paste and run over 30 days.Download hunt.kql
  • SplunkSPLSearch & Reporting, last 30 days or more. Reads the CIM data models.Download hunt.spl
  • Google SecOpsYARA-L 2.0Rules Editor. Paste, Retrohunt over 30 days, then turn on live mode.Download hunt.yaral

These queries can return false positives. Know your environment and confirm a hit before acting.

Summary

BO Team used Log4Shell in vCenter to take over a software maker and reach its code-signing server. The victim was a Russian developer of software used by industrial firms, mainly in Eastern Europe.

Do now

  1. Block the 12 indicators.
  2. Run the hunt.
  3. Patch CVE-2021-44228 now.

Indicators 16

ValueTypeActionCopy
346b04985ec6c5d10…df32fe7691MD5block
b86690213f0155f7b…32301ed932MD5block
6d12efa1db15121f8…9952e301efMD5block
5aa8c19c897176502…fc543fafc7MD5block
68957de915e2a5833…7f8078bdf4MD5block
5e04b2891635cbaa8…9fe248e85bMD5block
719e813e527920e83…61b5b1590fMD5block
86ff08749e77d5d07…e5f9748504MD5block
cb2908ef4cc042bfe…4e9b61a2f9MD5block
lo1yaizaeghaevaro…sdns[.]comDomainblock
lo1yaizaeghaevaro…sdns[.]comDomainblock
vmware-timecheck-…sdns[.]comDomainblock
95[.]81[.]115[.]77IPv4alert
193[.]3[.]23[.]236IPv4alert
80[.]76[.]42[.]139IPv4alert
ip-223-6[.]dataclub[.]infoDomainalert

Sources Kaspersky · The Hacker News

More detail
Note The intrusion ran in 2025 and Kaspersky held the report back for about a year, so the three IP addresses and the DataClub mail server may have changed hands; they are alert only. gsocket.io and the public Global Socket relay are legitimate and are not blocked; the GSocket hunts already on the feed cover them. The victim is in Russia, but the techniques (Log4Shell on old vCenter, cron backdoors on ESXi, abuse of Ansible and GitLab keys) apply anywhere.

What to do

  1. Block the nine MD5 hashes and the three nofrillsdns.com hosts, and search DNS, proxy and EDR logs for them and for the alert-only addresses.
  2. Patch or retire VMware vCenter builds still exposed to Log4Shell, rotate the vCenter root SSH key and check ESXi and Linux hosts for /etc/cron.hourly/pgcache, /etc/cron.hourly/1vmware-timesync and /usr/bin/vmware-toolbox-setdate.
  3. Disable password logins for service accounts on internet-facing SSH, keep GitLab, Ansible and signing keys off shared hosts, and alert on changes to /usr/bin/nxnode-login.
  4. Software vendors should keep build-signing servers isolated, log every signing request and review recent releases if any indicator matches.

Behaviours to hunt 3

Behaviours are leads, not confirmed indicators, and can match legitimate activity. Compare any hit against your own baseline and environment before acting.

  1. alert pgcache or 1vmware-timesync cron files, or vmware-toolbox-setdate

    Look forHourly cron backdoor files /etc/cron.hourly/pgcache or /etc/cron.hourly/1vmware-timesync, or the script /usr/bin/vmware-toolbox-setdate being written or run

    Why it mattersKaspersky ICS CERT found BO Team's bash backdoor in /etc/cron.hourly/pgcache on the ESXi hosts, disguised as a PostgreSQL component and timestomped to 2021, and a second cron script /etc/cron.hourly/1vmware-timesync on virtual machines that runs /usr/bin/vmware-toolbox-setdate, an obfuscated loader for ReverseSSH. VMware tools ship vmware-toolbox-cmd, not vmware-toolbox-setdate, and PostgreSQL does not install cron.hourly jobs named pgcache. Expected false positives: none known. Kaspersky

    Log sourceDefender for Endpoint (Linux) DeviceFileEvents and DeviceProcessEvents; auditd or file integrity monitoring on ESXi and Linux hosts

    QueriesKQL · SPL · YARA-L

  2. alert Shell tools reaching a nofrillsdns.com host

    Look forcurl, wget or bash reaching a nofrillsdns.com host

    Why it mattersEvery BO Team stage in this case talked to subdomains the actor created on the free nofrillsdns.com service: the cron backdoor pulls script.sh, the downloaders report the host name and ReverseSSH connects to vmware-timecheck-api[.]nofrillsdns[.]com:443. Servers have little reason to call this service from shell tools. Expected false positives: admins who use nofrillsdns.com for their own dynamic DNS; check the subdomain and parent process. Kaspersky

    Log sourceDefender for Endpoint (Linux) DeviceProcessEvents and DeviceNetworkEvents; DNS logs

    QueriesKQL · SPL · YARA-L

  3. hunt NX login script modified to capture passwords

    Look for/usr/bin/nxnode-login modified on a Linux terminal server

    Why it mattersWith a privileged account, BO Team edited the NX remote desktop login script /usr/bin/nxnode-login so it wrote every user's credentials to a file under /dev/shm, turning the legitimate NX service into a password logger. The script changes only with NX package updates, so a write outside patching is suspicious. Expected false positives: NX or NoMachine package upgrades; compare the time with your patch window. Kaspersky

    Log sourceDefender for Endpoint (Linux) DeviceFileEvents; file integrity monitoring

    QueriesKQL · SPL

Affected countries and sectors

Targets
Russia, Eastern Europe
Sectors
Software development, Industrial software

Background

Kaspersky ICS CERT published on 5 November 2026 (reported by The Hacker News on 16 November) its response to a months-long 2025 intrusion it attributes with high confidence to BO Team, also called Black Owl. The victim was a Russian developer of software used by industrial firms, mainly in Eastern Europe. The actor logged in to an internet-facing Linux terminal server over SSH with a password-enabled service account, exploited Log4Shell (CVE-2021-44228) in an unpatched VMware vCenter 7.0.3 to get root, used vCenter's own SSH key to reach the ESXi hosts and planted hourly cron backdoors (/etc/cron.hourly/pgcache and /etc/cron.hourly/1vmware-timesync) that stay idle until a nofrillsdns.com DNS record is switched on. It then ran a ReverseSSH build in memory, took GitLab and Ansible private keys, dumped domain credentials, turned the NX remote desktop login script into a password logger, stole the VPN configuration, abused the victim's DKIM key for phishing and reached the build-signing server. Kaspersky believes the goal was a supply-chain attack on the developer's customers, stopped before any release was tampered with. The nine MD5 hashes and three nofrillsdns.com hosts are on the block list; the actor's 2025 IP addresses are alert only.

Downloads

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MITRE ATT&CK11

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