BBNet Linux botnet
BBNet: Multi-Architecture Linux Botnet with Divergent Scanners
- Published
- 5 November 2026
- Added
- 12 November 2026, 15:11 UK
- Last updated
- 12 November 2026
Nothing to block8 to hunt5 behaviours to hunt
Hunt3 platforms
Run the hunt before you block, to find past activity. The same hunt is published for each platform. Preview and copy the queries in the dashboard.
- Defender XDRKQLDefender portal > Hunting > Advanced hunting. Paste and run over 30 days.Download hunt.kql
- SplunkSPLSearch & Reporting, last 30 days or more. Reads the CIM data models.Download hunt.spl
- Google SecOpsYARA-L 2.0Rules Editor. Paste, Retrohunt over 30 days, then turn on live mode.Download hunt.yaral
These queries can return false positives. Know your environment and confirm a hit before acting.
Summary
Multi-arch Linux botnet that scans before it talks to C2, with no published C2 addresses or hashes. Default C2 is plaintext TCP port 7778, with HTTP updates on port 7779; both can be changed at runtime.
Do now
- Run the hunt.
- Patch CVE-2025-55182 and CVE-2026-24061.
- Check for infect.sh.
Indicators 8
| Value | Type | Action | Copy |
|---|---|---|---|
/tmp/.bbnet | File name | alert | |
/etc/.bbnet | File name | alert | |
/var/lib/.bbnet | File name | alert | |
/tmp/.bbnet.new | File name | alert | |
/var/tmp/.bbnet.new | File name | alert | |
.bbnet_scan_on | File name | alert | |
.bbnet_scan.stats | File name | alert | |
infect.sh | File name | alert |
Sources Security Online
More detail
What to do
- Hunt Linux and embedded hosts for hidden .bbnet binaries under /tmp, /var/lib and /etc, and for .bbnet.new, .bbnet_scan_on and .bbnet_scan.stats.
- Audit /etc/crontab and /etc/rc.local for unauthorised @reboot entries that launch .bbnet, and remove the binary and its persistence together; a C2 block alone will not stop the scanner child.
- Patch React Server Components (CVE-2025-55182) and GNU Inetutils telnetd (CVE-2026-24061), and disable exposed Telnet on ports 23 and 2323.
- Review firewall and NetFlow for bursts of Telnet authentication to 23/2323 and for processes named .bbnet connecting to TCP 7778 or HTTP 7779; do not block those ports globally.
Behaviours to hunt 5
Behaviours are leads, not confirmed indicators, and can match legitimate activity. Compare any hit against your own baseline and environment before acting.
hunt Telnet brute force on TCP 23 and 2323
Look forTelnet brute force against TCP ports 23 and 2323, including a SHELL_TEST echo check after a guessed credential
Why it mattersThe x86-64 BBNet build scans local /24 subnets on TCP 23 and 2323 with 20 credential pairs; the expanded scanner in the other builds uses 45 pairs. Blocking the C2 does not stop this pre-registration scanning. Security Online
Log sourceFirewall, IDS, honeypot and Linux endpoint network logs; Defender XDR DeviceNetworkEvents
QueriesKQL
hunt CVE-2025-55182 or CVE-2026-24061 exploitation, or infect.sh fetch
Look forExploitation attempts against React Server Components CVE-2025-55182 or GNU Inetutils telnetd CVE-2026-24061, or a follow-on fetch of infect.sh
Why it mattersThe expanded BBNet scanner includes 11 exploit handlers, among them CVE-2025-55182 (React Server Components multipart deserialisation) and CVE-2026-24061 (telnetd NEW-ENVIRON argument injection), plus Hikvision, D-Link, Netgear, GPON, Huawei and Realtek flaws. The HTTP helper marks a 'hit' as soon as the request is sent, so internal counts overstate successful exploitation. No unique exploit payload was published. Security Online
Log sourceWeb, WAF and Telnet service logs; Defender XDR DeviceNetworkEvents and DeviceProcessEvents on Linux hosts
QueriesKQL · SPL
alert crontab or rc.local persistence launching .bbnet
Look forNew @reboot or similar entries in /etc/crontab or /etc/rc.local that launch a hidden .bbnet binary, without preserving a runtime C2 argument
Why it mattersAfter a double fork, BBNet writes reboot entries into /etc/crontab and /etc/rc.local. Those entries omit runtime server arguments, so a restarted implant falls back to its compiled default C2. Security Online
Log sourceLinux file integrity, auditd and Defender XDR DeviceFileEvents or DeviceProcessEvents
QueriesKQL · SPL · YARA-L
alert Hidden .bbnet ELF drops and scanner state files
Look forMulti-architecture ELF drops in /tmp, /var/tmp, /dev/shm or /var/run, saved as .b and then copied to /etc, /var/lib or /tmp as .bbnet, plus .bbnet.new, .bbnet_scan_on or .bbnet_scan.stats
Why it mattersinfect.sh pulls 13 architecture binaries (ARM, AArch64, x86, MIPS and PowerPC; 10 unique SHA-256 hashes, unpublished in the public write-up), saves each candidate as .b, and runs it without checking the host CPU. The running implant then copies itself to .bbnet. Security Online
Log sourceDefender XDR DeviceFileEvents on Linux hosts; file integrity monitoring
QueriesKQL · SPL · YARA-L
hunt Default C2 on TCP 7778 or updates on 7779 from .bbnet
Look forOutbound plaintext TCP to port 7778 with a registration string, or HTTP to port 7779 for 16-character build markers, especially from a process whose image is .bbnet
Why it mattersAfter starting its scanner, the parent process connects to a default C2 port 7778 and sends a registration string (a random 24-character hex ID, architecture, OS, hostname and version). An HTTP updater checks port 7779. Both ports can be changed at runtime, and no C2 address was published. Security Online
Log sourceFirewall, NetFlow and Defender XDR DeviceNetworkEvents on Linux hosts
QueriesKQL
Affected countries and sectors
- Targets
- Not stated
- Sectors
- Internet-facing Linux hosts, Routers and network cameras, React Server Components deployments
Background
PRODAFT's Threat Intelligence team, in a report dated 5 November 2026 and summarised publicly on 12 November by Security Online, analysed a 13.65 MB package recovered from an open directory and labelled the family BBNet. The archive holds a loader named infect.sh and 13 statically linked ELF binaries for ARM, AArch64, x86, MIPS and PowerPC (10 unique SHA-256 hashes; three filename pairs are byte-identical). After a double fork the implant copies itself to /etc, /var/lib or /tmp as .bbnet, writes @reboot entries in /etc/crontab and /etc/rc.local, and starts scanning before it ever registers with its controller, so blocking the C2 will not stop propagation. The x86-64 build brute-forces Telnet on TCP 23 and 2323; the other builds add 11 exploit handlers, including React Server Components CVE-2025-55182 and GNU Inetutils telnetd CVE-2026-24061, plus Hikvision, D-Link, Netgear, GPON, Huawei and Realtek flaws. Default C2 is plaintext TCP port 7778, with HTTP updates on port 7779; both can be changed at runtime. PRODAFT did not publish C2 addresses or file hashes in the public coverage, and the recovered package had no victim telemetry, so this entry is behaviours and file-name leads only. Patch the two CVEs, disable exposed Telnet, and hunt the .bbnet artefacts.