Intrusion / financially motivatedCriticalTLP:CLEAR

AI retail intrusion

AI-Assisted Intrusion at a U.S. Retailer: SolarWinds Orion Erlang Cookie Abuse, Side-Loaded Loaders and Yuze Tunnels

Published
12 November 2026
Added
13 November 2026, 09:55 UK
Last updated
13 November 2026

35 to block now27 to hunt8 behaviours to hunt

Hunt3 platforms

Run the hunt before you block, to find past activity. The same hunt is published for each platform. Preview and copy the queries in the dashboard.

  • Defender XDRKQLDefender portal > Hunting > Advanced hunting. Paste and run over 30 days.Download hunt.kql
  • SplunkSPLSearch & Reporting, last 30 days or more. Reads the CIM data models.Download hunt.spl
  • Google SecOpsYARA-L 2.0Rules Editor. Paste, Retrohunt over 30 days, then turn on live mode.Download hunt.yaral

These queries can return false positives. Know your environment and confirm a hit before acting.

Summary

Attackers using AI-written PowerShell abuse SolarWinds Orion's RabbitMQ Erlang cookie to move laterally at a U.S. retailer.

Do now

  1. Block the 35 indicators.
  2. Run the hunt.
  3. Check for erl.exe.

Indicators 62

ValueTypeActionCopy
204[.]194[.]49[.]129IPv4block
166[.]0[.]25[.]106IPv4block
154[.]81[.]37[.]136IPv4block
155[.]254[.]22[.]215IPv4block
108[.]165[.]20[.]205IPv4block
103[.]142[.]103[.]225IPv4block
176[.]97[.]117[.]157IPv4block
103[.]79[.]79[.]191IPv4block
103[.]79[.]79[.]120IPv4block
hxxp://154[.]81[.…server.ps1URLblock
hxxp://166[.]0[.]…server.ps1URLblock
hxxp://166[.]0[.]…anager.aspURLblock
hxxp://204[.]194[…80/log.dllURLblock
hxxp://204[.]194[…80/log.txtURLblock
hxxp://204[.]194[…reinit.exeURLblock
hxxp://204[.]194[…80/ASK.exeURLblock
hxxp://204[.]194[…dajhsd.aspURLblock
hxxp://108[.]165[…qlrun2.ps1URLblock
hxxp://103[.]79[.….]191/yuzeURLblock
54fb493822bcd832f…8ad3fdbd0aSHA256block
9c866c403e6bd5778…7e30c0abf3SHA256block
e95a265bf220a4330…c14b6b26afSHA256block
c21e4fb40f871e418…538b66fa01SHA256block
7265d69dd8d8939dc…a7b3383205SHA256block
3d79628bf7804dbf1…a20953438aSHA256block
f042d705e1de3b5f9…9ab1c7cf51SHA256block
5db5e7f655c4ee944…c3cb25bf03SHA256block
f8b67854d119da08c…1f1c7dea68SHA256block
ef7c23619cf929300…3dc2eb1dceSHA256block
b739635832c7f7f2b…b8c0cf6eeaSHA256block
0241f569f4ce1bf0f…b591f446bcSHA256block
c9a5e9799f2844a71…be4d89423cSHA256block
fad5dc8987df3206f…560562647eSHA256block
2b7ed8dc34a834300…99a34dcf19SHA256block
7c8eb7d23337536ed…e6a3bd87c4SHA256block
8[.]219[.]82[.]21IPv4alert
43[.]208[.]224[.]101IPv4alert
hxxp://8[.]219[.]…ws-X64.exeURLalert
a6579b16f895cf9ac…1039881513SHA256alert
6500890307f386089…b65836d55eSHA256alert
ba4038fd20e474c04…8d8d819436SHA256alert
deabe064a12641c4e…1dde2aa774SHA256alert
d92f20d73ade9a613…ce0f852104SHA256alert
bcccfca65602e2691…c900b31ad4SHA256alert
9b077fc464d9a4a2e…af0de93d19SHA256alert
59e51c54cf3ac4d37…29097b9eacSHA256alert
330e9314bd3989898…d539dd0438SHA256alert
2be9c2222cb177747…6d320b8edfSHA256alert
1df54c1c5ee76f2f8…b817a5e2f7SHA256alert
11b26168927a622dd…039068dd67SHA256alert
1f8565e14f8bcde3e…ac8725c17cSHA256alert
d376e01930adabbe4…302e45aaf5SHA256alert
642ea33ddf7eba304…5dfa44d893SHA256alert
5ee783076e9c8b383…f7607f1d38SHA256alert
dac237636f2fb1e44…2ffe561793SHA256alert
76adf3141ccd877d9…260dd2faa3SHA256alert
5666332a66b1fb46b…cec6aa3207SHA256alert
2ffe8c6910d08072c…d294fe9b23SHA256alert
717319bc981c2b8f7…ec2d0c9b04SHA256alert
7e9b60d021067dfe2…55dca6779eSHA256alert
9b7b2dadba43634e8…434c26a74aSHA256alert
318ce2ca913ff8297…65d71e1407SHA256alert

Sources Symantec Threat Hunter Team · Symantec Threat Hunter Team (2) · Gambit Security · ThreatFox · MalwareBazaar · Spamhaus

More detail
Note bdreinit.exe and ask.exe are legitimate signed binaries abused for side-loading and are alert only. The 8[.]219[.]82[.]21 (Alibaba Cloud) and 43[.]208[.]224[.]101 (AWS) Yuze hosts may be reassigned and are alert only. Files Symantec lists only as suspicious are alert only, and two listed hashes that match known-good files were left out. The initial access route is unknown and no data theft or encryption was observed.

What to do

  1. Block the staging and C2 servers (204[.]194[.]49[.]129, 166[.]0[.]25[.]106, 154[.]81[.]37[.]136, 108[.]165[.]20[.]205, 155[.]254[.]22[.]215, 103[.]142[.]103[.]225, 176[.]97[.]117[.]157 and the Yuze hosts 103[.]79[.]79[.]191 and 103[.]79[.]79[.]120), the payload URLs and the malicious hashes, and search 90 days of proxy, firewall and EDR logs for them; alert on 8[.]219[.]82[.]21 and 43[.]208[.]224[.]101.
  2. Hunt for erl.exe from a SolarWinds Orion folder run with -setcookie and an rpc:call to os:cmd, and treat any hit as lateral movement.
  3. Alert on cmd.exe or PowerShell started by sqlservr.exe or w3wp.exe, and on bdreinit.exe, ask.exe or a w3wp.exe copy running from ProgramData.
  4. Hunt for certutil decoding into ProgramData followed by csc.exe, reg save of the SAM, SYSTEM or SECURITY hives, BreakChain launchers and scripts named i<number>_*.ps1.
  5. If Orion runs in your estate, restrict access to the RabbitMQ .erlang.cookie file and the Erlang distribution ports, rotate the cookie after any compromise, and disable xp_cmdshell where it is not needed.
  6. On a confirmed host, rotate SQL logins, domain and local administrator passwords, FTP, WinSCP, PuTTY and RDP saved credentials, and the Zabbix pre-shared key.

Behaviours to hunt 8

Behaviours are leads, not confirmed indicators, and can match legitimate activity. Compare any hit against your own baseline and environment before acting.

  1. alert Orion erl.exe with a stolen Erlang cookie running os:cmd

    Look forerl.exe from a SolarWinds Orion folder run with -setcookie and an -eval rpc:call to os:cmd, the command written as decimal character codes

    Why it mattersThe attackers read the .erlang.cookie of the RabbitMQ broker that ships with Orion and used Orion's own erl.exe to run operating system commands on a second server about 10 minutes after first querying Orion. Encoding the command as character codes keeps it out of plain text. Legitimate RabbitMQ administration rarely passes os:cmd through rpc:call. Symantec Threat Hunter Team

    Log sourceEDR process events (DeviceProcessEvents), Windows 4688 with command line

    QueriesKQL · SPL · YARA-L

  2. alert SQL or IIS shell then a ProgramData side-loading host within 60m

    Look forcmd.exe or PowerShell started by sqlservr.exe or w3wp.exe, followed within 60 minutes on the same device by bdreinit.exe, ask.exe, a BreakChain launcher or a w3wp.exe copy running from ProgramData

    Why it mattersEvery stage of this intrusion ran through the SQL Server service (xp_cmdshell) or the IIS worker process, and the attackers then launched side-loading hosts and BreakChain from ProgramData, also copying ask.exe to ProgramData\w3wp.exe. The pairing is a stronger lead than either event alone. Database maintenance jobs that shell out can match the first half; exclude known SQL Agent and deployment accounts. Symantec Threat Hunter Team

    Log sourceDefender XDR DeviceProcessEvents (join on DeviceId within 60 minutes)

    QueriesKQL

  3. alert Shell spawned by sqlservr.exe or w3wp.exe

    Look forcmd.exe or PowerShell spawned by sqlservr.exe or w3wp.exe

    Why it mattersSymantec saw the first activity as cmd.exe directly under sqlservr.exe on three SQL servers, pointing to xp_cmdshell, and later as cmd.exe under w3wp.exe on a compromised web application. Both are rare on a healthy server. Symantec Threat Hunter Team

    Log sourceEDR process events (DeviceProcessEvents), Windows 4688 with command line

    QueriesKQL · SPL · YARA-L

  4. alert bdreinit.exe or ask.exe side-loading from ProgramData

    Look forbdreinit.exe or ask.exe (run with -gdata) loading log.dll or ask.dll from ProgramData, or w3wp.exe running outside the IIS inetsrv folder

    Why it mattersThe attackers side-loaded log.dll through an old Bitdefender bdreinit.exe and ask.dll through a G DATA signed ask.exe, both from ProgramData, and copied ask.exe to a file named w3wp.exe to blend in. The bdreinit.exe and log.dll pairing is also used by other actors, so it is a lead rather than attribution. Symantec Threat Hunter Team

    Log sourceEDR process and image-load events (DeviceProcessEvents, DeviceImageLoadEvents)

    QueriesKQL · SPL · YARA-L

  5. alert BreakChain launcher relaunching payloads

    Look forA BreakChain launcher (breakchain*.exe) run with -m wmi or the shell mode to relaunch a payload

    Why it mattersAfter repeated terminations the attackers used BreakChain so their payloads would no longer appear as children of w3wp.exe; a second build arrived about 75 minutes after the first was blocked. Symantec Threat Hunter Team

    Log sourceEDR process events (DeviceProcessEvents)

    QueriesKQL · SPL · YARA-L

  6. alert certutil and csc.exe in ProgramData, or hive dumps

    Look forcertutil decoding a file into ProgramData followed by csc.exe compiling it, and SAM, SYSTEM or SECURITY hives saved to disk

    Why it mattersOn a SQL server the attackers appended about 20 base64 chunks to a file under ProgramData, decoded it with certutil and compiled EfsPotato with csc.exe, then saved the SAM, SYSTEM and SECURITY hives; the same hive dumps recurred on other servers. Developers and build agents use csc.exe, so scope the hunt to servers. Symantec Threat Hunter Team

    Log sourceEDR process events (DeviceProcessEvents), Windows 4688 with command line

    QueriesKQL · SPL · YARA-L

  7. hunt Long labelled PowerShell scripts from a server process

    Look forLong PowerShell scripts from a web or database service with labelled output banners such as ===FILES MENTIONING CONN STRINGS=== or ### whoami/priv ###

    Why it mattersThe AI-assisted phase sent about 50 scripts in two hours, median over 500 characters, each bundling several probes under quoted banners and capping output. Banner formatting alone also appears in admin scripts, so pair it with a sqlservr.exe or w3wp.exe parent. Symantec Threat Hunter Team

    Log sourceEDR process events (DeviceProcessEvents), PowerShell 4104 script block logging

    QueriesKQL · SPL

  8. hunt Numbered i<n>_*.ps1 spraying scripts

    Look forPassword-spraying scripts named i<number>_<name>.ps1, such as i187_winspray.ps1

    Why it mattersSeveral file names in this intrusion began with i and a number, which may be a per-target numbering scheme; the sprayer tested credential pairs downloaded from the later staging server. Symantec Threat Hunter Team

    Log sourceEDR process and file events (DeviceProcessEvents, DeviceFileEvents)

    QueriesKQL · SPL

Affected countries and sectors

Targets
United States, North America, East Africa, South Asia
Sectors
Retail, Securities and financial services, ICT providers to banks and telecoms, Energy

Background

Symantec's Threat Hunter Team describes a September 2026 intrusion at a U.S. retailer that stalled while the attackers typed commands by hand, then sped up once they switched to long, labelled, error-free PowerShell scripts that read like a language model's output relayed by an operator. Commands ran as cmd.exe under sqlservr.exe (xp_cmdshell) on SQL servers and under w3wp.exe on a web server. The attackers staged an old Bitdefender bdreinit.exe with log.dll and log.txt, and a G DATA signed ask.exe with ask.dll, from 204[.]194[.]49[.]129:8080, used a BreakChain launcher to move payloads out from under w3wp.exe, dropped the AES-encrypted server.ps1 reverse shell to 166[.]0[.]25[.]106:443 and two ASP web shells, and built EfsPotato with certutil and csc.exe to dump the SAM, SYSTEM and SECURITY hives. About 10 minutes after first querying SolarWinds Orion they read the .erlang.cookie of Orion's bundled RabbitMQ and ran Orion's erl.exe with that cookie to execute commands on a second server, with each command encoded as decimal character codes. They then hunted NTDS.dit, Group Policy cpassword and LAPS passwords, sprayed passwords with i<number>_winspray.ps1 scripts and tunnelled with Chisel and Yuze. Symantec links the loaders and staging server to an August 2026 intrusion and a July 2026 intrusion at a securities firm, and 155[.]254[.]22[.]215, which the attackers tested egress to, matches the AI console Gambit Security tied to an operator stealing card data from online retailers. Attacker servers, payload URLs and malicious tool hashes are on the block list.

Downloads

View folder in repository

MITRE ATT&CK17

Open in the live dashboard Get the blocklist