AI retail intrusion
AI-Assisted Intrusion at a U.S. Retailer: SolarWinds Orion Erlang Cookie Abuse, Side-Loaded Loaders and Yuze Tunnels
- Published
- 12 November 2026
- Added
- 13 November 2026, 09:55 UK
- Last updated
- 13 November 2026
35 to block now27 to hunt8 behaviours to hunt
Hunt3 platforms
Run the hunt before you block, to find past activity. The same hunt is published for each platform. Preview and copy the queries in the dashboard.
- Defender XDRKQLDefender portal > Hunting > Advanced hunting. Paste and run over 30 days.Download hunt.kql
- SplunkSPLSearch & Reporting, last 30 days or more. Reads the CIM data models.Download hunt.spl
- Google SecOpsYARA-L 2.0Rules Editor. Paste, Retrohunt over 30 days, then turn on live mode.Download hunt.yaral
These queries can return false positives. Know your environment and confirm a hit before acting.
Summary
Attackers using AI-written PowerShell abuse SolarWinds Orion's RabbitMQ Erlang cookie to move laterally at a U.S. retailer.
Do now
- Block the 35 indicators.
- Run the hunt.
- Check for erl.exe.
Indicators 62
| Value | Type | Action | Copy |
|---|---|---|---|
204[.]194[.]49[.]129 | IPv4 | block | |
166[.]0[.]25[.]106 | IPv4 | block | |
154[.]81[.]37[.]136 | IPv4 | block | |
155[.]254[.]22[.]215 | IPv4 | block | |
108[.]165[.]20[.]205 | IPv4 | block | |
103[.]142[.]103[.]225 | IPv4 | block | |
176[.]97[.]117[.]157 | IPv4 | block | |
103[.]79[.]79[.]191 | IPv4 | block | |
103[.]79[.]79[.]120 | IPv4 | block | |
hxxp://154[.]81[.…server.ps1 | URL | block | |
hxxp://166[.]0[.]…server.ps1 | URL | block | |
hxxp://166[.]0[.]…anager.asp | URL | block | |
hxxp://204[.]194[…80/log.dll | URL | block | |
hxxp://204[.]194[…80/log.txt | URL | block | |
hxxp://204[.]194[…reinit.exe | URL | block | |
hxxp://204[.]194[…80/ASK.exe | URL | block | |
hxxp://204[.]194[…dajhsd.asp | URL | block | |
hxxp://108[.]165[…qlrun2.ps1 | URL | block | |
hxxp://103[.]79[.….]191/yuze | URL | block | |
54fb493822bcd832f…8ad3fdbd0a | SHA256 | block | |
9c866c403e6bd5778…7e30c0abf3 | SHA256 | block | |
e95a265bf220a4330…c14b6b26af | SHA256 | block | |
c21e4fb40f871e418…538b66fa01 | SHA256 | block | |
7265d69dd8d8939dc…a7b3383205 | SHA256 | block | |
3d79628bf7804dbf1…a20953438a | SHA256 | block | |
f042d705e1de3b5f9…9ab1c7cf51 | SHA256 | block | |
5db5e7f655c4ee944…c3cb25bf03 | SHA256 | block | |
f8b67854d119da08c…1f1c7dea68 | SHA256 | block | |
ef7c23619cf929300…3dc2eb1dce | SHA256 | block | |
b739635832c7f7f2b…b8c0cf6eea | SHA256 | block | |
0241f569f4ce1bf0f…b591f446bc | SHA256 | block | |
c9a5e9799f2844a71…be4d89423c | SHA256 | block | |
fad5dc8987df3206f…560562647e | SHA256 | block | |
2b7ed8dc34a834300…99a34dcf19 | SHA256 | block | |
7c8eb7d23337536ed…e6a3bd87c4 | SHA256 | block | |
8[.]219[.]82[.]21 | IPv4 | alert | |
43[.]208[.]224[.]101 | IPv4 | alert | |
hxxp://8[.]219[.]…ws-X64.exe | URL | alert | |
a6579b16f895cf9ac…1039881513 | SHA256 | alert | |
6500890307f386089…b65836d55e | SHA256 | alert | |
ba4038fd20e474c04…8d8d819436 | SHA256 | alert | |
deabe064a12641c4e…1dde2aa774 | SHA256 | alert | |
d92f20d73ade9a613…ce0f852104 | SHA256 | alert | |
bcccfca65602e2691…c900b31ad4 | SHA256 | alert | |
9b077fc464d9a4a2e…af0de93d19 | SHA256 | alert | |
59e51c54cf3ac4d37…29097b9eac | SHA256 | alert | |
330e9314bd3989898…d539dd0438 | SHA256 | alert | |
2be9c2222cb177747…6d320b8edf | SHA256 | alert | |
1df54c1c5ee76f2f8…b817a5e2f7 | SHA256 | alert | |
11b26168927a622dd…039068dd67 | SHA256 | alert | |
1f8565e14f8bcde3e…ac8725c17c | SHA256 | alert | |
d376e01930adabbe4…302e45aaf5 | SHA256 | alert | |
642ea33ddf7eba304…5dfa44d893 | SHA256 | alert | |
5ee783076e9c8b383…f7607f1d38 | SHA256 | alert | |
dac237636f2fb1e44…2ffe561793 | SHA256 | alert | |
76adf3141ccd877d9…260dd2faa3 | SHA256 | alert | |
5666332a66b1fb46b…cec6aa3207 | SHA256 | alert | |
2ffe8c6910d08072c…d294fe9b23 | SHA256 | alert | |
717319bc981c2b8f7…ec2d0c9b04 | SHA256 | alert | |
7e9b60d021067dfe2…55dca6779e | SHA256 | alert | |
9b7b2dadba43634e8…434c26a74a | SHA256 | alert | |
318ce2ca913ff8297…65d71e1407 | SHA256 | alert |
Sources Symantec Threat Hunter Team · Symantec Threat Hunter Team (2) · Gambit Security · ThreatFox · MalwareBazaar · Spamhaus
More detail
What to do
- Block the staging and C2 servers (204[.]194[.]49[.]129, 166[.]0[.]25[.]106, 154[.]81[.]37[.]136, 108[.]165[.]20[.]205, 155[.]254[.]22[.]215, 103[.]142[.]103[.]225, 176[.]97[.]117[.]157 and the Yuze hosts 103[.]79[.]79[.]191 and 103[.]79[.]79[.]120), the payload URLs and the malicious hashes, and search 90 days of proxy, firewall and EDR logs for them; alert on 8[.]219[.]82[.]21 and 43[.]208[.]224[.]101.
- Hunt for erl.exe from a SolarWinds Orion folder run with -setcookie and an rpc:call to os:cmd, and treat any hit as lateral movement.
- Alert on cmd.exe or PowerShell started by sqlservr.exe or w3wp.exe, and on bdreinit.exe, ask.exe or a w3wp.exe copy running from ProgramData.
- Hunt for certutil decoding into ProgramData followed by csc.exe, reg save of the SAM, SYSTEM or SECURITY hives, BreakChain launchers and scripts named i<number>_*.ps1.
- If Orion runs in your estate, restrict access to the RabbitMQ .erlang.cookie file and the Erlang distribution ports, rotate the cookie after any compromise, and disable xp_cmdshell where it is not needed.
- On a confirmed host, rotate SQL logins, domain and local administrator passwords, FTP, WinSCP, PuTTY and RDP saved credentials, and the Zabbix pre-shared key.
Behaviours to hunt 8
Behaviours are leads, not confirmed indicators, and can match legitimate activity. Compare any hit against your own baseline and environment before acting.
alert Orion erl.exe with a stolen Erlang cookie running os:cmd
Look forerl.exe from a SolarWinds Orion folder run with -setcookie and an -eval rpc:call to os:cmd, the command written as decimal character codes
Why it mattersThe attackers read the .erlang.cookie of the RabbitMQ broker that ships with Orion and used Orion's own erl.exe to run operating system commands on a second server about 10 minutes after first querying Orion. Encoding the command as character codes keeps it out of plain text. Legitimate RabbitMQ administration rarely passes os:cmd through rpc:call. Symantec Threat Hunter Team
Log sourceEDR process events (DeviceProcessEvents), Windows 4688 with command line
QueriesKQL · SPL · YARA-L
alert SQL or IIS shell then a ProgramData side-loading host within 60m
Look forcmd.exe or PowerShell started by sqlservr.exe or w3wp.exe, followed within 60 minutes on the same device by bdreinit.exe, ask.exe, a BreakChain launcher or a w3wp.exe copy running from ProgramData
Why it mattersEvery stage of this intrusion ran through the SQL Server service (xp_cmdshell) or the IIS worker process, and the attackers then launched side-loading hosts and BreakChain from ProgramData, also copying ask.exe to ProgramData\w3wp.exe. The pairing is a stronger lead than either event alone. Database maintenance jobs that shell out can match the first half; exclude known SQL Agent and deployment accounts. Symantec Threat Hunter Team
Log sourceDefender XDR DeviceProcessEvents (join on DeviceId within 60 minutes)
QueriesKQL
alert Shell spawned by sqlservr.exe or w3wp.exe
Look forcmd.exe or PowerShell spawned by sqlservr.exe or w3wp.exe
Why it mattersSymantec saw the first activity as cmd.exe directly under sqlservr.exe on three SQL servers, pointing to xp_cmdshell, and later as cmd.exe under w3wp.exe on a compromised web application. Both are rare on a healthy server. Symantec Threat Hunter Team
Log sourceEDR process events (DeviceProcessEvents), Windows 4688 with command line
QueriesKQL · SPL · YARA-L
alert bdreinit.exe or ask.exe side-loading from ProgramData
Look forbdreinit.exe or ask.exe (run with -gdata) loading log.dll or ask.dll from ProgramData, or w3wp.exe running outside the IIS inetsrv folder
Why it mattersThe attackers side-loaded log.dll through an old Bitdefender bdreinit.exe and ask.dll through a G DATA signed ask.exe, both from ProgramData, and copied ask.exe to a file named w3wp.exe to blend in. The bdreinit.exe and log.dll pairing is also used by other actors, so it is a lead rather than attribution. Symantec Threat Hunter Team
Log sourceEDR process and image-load events (DeviceProcessEvents, DeviceImageLoadEvents)
QueriesKQL · SPL · YARA-L
alert BreakChain launcher relaunching payloads
Look forA BreakChain launcher (breakchain*.exe) run with -m wmi or the shell mode to relaunch a payload
Why it mattersAfter repeated terminations the attackers used BreakChain so their payloads would no longer appear as children of w3wp.exe; a second build arrived about 75 minutes after the first was blocked. Symantec Threat Hunter Team
Log sourceEDR process events (DeviceProcessEvents)
QueriesKQL · SPL · YARA-L
alert certutil and csc.exe in ProgramData, or hive dumps
Look forcertutil decoding a file into ProgramData followed by csc.exe compiling it, and SAM, SYSTEM or SECURITY hives saved to disk
Why it mattersOn a SQL server the attackers appended about 20 base64 chunks to a file under ProgramData, decoded it with certutil and compiled EfsPotato with csc.exe, then saved the SAM, SYSTEM and SECURITY hives; the same hive dumps recurred on other servers. Developers and build agents use csc.exe, so scope the hunt to servers. Symantec Threat Hunter Team
Log sourceEDR process events (DeviceProcessEvents), Windows 4688 with command line
QueriesKQL · SPL · YARA-L
hunt Long labelled PowerShell scripts from a server process
Look forLong PowerShell scripts from a web or database service with labelled output banners such as ===FILES MENTIONING CONN STRINGS=== or ### whoami/priv ###
Why it mattersThe AI-assisted phase sent about 50 scripts in two hours, median over 500 characters, each bundling several probes under quoted banners and capping output. Banner formatting alone also appears in admin scripts, so pair it with a sqlservr.exe or w3wp.exe parent. Symantec Threat Hunter Team
Log sourceEDR process events (DeviceProcessEvents), PowerShell 4104 script block logging
QueriesKQL · SPL
hunt Numbered i<n>_*.ps1 spraying scripts
Look forPassword-spraying scripts named i<number>_<name>.ps1, such as i187_winspray.ps1
Why it mattersSeveral file names in this intrusion began with i and a number, which may be a per-target numbering scheme; the sprayer tested credential pairs downloaded from the later staging server. Symantec Threat Hunter Team
Log sourceEDR process and file events (DeviceProcessEvents, DeviceFileEvents)
QueriesKQL · SPL
Affected countries and sectors
- Targets
- United States, North America, East Africa, South Asia
- Sectors
- Retail, Securities and financial services, ICT providers to banks and telecoms, Energy
Background
Symantec's Threat Hunter Team describes a September 2026 intrusion at a U.S. retailer that stalled while the attackers typed commands by hand, then sped up once they switched to long, labelled, error-free PowerShell scripts that read like a language model's output relayed by an operator. Commands ran as cmd.exe under sqlservr.exe (xp_cmdshell) on SQL servers and under w3wp.exe on a web server. The attackers staged an old Bitdefender bdreinit.exe with log.dll and log.txt, and a G DATA signed ask.exe with ask.dll, from 204[.]194[.]49[.]129:8080, used a BreakChain launcher to move payloads out from under w3wp.exe, dropped the AES-encrypted server.ps1 reverse shell to 166[.]0[.]25[.]106:443 and two ASP web shells, and built EfsPotato with certutil and csc.exe to dump the SAM, SYSTEM and SECURITY hives. About 10 minutes after first querying SolarWinds Orion they read the .erlang.cookie of Orion's bundled RabbitMQ and ran Orion's erl.exe with that cookie to execute commands on a second server, with each command encoded as decimal character codes. They then hunted NTDS.dit, Group Policy cpassword and LAPS passwords, sprayed passwords with i<number>_winspray.ps1 scripts and tunnelled with Chisel and Yuze. Symantec links the loaders and staging server to an August 2026 intrusion and a July 2026 intrusion at a securities firm, and 155[.]254[.]22[.]215, which the attackers tested egress to, matches the AI console Gambit Security tied to an operator stealing card data from online retailers. Attacker servers, payload URLs and malicious tool hashes are on the block list.
Downloads
MITRE ATT&CK17
- T1505.003Web Shell
- T1059.001PowerShell
- T1059.003Windows Command Shell
- T1574.002DLL Side-Loading
- T1036.005Match Legitimate Name or Location
- T1068Exploitation for Privilege Escalation
- T1027.004Compile After Delivery
- T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information
- T1003.002Security Account Manager
- T1003.004LSA Secrets
- T1003.003NTDS
- T1552.001Credentials In Files
- T1552.006Group Policy Preferences
- T1021Remote Services
- T1110.003Password Spraying
- T1090.001Internal Proxy
- T1572Protocol Tunneling