AntiFox AWS secret theft
AntiFox: ARTEX Fork Used to Implant IIS Web Shells and Steal AWS Secrets
- Published
- 11 November 2026
- Added
- 12 November 2026, 09:25 UK
- Last updated
- 12 November 2026
Nothing to block2 to hunt3 behaviours to hunt
Hunt3 platforms
Run the hunt before you block, to find past activity. The same hunt is published for each platform. Preview and copy the queries in the dashboard.
- Defender XDRKQLDefender portal > Hunting > Advanced hunting. Paste and run over 30 days.Download hunt.kql
- SplunkSPLSearch & Reporting, last 30 days or more. Reads the CIM data models.Download hunt.spl
- Google SecOpsYARA-L 2.0Rules Editor. Paste, Retrohunt over 30 days, then turn on live mode.Download hunt.yaral
These queries can return false positives. Know your environment and confirm a hit before acting.
Summary
ARTEX fork used to implant IIS web shells and steal AWS production secrets. AntiFox is an open-source agentic penetration-testing platform built on ARTEX.
Do now
- Run the hunt.
- Check for w3wp.exe.
- Check for the listed behaviours.
Indicators 2
| Value | Type | Action | Copy |
|---|---|---|---|
47[.]79[.]4[.]33 | IPv4 | alert | |
8[.]208[.]101[.]210 | IPv4 | alert |
Sources The Hacker News · BleepingComputer
More detail
What to do
- Hunt IIS servers for w3wp.exe creating new .aspx files, and for w3wp.exe launching cmd, PowerShell, whoami or icacls.
- In AWS CloudTrail, hunt valid identities that enumerate many services and, in particular, ListSecrets followed by GetSecretValue or unexpected S3 object access.
- Treat the two circulated IP addresses as alert-only leads only; do not block Alibaba Cloud.
- This is a separate AntiFox fork from Storm-3358; review both entries if you already hunt ARTEX behaviour.
Behaviours to hunt 3
Behaviours are leads, not confirmed indicators, and can match legitimate activity. Compare any hit against your own baseline and environment before acting.
alert IIS worker dropping an ASPX web shell
Look forw3wp.exe creating a new .aspx file under the web root or an upload directory
Why it mattersArctic Wolf saw the IIS worker process drop an ASPX web shell after the web application was compromised, then run commands through that shell. The Hacker News
Log sourceEDR file events on IIS servers
QueriesKQL · SPL · YARA-L
alert IIS worker running whoami, icacls or PowerShell
Look forw3wp.exe starting cmd, PowerShell, whoami or icacls, or PowerShell that searches for web.config and connection strings
Why it mattersArctic Wolf reported commands run through w3wp.exe to identify the execution context, enumerate the application directory, check permissions with icacls, and locate configuration and credentials. The Hacker News
Log sourceEDR process events on IIS servers
QueriesKQL · SPL · YARA-L
hunt AWS secret and service enumeration
Look forValid AWS identities enumerating many services, especially Secrets Manager ListSecrets followed by GetSecretValue, or rapid List, Get and Describe calls across IAM, EC2, S3, Lambda, RDS, KMS and similar APIs
Why it mattersArctic Wolf saw attackers abuse valid IAM identities to enumerate dozens of AWS services and, in some cases, successfully call GetSecretValue on a production secret or perform S3 object operations. The Hacker News
Log sourceAWS CloudTrail, or CloudAppEvents with the AWS connector
QueriesKQL · SPL
Affected countries and sectors
- Targets
- Not stated
- Sectors
- Cloud services, Technology
Background
Arctic Wolf Labs, reported on 11 November 2026, observed intrusions in which self-hosted AntiFox consoles on Alibaba Cloud were used against internet-facing IIS applications. AntiFox is an open-source agentic penetration-testing platform built on ARTEX. In the observed cases, access to a compromised IIS application was used to drop an ASPX web shell through w3wp.exe, run whoami and icacls, read web.config and connection strings, and then abuse valid AWS identities to enumerate many services. In some instances the actor called GetSecretValue on a production secret, or used the identity for S3 discovery and object operations. This is a different fork and different infrastructure from the Storm-3358 ARTEX campaign already in this feed. Arctic Wolf did not publish network indicators in the public write-ups; two IP addresses circulating on third-party sites are included as medium-confidence alert-only leads and have not been confirmed by Arctic Wolf. Do not block Alibaba Cloud.